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Preface
T h is  s tu d y  was u n d e r t a k e n  i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  a Colombo P la n  
S c h o l a r s h i p  w hich b r o u g h t  me t o  A u s t r a l i a  i n  O c to b e r  1972. I was 
f i r s t  a t t a c h e d  to  t h e  D epa r tm en t  o f  P o l i t i c a l  S c ie n c e  i n  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  
o f  T asm an ia ,  where I  s t u d i e d  p u b l i c  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  
t h e  m a c h in e ry  o f  g overnm en t  i n  p r e p a r a t i o n  f o r  t h e  q u a l i f y i n g  e x a m in a t io n  
f o r  t h e  M a s te r  o f  A r t s  d e g r e e .  I n  t h e  c o u rs e  o f  t h i s  s tu d y  I  became 
c o n s c io u s  o f  t h e  im p o r t a n t  p l a c e  t h a t  t h e  p u b l i c  c o r p o r a t i o n  was t a k i n g  
i n  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  sy s te m  and i n  t h e  econom ic  d e v e lo p m en t  o f  my own 
c o u n t r y ,  S r i  Lanka. E n th u s e d  by t h e  scope  t h i s  s u b j e c t  o f f e r e d  f o r  
r e s e a r c h  and  e n c o u ra g e d  by my s tu d y  s u p e r v i s o r s ,  R .J .K .  Chapman and  
B ruce  D a v is ,  I  c h o se  ' P u b l i c  C o r p o r a t i o n s  i n  C e y lo n ' a s  t h e  t o p i c  f o r  
my M a s t e r ' s  d e g re e  d i s s e r t a t i o n ,  w i th  s p e c i a l  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n s  
i n  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  f i e l d .  A f t e r  p a s s i n g  t h e  q u a l i f y i n g  e x a m in a t io n  I  
t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  N a t i o n a l  U n i v e r s i t y ,  h a v in g  d i s c o v e r e d  
t h a t  s u i t a b l e  s o u rc e  m a t e r i a l s  f o r  t h i s  t h e s i s  w ere  u n o b t a i n a b le  i n  
T asm an ia ,  w h i l e  t h e  N a t i o n a l  L i b r a r y  o f  A u s t r a l i a  h e l d  a f i n e  c o l l e c t i o n  
o f  S r i  Lanka o f f i c i a l  docum ents  i n  t h e  form o f  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  d e b a t e s ,  
p u b l i c  a c c o u n t s  com m ittee  r e p o r t s  and  s e s s i o n a l  p a p e r s ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  
a v a r i e t y  o f  S r i  Lanka n e w sp a p e rs  d a t i n g  from 1956. S e c o n d a ry  l i t e r a t u r e  
i n  E n g l i s h  on t h e  t h e o r y  and  p r a c t i c e  o f  p u b l i c  c o r p o r a t i o n s  was a l s o  
a c c e s s i b l e  in  C a n b e r ra .
N e v e r t h e l e s s  t h e  m a t e r i a l  I had  t o  work w i th  was d e f i c i e n t  i n  
a number o f  r e s p e c t s ,  an d  c a u s e d  c o n s i d e r a b l e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  t h e  
p r e p a r a t i o n  o f  t h i s  t h e s i s .  I t  h a s  had  t o  be  a p i o n e e r i n g  s tu d y  i n  i t s
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field, since I found hardly any secondary sources dealing with the 
politico-administrative aspects of public corporations in Sri Lanka, 
in contrast with the considerable number of studies of economic 
aspects of Sri Lanka corporations and of administrative aspects of 
corporations in other countries of the third world. Further, the 
material available in the official documents was incomplete and often 
scrappy: for example, there are no complete published lists of Sri
Lanka public corporations as a whole, so that the elementary information 
in appendices 1-3 had to be compiled from innumerable scattered 
references and is there assembled, I believe, for the first time. It 
was impossible for me to return to Sri Lanka during the tenure of my 
scholarship so that I had to obtain additional documentation, where 
possible, through friends there, and I was not able to supplement the 
documentary sources by interviews with officials or politicians, with 
the exception of one board chairman who happened to visit Australia 
during the period.
Hence the structure of the thesis, the treatment of its subject 
matter and its selection of main themes must reflect some distortions 
and gaps in the range of original source materials available to me.
I was encouraged, nevertheless, to persevere with this subject because 
I believe a better understanding of it is vital to the future development 
of my country, and because it has been almost completely neglected there. 
In addition my inquiries led me to believe that had I been working in 
Sri Lanka it would have been almost as difficult to obtain the additional
documentation wanted (since internal departmental circulars and reports
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are rarely released to research workers), and not at all easy to 
secure informative interviews with the most relevant people. At the 
same time I was reassured to some extent on learning from the board 
member I did interview that the picture of his own organisation I 
had assembled from documentary sources was not distorted.
For the reasons mentioned and also because of the nature of the 
inquiry I depended heavily on parliamentary debates, public accounts 
committee reports, administrative reports and circulars, commission 
inquiries and other printed government documents. Many of the Ceylonese 
newspapers such as The Ceylon Daily News and The Ceylon Observer also 
provided me with valuable information on a wide range of issues in 
corporate administration in general. These, in addition to the general 
books and articles which provided much valuable insight and under­
standing of the corporate system, form the major part of the bibliography 
arranged according to alphabetical order of author or source. All details 
of the sources of material used in the text are given in the bibliography, 
together with selected items found relevant to this work but not 
specifically cited in the text.
Before concluding, I wish to express my appreciation and thanks 
to my supervisor, Professor R.S. Parker, who gave generously of his 
knowledge and time in assisting me to prepare this thesis. It was a 
rare privilege and pleasure indeed to work with someone who is in every 
respect a superior, a teacher and above all kind and understanding.
VI am thankful to Mr David Adams for his helpful comments and 
suggestions as my supervisor in a later stage of this study and to 
Messrs R.J.K. Chapman and Bruce Davis for their initial advice and 
encouragement. My grateful acknowledgements are also due to the 
government of Australia for providing me with a Colombo Plan 
Scholarship for the tenure of this study and to the staff of the 
National Library of Australia for their kind and courteous attention 
John Pflugradt and Jim rendered timely assistance with proof reading 
Needless to say, I alone remain responsible for the flaws, v/hether
factual or interpretative, which exist in this work.
I THE AIMS OF THE STUDY
The main purpose of this study is to examine the corporate form 
as it exists in Sri Lanka and to analyse the conditions and problems 
under which it has been operating. It is therefore an attempt to 
relate the theory of public corporations to the actual functioning of 
corporations in a developing country.
The public corporation has now become a major feature of every 
administrative system of modem government. Almost every country in 
the world irrespective of its ruling political philosophy or form of 
government organises and operates a wide variety of public functions 
through the institution of the public corporation. Some corporations 
(Chester 1953: 46) are concerned with administrative matters, being 
entrusted with functions of a regulatory or supervisory nature. The 
Ceylon Coconut Board and Water Resources Board and the Australian 
Broadcasting Control Board and Film Censorship Board are corporations 
of this kind created to provide assistance or promote and regulate 
standards in the activity specified for the board's control and 
supervision.
The public corporation is also employed to organise some of the 
social service or welfare functions of the government. Professor 
Friedmann mentions the National Assistance Board and the Regional Hospital 
Board as examples of this type of corporation in Britain (Friedmann 1954: 
167; see also Gamer 1970: 6). The corporate form is also evident in such 
areas as culture, recreation, and academic research. The familiar Arts
2Council, Universities and CISIR are clear Sri Lankan examples of 
this category of corporations. An essential characteristic of these 
types of corporations is that they are often dependent on government 
for financial support given in the form of 'grant-in-aid' or 'donations' 
and operate close to the administrative ministry charged with their 
affairs. Consequently major changes and shifts in policies of the 
government tend to affect the work of these groups of corporations 
more directly than in the case of other categories of corporations 
which will be referred to later. The major difference between them 
and the Department is that they are exempt from the rigid accounting 
methods the departments are normally subject to and from other 
restrictions, formalities and rules that hedge and hamper the work of 
a department. Corporate form is employed in the case of these 
activities in order to grant a certain degree of procedural autonomy 
so as to allow them to maintain separate accounts from that of the 
government and utilise funds allocated in the most flexible manner as 
decided by the corporate management. The institution of corporate 
form is believed to facilitate better than orthodox public service 
recruitment methods the drawing together of the technical, professional 
and managerial personnel most suited to the activity in question. In 
the case of cultural activity or academic research the advantage of 
corporate form has been to permit the greatest intellectual independence 
to bodies nevertheless financed from public funds.
However the rise to prominence of the corporate form as an 
instrument of public administration is most importantly to be seen in
3t h e  s p h e re  o f  g o v e rn m e n ta l  i n d u s t r i a l  and co m m erc ia l  a c t i v i t i e s .  I t  
i s  h e r e  t h a t  th e  c o r p o r a t i o n  a s s e r t e d  i t s e l f  a s  an i n d i s p e n s a b l e  
p a r t  o f  th e  g o v e rn m e n ta l  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  m a c h in e ry .  W ith t h e  e n t r y  
o f  more and more g o ve rnm en ts  i n t o  t h e  s p h e r e s  o f  t r a d e ,  commerce and  
i n d u s t r i a l  p r o d u c t i o n  -  a f i e l d  once  c o n s i d e r e d  o u t s i d e  t h e  scope  o f  
g o v e rn m e n ta l  a c t i v i t y  -  i n d u s t r i a l ,  com m erc ia l  and  t r a d i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n s  
h av e  lo n g  been  f e a t u r e s  o f  e v e ry  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s y s te m .  P r o f e s s o r  
Robson c a l l s  t h i s  c a t e g o r y  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  and co m m erc ia l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  
t h e  'New P u b l i c  C o r p o r a t i o n s '  (Robson 1960: 47) b e c a u s e  o f  t h e i r  
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  f e a t u r e s  and  a l s o  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e i r  o p e r a t i o n a l  c h a r a c t e r ­
i s t i c s .  U n l ik e  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n s  w i th  s u p e r v i s o r y  and  r e g u l a t o r y  pow ers  
and  o t h e r  m a n a g e r ia l  b o d i e s  w i t h  s o c i a l  s e r v i c e  f u n c t i o n s ,  t h e  i n d u s ­
t r i a l  and com m erc ia l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  o p e r a t e  a s  b u s i n e s s  e n t e r p r i s e s  
d e r i v i n g  m ost o f  t h e i r  incom e from t h e  s a l e  o f  goods and  s e r v i c e s ;  t h e y  
e n jo y  g r e a t e r  l a t i t u d e  and  o p e r a t e  a c c o r d in g  to  com m erc ia l  o r  b u s i n e s s  
p r i n c i p l e s .  They have  v a r y i n g  d e g r e e s  o f  w h a t  m ig h t  be  c a l l e d  ' p o l i c y  
i n d e p e n d e n c e '  t o  t a k e  m a jo r  d e c i s i o n s  a s  r e g a r d s  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  and  
o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  e n t e r p r i s e s .  I n  t h e  w ords o f  P r e s i d e n t  R o o s e v e l t ,  
t h e s e  a r e  c o r p o r a t i o n s  t h a t  o p e r a t e  w i t h  g o v e rn m e n ta l  pow er b u t  p o s s e s s  
much o f  t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  and f l e x i b i l i t y  o f  p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e .
Most c o r p o r a t i o n s  t h a t  a p p e a r  i n  a  d e v e lo p in g  c o u n t r y  a r e  
c o r p o r a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  ty p e  p r i m a r i l y  c o n c e rn e d  w i th  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  
i n d u s t r y ,  commerce, and  t r a d e  (Hanson 1961: 619 ; T e r i b a  1967: 39;
U d o j i  1970: 2 1 7 ) .  C o r p o r a t i o n s  a l s o  u n d e r t a k e  t h e  management o f  o t h e r  
e n t e r p r i s e s  -  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e  and  p u b l i c  u t i l i t i e s  r e q u i r e d  i n  t h e
4i n t e r e s t  o f  n a t i o n a l  d e v e lo p m e n t .  Even a c u r s o r y  lo o k  a t  a d e v e lo p in g  
c o u n t r y  w i l l  show th e  e x t e n t  o f  t h e i r  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  and t h e  r a p i d i t y  
w i t h  w hich  th e y  have  grown (Hanson 1955: La P o r t e  1967: 3 2 0 ) .
C o r p o r a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  k in d  t e n d  t o  m u l t i p l y  more r a p i d l y  t h a n  i n  t h e  
w e s t  b e c a u s e  t h e  d e v e lo p m en t  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  s e c t o r  i n  t h e s e  n a t i o n s ,  
i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  p r i v a t e  i n v e s t m e n t  c a p i t a l ,  t e c h n i c a l  know-how and  
m a n a g e r i a l  s k i l l ,  i s  f a r  more v i t a l  an d  c r u c i a l  t o  t h e  g row th  and 
p r o s p e r i t y  o f  t h e s e  n a t i o n s .  The g o v e rn m e n ts  i n  d e v e lo p in g  c o u n t r i e s  
a r e  f o r c e d  t o  assume th e  p o s i t i o n  o f  an e n t r e p r e n e u r  i n  b r i n g i n g  
a b o u t  t h e  r e q u i r e d  g row th  and  d e v e lo p m en t  o f  t h e i r  econom ies  (Hanson 
1966 : 1 1 6 ) .
Sri Lanka's Experience
S r i  L a n k a 's  q u a r t e r  o f  a  c e n t u r y ' s  e x p e r i e n c e  w i th  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  
form  s i n c e  in d e p e n d e n c e  i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  c o r p o r a t i o n s  
i n  a d e v e lo p in g  c o u n t r y  (K earney  1966: 530 ; La P o r t e  1970: 1 5 9 ) .
H av ing  a t t a i n e d  in d e p e n d e n c e  i n  1948 , S r i  Lanka f a c e d  an u r g e n t  n e e d  
f o r  econom ic  d e v e lo p m e n t .  I n i t i a l l y  o n ly  one o f  many o b j e c t s  o f  
c o n c e r n ,  d e v e lo p m en t  became an i s s u e  o f  f a r - r e a c h i n g  im p o r ta n c e  a s  y e a r s  
w en t b y .  S r i  L a n k a 's  s i x - y e a r  programme o f  i n v e s t m e n t  fo l lo w e d  by t h e  
t e n  and f i v e  y e a r  p l a n s  a r e  c l e a r  e v id e n c e  o f  t h i s  o v e r r i d i n g  e m p h a s is  
upon d e v e lo p m e n t .  H er p o p u l a t i o n  grew  a t  a r a p i d  r a t e ,  w h i l e  t h e  
economy som etim es  re m a in e d  s t a g n a n t  and  som etim es  f e l l  f a r  be low  t h e  
r e q u i r e d  g row th  r a t e .  M ass iv e  unem ploym ent, u n f a v o u r a b le  t r a d e  b a l a n c e s ,  
f a l l i n g  exchange  r e s e r v e s  c o u p le d  w i t h  p o o r  l i v i n g  s t a n d a r d s  r a i s e d  
a f r e s h  th e  q u e s t i o n  o f  econom ic  d e v e lo p m e n t  and made i n e v i t a b l e  t h e
5entry of the state into the arena of economic management and resource 
allocation (Oliver 1962: 202-237; Corea 1965: 29-65). Planning, 
developing and coordinating the entire process of economic development 
became the primary responsibility of the state.
This reorientation of the state's role from that of 'provider of 
peace, order and good government' to that of planner, developer and co­
ordinator of economic development has been the significant feature of 
the post-independence era of politics and administration in Sri Lanka.
A direct consequence of this role has been the growth and development 
of corporate bodies in great number and variety. The necessity to 
create an industrial base to diversify the somewhat lopsided colonial 
economy, as explained in the six-year programme of investment followed 
by the ten and five year plans, led to the emergence of twenty-eight 
state industrial corporations. These were corporations to undertake the 
production of cement, steel, tyres, ceramics, sale, hardware, textiles 
and sugar for domestic consumption. In addition, corporations for 
Industrial Development, Development Finance and Industrial Credit were 
created to lend support to the willing entrepreneur in the country. In 
the sphere of agricultural development the Gal Oya and Mahaweli Develop­
ment Boards were instituted in order to develop river basins and help 
settle landless peasants in suitable areas. The People's Bank and 
Agricultural Credit Corporation were established to enlarge the supply of 
farm credit. These were some of the many corporations charged with 
developmental functions. In short, of the one hundred corporate
6bodies that appeared since independence more than sixty had functions 
relating to the development of industry, commerce and utilities (see 
Appendix 1).
This study is primarily concerned with this category of economic 
corporations in Sri Lanka, particularly those created to establish and 
manage industrial enterprises.
Apart from the economic importance of these corporations there was
another reason for selecting them for this study. For any meaningful
discussion of the problems and issues of public corporations, attention
must be directed to a set of corporations with similar objectives and
functions. This point was well emphasised by Professor L.C. Webb:
The correct approach to the problems of statutory corporations 
as agencies of government is, I suggest, not to regard them 
as one category to which certain conventions or principles 
are applicable but to classify them according to their 
functions and, in the light of these functions, to deal with 
such issues as accountability and control from the centre.
It is obvious, for instance, that controls appropriate to 
regulatory boards will not be appropriate to marketing 
boards or to corporations which manage industrial enter­
prises. (Webb 1955: 152).
With this in mind the following group of corporations has been 
chosen for the purpose of this study:
(1) Ceylon Mineral Sands Corporation
(2) National Salt Corporation
(3) Sri Lanka Sugar Corporation
(4) National Textile Corporation
(5) Eastern Paper Mills Corporation
(6) Ceylon Ceramics Corporation
(7) Ceylon Oils and Fats Corporation
(8) Ceylon Cement Corporation
(9) Ceylon Plywoods Corporation
(10) Paranthan Chemicals Corporation
(11) Ceylon Leather Products Corporation
(12) National Small Industries Corporation
(13) Ceylon Hardboard Board
(14) Industrial Estates Corporation
(15) Ceylon Steel Corporation
(16) Ceylon Tyre Corporation
(17) State Engineering Corporation
(18) Ceylon Hardware Corporation
(19) Ceylon Fisheries Corporation
(20) State Fertilizer Corporation
(21) Ceylon State Flour Milling Corporation
(22) Ceylon State Fertilizer Manufacturing Corporation
(23) State Ayurvedic Drugs Corporation
(24) State Graphite Corporation
(25) State Pharmaceuticals Corporation
(26) Ceylon Fisheries Harbour Board
(27) Sri Lanka Tobacco Industries Corporation
(28) State Distilleries Corporation
8Some of the similarities and dissimilarities among these corporations 
should be noted. Firstly, they vary both as to size and the time of 
their creation. Many have been in existence for well over twenty years 
whereas others are relatively new ventures. Cement, Ceramics, Paper 
Mills, Textile, Leather Products, Oils and Fats, Chemicals, Mineral 
Sands and Plywood have been operating to capacity for some time, either 
realising profit or breaking even, whereas corporations like State 
Fertilizer, Pharmaceuticals and Ayurvedic Drugs have not as yet started 
production even though some of them have been in existence for well over 
five years. Even in regard to the size measured in terms of capital 
and labour involved in their working the corporations vary markedly.
In spite of these differences in scale and stage of operation, 
these corporations share certain common characteristics. Firstly, they 
are productive enterprises marketing some measurable commodity or service 
and therefore subject to similar experiences and problems regarding 
organisation and operation. Secondly, since their inception most of 
them have been functioning under the same administrative ministry, 
namely the Ministry of Industries, and as a result have tended to establish 
certain patterns of relationship with government. Thirdly, all of these 
corporations have been incorporated and operated within the power and 
authority defined in the State Industrial Corporations Act No. 49
of 1957.
9Nature of the Study
B ro a d ly  two d i f f e r e n t  a p p ro a c h e s  a r e  p o s s i b l e  i n  s tu d y i n g  t h i s  
g ro u p  o f  c o r p o r a t i o n s .  They can be s t u d i e d  f o r  i n s t a n c e  f o r  t h e  way 
t h e y  a r e  i n t e r n a l l y  o r g a n i s e d  and o p e r a t e d  t o  a c h ie v e  th e  p u r p o s e s  
f o r  w hich  th e y  have  been  s e t  up . The fo c u s  o f  a t t e n t i o n  w ould  t h e n  be 
on t h e  i n t e r n a l  p r o c e s s  o f  management and  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and  t h e  n a t u r e  
o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw e en  p a r t s  o f  e a c h  e n t e r p r i s e  e . g . ,  b e tw een  
management and  l a b o u r ,  management and c l i e n t e l e  e t c .
T h i s  s tu d y  i s  n o t  c o n c e rn e d  w i th  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  w o rk in g  
o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n s  e x c e p t  i n  so  f a r  a s  i t  i s  r e l e v a n t  t o  o t h e r  a r e a s  
o f  s t u d y .  What i t  i s  c o n c e rn e d  w i th  how ever  i s  t h e i r  e x t e r n a l  r e l a t i o n ­
s h i p s ;  t h e  way th e y  a r e  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  c e n t r a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  t h e  
s o u r c e s  o f  t h e i r  f i n a n c e  and p e r s o n n e l  and  means and  m ethods  o f  
m i n i s t e r i a l  and p a r l i a m e n t a r y  c o n t r o l  e x e r c i s e d  o v e r  them . These  a s p e c t s  
o f  t h e  w o rk in g  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  (Coombes 1971: 1 6 ) ,  I  b e l i e v e ,  a r e  
e v en  more im p o r t a n t  b e c a u s e  w ha t  t e n d s  t o  p a s s  w i t h i n  t h e  m a n a g e r i a l  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  p u b l i c  u n d e r t a k i n g s  c o u ld  l a r g e l y  be  c o n d i t i o n e d  by  them .
As a l r e a d y  i n d i c a t e d  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  i n t r o d u c i n g  th e  c o r p o r a t e  form  
f o r  a g e n c i e s  in v o lv e d  i n  t h e  management o f  e n t e r p r i s e s  i s  t o  b r i n g  
a b o u t  a d i f f e r e n t  p a t t e r n  o f  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw e e n  th e  e n t e r p r i s e s  and 
gove rnm en t  from t h a t  e x i s t i n g  b e tw een  gove rnm en t  and  D e p a r tm e n ts .  T h i s  
i s  n o r m a l ly  a c h ie v e d  by e x e m p tin g  t h e  p u b l i c  u n d e r t a k i n g s  from  t h e  r u l e s  
an d  r e g u l a t i o n s  commonly a p p l i c a b l e  t o  t h e  o t h e r  o r g a n s  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
and  by l e g a l l y  d e f i n i n g  t h e i r  scope  and  f u n c t i o n s .  The o f t - q u o t e d
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Statement by Professor Robson that 'the original impetus to the movement 
for public corporations came from the two-fold desire to secure freedom 
from parliamentary supervision over management on the one hand and 
treasury control over personnel and finance on the other' (Robson 1960:
59) also serves to emphasise the same point.
The extent of such freedom however is determined partly by the 
constitutional provisions embodied in the statutes which create 
corporations and partly by the socio-political and economic environment 
in which they operate. It is one of the basic assumptions of this study 
that even where a corporation has the necessary constitutional character­
istics required to operate independently, social, economic and political 
factors play an important part in determining the precise scope and 
nature of that freedom in practice.
For corporations develop variously in different countries and 
acquire importance and functions according to the conditions prevalent 
in each country. For some countries the corporate form represents an 
administrative means to bring already established and operating enter­
prises under state control without endangering the business flexibility 
and initiative required in running them. For others such as developing 
countries they are primarily economic instruments to pioneer ventures 
in areas which private enterprise is hesitant to enter. Because of 
the way corporations develop they differ in their patterns of organisation 
and operation and in the way they relate to the broader fabric of
government.
11
U sin g  th e  t h e o r i e s  and c o n c e p t u a l i s a t i o n s  o f  o t h e r s  and w eav ing  
t h e  t h e o r y  w i th  p r im a ry  s o u r c e  d a t a  t h i s  d i s s e r t a t i o n  w i l l  a t t e m p t  t o  
i d e n t i f y  f e a t u r e s  and  p ro b le m s  t h a t  a r e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  c o r p o r a t e  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  S r i  Lanka.
Organisation of the Study
T h is  s tu d y  i s  a c c o r d i n g l y  d i v i d e d  i n t o  s e v e n  c h a p t e r s .
C h a p te r  I I  d e a l s  w i th  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  and  th e  
d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  c o r p o r a t e  form  i n  S r i  Lanka . Even th o u g h  g overnm en t  
e n t e r p r i s e s  and  s t a t e  c o r p o r a t i o n s  a r e  a common f e a t u r e  t o d a y ,  t h e i r  
d e v e lo p m e n t ,  im p o r ta n c e  and  f u n c t i o n s  a r e  n o t  i d e n t i c a l .  An a t t e m p t  
i s  made i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  t o  s tu d y  t h e  way t h e  s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  d e v e lo p e d  
a n d  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  t h e i r  i n c o r p o r a t i o n .
C h a p te r  I I I  p r o v i d e s  an  a c c o u n t  o f  some o f  t h e  m a jo r  i n d u s t r i a l  
c o r p o r a t i o n s  chosen  f o r  t h i s  s tu d y  w i t h  a v iew  to  e x p o s in g  t h e i r  
f u n c t i o n a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and  o t h e r  f e a t u r e s  o f  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s .
C h a p te r  IV t a k e s  up t h e  theme o f  c o n t r o l ,  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  and  
s u p e r v i s i o n  e x e r c i s e d  by t h e  c e n t r a l  o r g a n s  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  In  
p a r t i c u l a r  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i th  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  M i n i s t r y ,  
T r e a s u r y  and  t h e  M i n i s t r y  o f  Economic P l a n n in g  i s  a n a ly s e d  i n  o r d e r  t o  
e v a l u a t e  t h e  d e g re e  o f  l a t i t u d e  g iv e n  t o  e n t e r p r i s e s  i n  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g .
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Chapter V is devoted to corporate boards to identify issues and 
problems connected with tenure, size, composition and types.
Chapter VI reviews the nature and extent of parliamentary control 
exercised over industrial corporations.
Chapter VII discusses the suitability of organising the enterprise 
under a single structure such as the sector board and development 
corporation. Since the sector board now seems a likely set up to 
replace the present arrangement of industrial corporations, an attempt 
is made to study the early proposals made in this regard, and the
advantage of recently proposed sector board.
II STATE ENTERPRISE AND THE ADOPTION OF CORPORATE FORM
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This chapter seeks to explain the early state interest in the 
development of industrial enterprises and the circumstances that led 
to the choice of the corporate form.
As in other developing countries, the growth of the public 
corporation in Sri Lanka is a recent development in consequence of the 
entrepreneurial functions that governments have been compelled to 
assume in the interest of the economy. This is clear in the number and 
variety of corporations that appear particularly in the sphere of 
economic production and promotion. Before independence public corporations 
were few and so were state enterprises. Even those enterprises established, 
particularly the industrial ones, were experimental in nature, mainly 
to foster interest and create an awareness of the industrial potential 
of the nation among would-be investors. Consequently whatever enter­
prises appeared had been organised and managed within the ministerial 
departments. Corporations did not assume much importance until the end 
of the Second World War when state policy became one of direct participation 
in the promotion and development of industries. To understand the nature 
and the development of state enterprises in Sri Lanka which had been a 
colony since 1802, a knowledge of its political development is essential.
Pre-Independent State and Enterprise
Sri Lanka passed through four phases of political control: British
absolutism, limited self-government, semi-autonomy and independence 
(Weerawardena 1956: ch. VI). The development of government services
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fairly corresponded to these phases of political status with no state 
enterprises in the first period, few at the time of semi-autonomy and 
a rapid growth since independence. Since it is difficult to recapture 
in detail every turn and twist of this pattern of development only the 
salient features are noted.
British Absolutism covers a long period in the colonial history 
of the country extending up to 1912, when governors had absolute 
authority over the administration of its affairs subject to the over­
riding powers of the Secretary of State for Colonies in Britain (Wilson 
1962 : 200). It was a period in which there was no independent authority 
within the country to challenge that of the governors and their officials 
When the legislative council was added to the executive council in 1833, 
it had no independent authority in spite of the formal law-making powers 
it shared with the governor. For presided over by the governor it was 
dominated by the majority of colonial officials. This was a typical 
colonial administration established and maintained more or less to 
preserve the imperial interest.
Since the main objective of the early years of British absolutism 
was to establish and consolidate colonial authority in Sri Lanka, the 
major government services to appear were those relating to that goal. 
Collection of revenue, maintenance of law and order, creation of 
communications, provision of provincial administration were foremost 
amongst them (Collins 1951: ch. II, III). The nucleus of a colonial
bureaucracy that emerged at this time - comprising the chief secretary
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surveyor-general and colonial engineers - provided the essential 
requirements of this order, while departments such as Public Works, 
Irrigation, and Surveyor-General undertook the technical services 
necessary to colonise the country (Collins 1966: ch. 7). Because of the 
limited revenue derived mainly from taxes on land and property and the 
governmental monopoly in the cinnamon trade, plumbago and other products, 
and also because of the policy of the time that a colony must pay for its 
services, governmental activity did not extend much beyond law keeping 
and regulatory services.
Circumstances changed however with the development of natural 
resources in the latter half of the nineteenth century, particularly 
with the establishment of plantation industries in Sri Lanka first in 
coffee, then in tea and rubber which brought 'unexampled prosperity' to 
the nation (Ludowyke 1962: 202). Trade and commerce flourished; so did 
the governmental revenue by way of taxes, customs duties etc. Because 
of the open door policy and other concessions and incentives guaranteed 
by the colonial government in the form of exemption from customs duties 
and lowered land prices, large-scale investment capital entered the 
island in pursuit of profit in the plantation industry. About two hundred 
companies became established in Britain alone for the purpose of growing 
tea and rubber in Sri Lanka each paying a dividend of ten per cent.
The general economic prosperity that resulted was accompanied by an 
expansion in governmental services. While the early departments grew 
in size to cope with the new demands, new services began to appear
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particularly in the sphere of social welfare such as Health and 
Education (Collins 1951: ch. VIII, IX; Symmonds 1966: ch. V). Since 
most of the governmental revenue came from the plantation industry, it 
became the policy of the government to spend a proportionate amount on 
public works and other aspects of the industry's infra-structure 
(Snodgrass 1966: 31). The chief elements in this were the construction 
of railways and roads, the provision of electric power and the develop­
ment of the port of Colombo as the major seaport of the island. At the 
height of this period of building in 1871, public works, mainly for the 
plantation industry, absorbed 26 per cent of the government budget 
(Snodgrass 1966: 62).
Apart from arguing that the greater part of the revenue came from 
plantation enterprise, the European business community used the political 
powers they gained in this period to secure heavy spending on services 
for the industry. Success came in 1840 when the legislative council 
gained power to influence governmental expenditure (Weerawardena 1951: 3).
Thus up to 1923, when the Sri Lanka members constituted for the first 
time the majority in council, the policy of the government and the develop­
ment of the government services were mainly those required to maintain 
the imperialistic interest in the country. Either they were regulatory 
law-keeping services or infra-structure or public utility services mainly 
to serve the plantation sector.
An important aspect of this development of government services up 
to this period was the absence of any initiative or encouragement given
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to the development of industries (Kanesalingham 1970: 62). Partly 
because of its laissez-faire attitude and partly because of its 
unwillingness to undertake anything that might become a financial 
embarrassment, the colonial government took no interest. Consequently 
there was hardly any industrial activity; whatever existed was small and 
catered to the requirements of the plantation sector. The official view 
of the position was that the country had neither the raw materials nor 
the potentials necessary for industrial development. 'By reason of its 
natural resources Ceylon is destined to be an agricultural country'
(SP 1 1922: 9) so it was argued; in developing her agricultural 
potential she should buy her other requirements from outside. This 
theory of economic development, though it served the imperial interest 
well, proved restricting and stifling for the industrial development of 
the country.
Even the industries commission appointed in 1916 - the first formal 
attempt to investigate the possibility - concluded that Ceylon had no 
potential. 'Ceylon is not belssed with mineral wealth and is absolutely 
deficient in coal and iron' observed the commission and concluded by 
saying:
We have found it difficult in some cases and impossible 
in others to say whether certain industries though eminently 
suitable to Ceylon could be established as profitable ventures 
(SP 1 1922: 8).
Because of this pessimism the commission did not foresee any possibility 
of industrial development through state participation and promotion.
'It is not the function of the government' it said, 'to engage in
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commercial enterprises' (SP 1 1922: 15). Consequently no major 
functions were assigned except to recommend the establishment of a 
hydro-electric scheme to provide cheap power and the setting up of a 
'Central Bureau of Industry and Commerce' to foster experimental 
industries and render advice to private enterprise.
The commission's report which was made public in 1922 may well be 
regarded as the earliest statement of industrial policy in Sri Lanka; 
it saw no hope of industrial development either through state or through 
private investment.
The situation did not change in the period that ensued between 1923 
and 1931 when Sri Lankans, as unofficial members in the legislative 
council, had an absolute majority. Lacking in responsibility the most 
these council members could do was to demand a greater government 
participation, particularly in assisting local entrepreneurs with capital 
funds and technical know-how, the lack of which they considered major 
obstacles to industrial growth. Apart from such demands and other 
opposition to colonial policy the council was unable to do anything. For 
in spite of their majority in council, Sri Lankan members had no rights 
associated with the initiation and execution of policies which were 
still in the hands of the colonial authority.
It was not until 1931 when Sri Lankans gained a certain measure of 
internal self-government to initiate and develop policies of their own 
that the state professed any interest in the development of industrial
enterprises in Sri Lanka.
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Towards State-Run Industries
The year 1931 constitutes an important landmark in this respect.
The observations that the state council era 1931-48 was the seed time of 
the new nation and that many of the most significant nation building 
activities were initiated in this period (Ceylon Yearbook 1950) are 
especially true in respect of state activities connected with industrial 
development. For it was in this period that industrial development became 
for the first time a specific subject of administration under the direction 
of an elected minister (SP 15 1946: 7; Quarter Century 1956: 128).
The initial form of state interest however was not one of direct 
participation but merely of shov/ing to private investors avenues of 
industrial opportunity and to provide them with technical and financial 
assistance for industrial ventures. 'The policy of the government was 
not to nationalise industries but to bring the possibilities of 
industrial development to the notice of the public (SP 15 1946: 8) .
No separate department of industries existed and the work involved in 
the creation of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Labour was assigned 
to a division in the Registrar General's Department called 'Bureau of 
Commercial Intelligence'. The first few years of the ministry were spent 
on exploratory surveys and construction of model factories.
It was at this time that the Report of the Banking Commission 
appeared and altered the course of industrial development. Appointed in 
1931 under the chairmanship of Pockhanawela specifically to study the 
existing banking facilities, the Commission in its report, released in 1934,
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came out strongly in favour of state directed industrial development.
Attributing the country's weakness in this respect to the indifference
of the early governments, and the reluctance of private capital, the
commission emphasised that the country could no longer afford to depend
solely on income from primary products. It pointed out:
The first world war revealed an inherent weakness of the 
economic structure of a country whose natural prosperity 
depended on the welfare of the staple industries catering 
entirely for an export market. At the same time a public 
buoyed by the acquisition of a measure of political power 
aspired to achieve a similar measure of freedom in the 
economic sphere. It was considered essential for the 
attainment of this goal - economic freedom - that the 
public should have adequate financial assistance so as to 
enable indigenous capital and enterprise to participate in 
trade and industries... The most urgent problem is the 
opening up of new industries both agricultural and 
manufacturing with the main object of catering primarily 
for the home market and thereby rendering the economy less 
susceptible to the vagaries of the market abroad (SP 23 1934: 9).
Having thus exposed the need for industrial development the commission 
set out the manner in which the state could usefully associate itself 
with this.
Capital, power, skilled labour, raw materials are essential pre­
requisites for industrial development, but in Sri Lanka no effort had 
been made even to survey the resources of raw materials, while millions 
of rupees' worth of goods for the production of which raw materials were 
available were allowed to be imported. The commission recommended as 
a first step an immediate preliminary survey of raw materials to discover
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not only what were available, but also which of them held out prospects 
of commercial development and how they could be profitably developed.
For this purpose the commission suggested the establishment of model 
factories for experimentation and demonstration. When the industrial 
potential of a raw materials became known, the government could 
demonstrate the commercial viability of an industry and publicise costs, 
the production process and other particulars.
Apart from survey, research and experiment the commission also 
emphasised that the guaranteeing of certain types of investments, 
financial assistance, and technical education should receive governmental 
attention 'if industrial aspirations of the country are to be realised' 
(SP 23 1934: 174).
This was indeed a plea for state-directed industrial development, 
and to carry through the programme recommended the commission urged 
the setting up forthwith of a separate Department of Commerce and 
Industries whose functions would be:
(a) to undertake pioneer and demonstration work in relation
to industries;
(b) to assist industries by placing at their disposal technical
advice;
(c) in general to guide industrial policy (SP 23 1934: 182)
The banking commission's recommendations had a profound influence 
on the course of industrial policy.
The second Minister of Labour, Industry and Commerce in 1938 thus 
proceeded to set up a separate Department of Commerce and Industries.
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This was undoubtedly a significant step towards industrial development 
as the new department's functions included the establishment and 
maintenance of factories, industrial centres, workshops, training schools, 
fostering the development of industries and the demonstration of modem 
methods of manufacture (ADR 1938).
In the first year of its existence the department carried out- 
several surveys to ascertain the industries that could be developed 
with local raw materials. The industrial potential of plywoods, paper, 
cement, rubber goods, and glass was investigated and favourably reported 
on. A leather expert recruited to survey the position of the tanning 
industry found 'ample scope for establishing a leather factory to 
manufacture leather goods out of hides and skins presently exported'
(ADR 1938: 34), and a textile expert reported favourably on the textile 
industry. In addition experimental work was done in connection with 
the possibility of manufacturing quinine, acetic acid, resins, and 
undertaking printing work.
On the basis of the surveys carried out the Department drew up a 
plan to promote the inauguration of industries. The state council 
sanctioned a sum of three million rupees for the same purpose. The 
intention first was to offer schemes prepared by experts to private 
enterprise for commercial production and to set up model factories to 
demonstrate some of their operations as the banking commission had
intended.
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But private enterprise was unresponsive. Thus when the scheme 
for the establishment of the plywood factory was first offered by the 
minister it was not taken up. The government tried then to attract 
interest with a new proposal that it would underwrite the full issue of 
the shares. That suggestion also met with failure. The government 
then decided to establish the factory on its own account {SP 15 1946: 8; 
Debates of the State Council 1938, Vol, III Column 3832-49).
Thus the first factory on a commercial scale was started as a 
governmental venture only after private enterprise had declined to come 
forward to invest in it. This failure seems to have had a determining 
effect on subsequent government policy towards industrial development.
With the decision in 1939 to undertake the plywood factory as a state 
enterprise the efforts of the government to industrialise began in 
earnest. In the same year several other pilot plants were approved 
for construction as state ventures and funds were set aside to train Sri 
Lankan personnel abroad to man the programme {ADR 1939: 28).
The policy of the government was still not to compete with private 
enterprise. In 1941 in reply to a request for a statement in relation 
to industrial projects begun and contemplated by the Department of 
Commerce and Industries the then Minister Corea pointed out that the 
beginning of state factories had already been seen, but there was no 
question of industrialisation being the monopoly of the government. The 
policy was to open up the avenues for industrial exploitation which
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private enterprise had hitherto not attempted to traverse {SP 15 1946:9).
Just then the second world war intervened and hastened the process 
of state entry into the industrial field. A new industrial policy began 
to take shape - the beginnings of state owned and controlled factories 
'to supply those items so essential to the life of the community'
(ADR 1947). State factories and pilot plants conceived as models of 
industrial potentiality for the guidance of the local industrialists 
began to be converted into active production units.
It was in this fashion and under these circumstances that a 
plywood factory, a glass factory, a steel factory, a paper mill, a 
quinine and drugs factory/ a ceramic factory became government-owned 
and operated industries.
The war-time 'pioneer' public sector industries were however small- 
scale experimental units. Some of them were designed and built 
primarily to meet wartime scarcities using old machines and improvised 
techniques {ADR 1947: 8). For instance, the steel mill at Maradana was 
operated with a second-hand rolling mill from an old coconut mill 
imported from India. The acetic factory at Madampe was built by D.H. 
Balfour and his eager pioneers entirely from second-hand machinery or 
locally fabricated plants. The Gunasena Commission in 1953 in fact 
applauded the ministry for its 'romantic resourcefulness in conjuring 
up an acetic acid factory, steel rolling factory, a drugs factory and 
a paper factory out of practically nothing in order to provide for the 
starving needs of a country during a period of direst difficulty' {SP 19
1953: 3) .
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Nonetheless they supplied essential goods, earned large profits 
and more importantly taught the government the first lessons of 
industrialisation. The first plywood factory, opened up under a 
considerable amount of criticism, supplied tea chests and building 
boards during the war and rendered its establishment unassailable. The 
steel rolling mill begun in 1942 played an important part during the war 
by meeting the demands of the construction industry for rolled bars and 
rods all made from scrap steel collected from government departments. In 
the same way the acetic acid factory established in 1941 supplied the 
entire requirements of the rubber industry for acetic acid and also 
produced several other by-products. The paper mill begun in 1943 
supplied the war needs for paper and earned a profit. Similarly the 
ceramic factory and quinine factory established in 1943 mat the consumer 
need for earthen and porcelain jars and for drugs. The former were 
produced from the local clays found in great abundance.
The choice of most of these industries, however, was not arbitrary
nor made to meet temporary demands but based on a long term perspective.
The executive committee responsible for these industries said:
In selecting the industries to be developed we adopted 
the policy of selecting those which on expert and tech­
nical advice and from the point of view of availability 
of natural resources we were assured that permanency in 
establishment was quite within the realms of realisation 
(SP 15 1946: 9).
'Permanency in establishment' was the objective of early efforts 
at state ownership and operation and the established factories, though
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experimental and seemingly risky ventures were to be elements in the 
longer term plan for industrialisation of the country.
With the end of the war in sight, the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry began to plan ahead for the future. Because of its past 
experience with private enterprise, and of its current success with 
state industrial ventures, the Ministry became convinced of the 
necessity of state owned and operated enterprises as a means to further 
industrial development which it regarded as essential if Sri Lanka were 
to achieve any higher standard of living and full employment. 'We are 
aware that Ceylon is and will continue to be mainly an agricultural 
country but we realise that there is certainly a place for industrial 
development' (SP 15 1946: 13).
On the basis of this belief in state ownership the Ministry 
announced in 1946 its proposals for 'Post-War Development'. Included 
in it was a five-year plan for industrialisation. Cement, steel rolling, 
caustic soda, hydrogenation of coconut oil, sulphuric acid, and textiles 
were items planned for its five-year industrialisation programme. Unlike 
the war-time 'pioneers' these were to be large-scale state enterprises 
fully planned and well designed.
A cabinet sub-committee appointed in the meantime in 1946 to define 
state policy towards industrial development also favoured state control 
and ownership of the basic industries which it defined as those (a) which 
had strategic value in the development of industrial resources; (b) which
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m ig h t  become m o n o p o l ie s ;  and  (c) w hich  r e q u i r e d  l a r g e - s c a l e  c a p i t a l  
o u t l a y .  In  te rm s  o f  t h e s e  c r i t e r i a  th e  com m ittee  recommended t h a t  
(1) pow er;  (2) heavy  i n d u s t r i e s  -  i r o n ,  s t e e l ,  cem en t;  (3) heavy  
c h e m i c a l s ,  i n c l u d i n g  a g roup  o f  f e r t i l i z e r  c h e m i c a l s ;  (4) s p e c i f i e d  d ru g s  
and p h a r m a c e u t i c a l s ;  (5) c o t t o n  s p in n i n g  s h o u ld  be  n a t i o n a l i s e d  and  be 
t h e  e x c l u s i v e  monopoly o f  s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  (SP 15 1946: 1 7 ) .
T h is  was i n  a g re e m e n t  w i t h  w ha t  th e  M i n i s t r y  h a d  a l r e a d y  p l a n n e d  
and  p r o p o s e d  f o r  s t a t e  o w n e r s h ip .
A p a r t  from  th o s e  i t  p l a n n e d  e a r l i e r  su c h  a s  cem en t,  h y d r o g e n a t io n  
o f  o i l ,  s u l p h u r i c  a c i d ,  e t c . ,  i t  became c l e a r  t h a t  some o f  t h e  p i o n e e r  
w a r t im e  f a c t o r i e s  w ould  h av e  t o  be r e o r g a n i s e d  and o t h e r s  c l o s e d  down 
t o  be  r e p l a c e d  by new sch em es . A c c o r d in g ly  governm en t i n i t i a t e d  new 
schem es t o  r e o r g a n i s e  t h e  m a n u f a c tu r e  o f  c e r a m i c s ,  p a p e r ,  and  a c e t i c  
a c i d ,  w h i l e  i n  th e  c a s e  o f  p lyw ood , g l a s s ,  an d  l e a t h e r  f a c t o r i e s  p l a n s  
w ere  made to  r e -m o d e l  them  f o r  e x panded  p r o d u c t i o n .
Thus S r i  Lanka g a in e d  in d e p e n d e n c e  a n n o u n c in g  p l a n s  f o r  t h e  s t a t e  
t o  own and o p e r a t e  b a s i c  i n d u s t r i e s  and  r e o r g a n i s e  and  r e c o n s t r u c t  t h e  
e x i s t i n g  f a c t o r i e s .
Post-Independence Industrial Policies and State Enterprises
The f i r s t  f i v e  y e a r s  a f t e r  1948 when S r i  Lanka became a s o v e r e i g n  
s t a t e  u n d e r  a c a b i n e t  sy s te m  o f  gove rnm en t  saw no change  i n  t h e  b a s i c  
p o l i c y  o r  a t t i t u d e  o f  t h e  gov e rn m en t  to w a rd s  i n d u s t r i a l  d e v e lo p m en t  
(W rig g in s  1960: 3 0 4 ) .  The U n i te d  N a t i o n a l  P a r t y  (U .N .P .)  w hich  form ed
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the government seemed fully in favour of state ownership of industrial 
enterprises and continued to operate the war-time factories. Indeed 
in the initial phase of its rule plans were also announced to 'bring 
into production schemes nearing completion and the sound launching of 
new enterprises' (U.N.P. Souvenir 1952; Far Eastern Economic Review 
12 June 1952: 757). Nevertheless the period seems in retrospect to have 
been one of inaction. Whereas in 1938-46 so much was achieved with so 
little available in men and materials, the only enterprise to come into 
operation in the later period was the cement works on which construction 
in fact started back in 1946 (Economic Survey 1926-50 1951: 34). Even 
though plans were made for the production of paper, coconut oil, sugar, 
steel, fertilizer, caustic soda and concentrated ilmenite, little was 
done to implement them. Government itself was uncertain as evidenced 
by the constant changes that occurred when four ministers in five years 
took over the portfolio of industrial development without a permanent 
head to administer the programme.
In addition, the failure to update the war-time state enterprises 
to post-war conditions resulted in heavy losses and the enterprises, 
once the pride of the nation, became the liability of the state when in 
the single year 1951-52 they incurred a loss of Rs. 5.5 million.
It was no accident that a major set-back to the two decades of 
positive industrial policy should occur under this regime; it began 
with the recommendations of an International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD) mission in 1953 (The Times Review of Industry
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May 1953: 92). Disapproving the industrial programme of the government
as premature, the mission, invited to survey the country's resources and
prepare a long range plan for their development, condemned the emphasis
on state enterprises. The mission said that in the then existing state
of economic development in which land was not being fully utilised
industrial development should be assigned a second place, and cautioned:
We cannot escape the conclusion that the Ministry intent 
on building large scale factories on its own has had its 
attention turned from ... the enlistment of private capital 
and energies towards the development of the sounder pattern 
of diversified small industries which the country needs 
(IBRD Report 1952: 514) .
Accepting these recommendations the government sought to reverse its 
policy towards state enterprises (Economic Survey 1955: 49).
The six-year programme of investment which included most of the 
IBRD mission's recommendations thus allocated no more than Rs. 112 
million or 4.9 per cent for purposes of industrial development (See 
Community 1955 252-70). Even this was mainly intended not to develop 
state enterprises but to serve private enterprise. 'The objective is, 
in fact, to promote industrial development through the private sector 
and the Government's (industrial) programme is therefore confined to 
such requirements as are ancillary to this objective' (Six Year Programme 
of Investment 1954/55 to 1959/60 1955: 12).
Aside from allocating such a meagre sum to industrial development, 
the government also hastened to strengthen the private sector by 
disposing of whatever enterprises had existed in the public sector and
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unashamedly declared: 'the industrialisation is based on the new policy
to help the private sector to help itself. As a first step towards 
the implementation of this policy the State Sponsored Corporation Act 
No 19 of 1955 has been placed on the statute book' (Six Year Programme 
of Investment 1955: 238).
The primary object of the State Sponsored Corporation Act was to 
phase out the state ownership of industrial enterprises in three 
different stages. First, the intention was to convert them into public 
corporations to enable private capital to subscribe to their ownership. 
Second, when the enterprise was established on a firm footing the 
government was to withdraw gradually. Finally, when the government's 
share holding was below 20 per cent, the enterprise was to be constituted 
as a public company under the Company Law Act. Under the new policy, 
explained the minister, government would undertake the initial risk 
partly or wholly and once the industry was firmly established private 
capital would be invited to participate. In so far as the setting up of 
the new enterprises was concerned, the government was to act as a 
sponsoring agency (Das 1966: 43).
In adopting the programme and passing this act to transfer public 
ownership to private capital, government went much too far in accepting 
the recommendations of the IBRD and jettisoning the plans and programmes 
envisaged earlier (Kanesalingham 1970). The radical politicians of the 
country reasoned that this was mainly because of the character of the 
party that was in office: being dependent on planter's wealth and the
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villagers' vote it became fearful of the future voting strength of a 
rising industrial proletariat.
However this reversal in policy on the part of the United National 
Party did not last long. The year following the passage of the State 
Sponsored Corporation Act saw the first change in government (1956).
The U.N.P. which had held office for eight years after independence gave 
place to a government whose election platform had been socialisation of 
industries and state directed industrial development.
With the success of Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (M.E.P.) government 
planned development in industries became a major objective with the 
state having the 'decisive and directive voice'. The minister 
responsible for industries saw the change in policy in this way:
On the basic question of the public sector ours is a 
different policy, particularly with regard to investment 
in industries.
Having recognised the necessity for the state to play a 
direct role in controlling and guiding the development 
of the country a decision of policy has been taken that 
greater emphasis should be placed on the industrial 
development, and in that programme the public sector will 
play the dominant role particularly with regard to the 
basic industries and in the industries of a major nature 
essential to the life of the community. (CHRD 28 July 
1957: 1570).
The state policy thus shifted irrevocably in favour of public sector 
industrial enterprise. Government was to build not only medium sized 
industries, as was envisaged under the previous regime, but also to under­
take as state concerns large scale industrial enterprises. 'You cannot 
ignore large scale industries when you are thinking of economic development
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with a view to increasing national income. It is the policy of the 
government that they should be initiated and owned entirely by the 
government' (CHRD 28 July 1957: 1574).
On the basis of this statement government ear-marked the 
industries that would be the specific concern of the state, those 
that should remain in the private sector and industries that should 
be shared between the state and the private sector. Seven industries 
were specified in the first category (Schedule A), twenty-three were 
opened up both for state and private ownership either jointly or 
separately (Schedule B), and eighty-two specified industries were left 
free for development through the private sector (Schedule C). (See 
Appendix 3).
In their first year of office the government made a budgetary 
allocation of twenty-three million rupees for investment in industrial 
projects. This was to be the first instalment in a total of 2,300 
million rupees planned for expenditure over a period of ten years.
Cement, sugar, textiles, iron and steel, chemicals, were to receive the 
greater portion of this expenditure for expansion and development, while 
rayon, alcohol, power and mineral sands were to be developed as medium 
sized state enterprises.
Dr Nicholas Kaldor, Professor Joan Robinson, Gunnar Myrdal, Kenneth 
Galbraith who advised the planning council which initiated the ten-year 
plan and recommended several of the above projects for state development,
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welcomed state enterprises to relieve unemployment and achieve economic 
growth. 'This is an imperative', said Galbraith, 'that is largely 
independent of ideology or political preference. If the private sector 
had been competent for the task it would already have asserted itself'.
The next ten years thus saw continuous investment in industrial 
projects which absorbed a large part of the capital expenditure of 
the state budget.
The commitment of the government to long-term industrial develop­
ment made it necessary to revise the State Sponsored Corporations Act 
of 1955 which being a de-nationalisation act did not enable any new 
industries to be undertaken by the government. 'When it came to 
starting new industries, it was found necessary either to amend the act 
or to introduce a new bill, because there was no provision under that., 
for the government to start a new industry' (CHRD 17 October 1957: 919).
Thus after passing the State Industrial Corporations Act No. 49 
of 1957, empowering it to take over and carry on any corporation 
previously carried on by corporations, and to establish and carry on 
new industrial undertakings, the government began to create new 
enterprises as state concerns. New enterprises such as mineral sands, 
salt mining, and sugar milling were established in 1957 while 
enterprises for the manufacture of plywood, paper, leather goods, 
chemicals, oils and fats which were earlier constituted as corporations 
with the intention of transferring them to private capital were dissolved
and reconstituted under the new act.
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With the passage of this act several new industrial ventures 
were begun as state concerns. Textiles and Carpentry in 1958, Ceylon 
Hardboard in 1959, Industrial Estates in 1960, Ceylon Tyre, State 
Engineering and Ceylon Steel in 1962, State Hardware in 1963, Ceylon 
Fertilizer, State Flour Mill and Ceylon Fisheries in 1964, were all 
constituted under this act. The change of government that occurred 
in 1965 did not see any change in the act, instead the U.N.P. found 
it useful to create a State Fertilizer Manufacturing Corporation in 
1966. With the return of a United Left Front (ULF) government in 1970, 
several new state enterprises, State Rubber Manufacturing, State 
Pharmaceuticals in 1970, Sri Lanka Tobacco and State Graphite in 1971 
were established.
The State Industrial Corporation Act thus became the main 
instrument of the state to pioneer state enterprises and its presence 
in the statute book for the past eighteen years symbolises the acceptance 
by both major coalitions of public sector industries, and more importantly 
the acceptance of the public corporation as an instrument to operate these 
ventures.
The development of state industrial enterprises is thus a 
relatively recent phenomenon, compressed into the last few decades 
commencing from the establishment of the state council in 1931.
Whatever enterprises existed prior to this date were mainly public 
utilities and essential services. Until 1956, partly because of the 
reluctance of indigenous capital and partly because of the attractiveness 
of profit elsewhere, these state-promoted industrial enterprises 
constituted the only substantial effort towards industrial development 
and economic diversification in an otherwise agricultural country.
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The return of the U.L.F. government in 1970, with its definite 
objective of socialising essential services and owning and operating 
basic industries, signifies once again the dominant and active role 
expected of the public sector in industrial development. (CHRD 
25 October 1970: Col. 505; CO 17 August 1970). And in the time this 
government has been in office it has created many enterprises and 
expanded the scope of others in its quest for economic growth and a 
socialist pattern of society.
The success or failure of such a policy depends on the efficiency 
of the management of the projects and the effectiveness with which the 
instruments chosen for their operation achieve their goals. Except for 
a brief period in the initial stages almost every industrial enterprise 
has so far been organised as a state corporation.
The choice of the corporate form may seem obvious but it is 
important to understand what brought about that choice and what 
principles and policies underlie its continued acceptance as the best 
form to organise and operate industrial enterprises.
T h e  R i s e  o f  the P u b l i c  C o r p o r a t i o n
Early efforts in developing state enterprises were made without 
much consideration of administrative aspects. Partly because of the 
circumstances in which these enterprises came to be state-owned and 
partly because they were experimental in nature, almost every single 
enterprise undertaken was organised under departmental administration. 
This was not unusual at a time when railways, ports and electricity and 
even some other enterprises in the sphere of public utilities and
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essential services had a similar form of organisation and management.
The public corporation as such was not widely used in Ceylon, being 
confined to research and financial institutions (Paul, 1957: 156).
The Tea Research Institute (Paul 1957: 156) established in 1925, the 
Coconut Research Institute in 1928, the Rubber Research Institute in 
1930 and the Tea Propaganda Board in 1932 were the first set of 
corporate bodies to appear in the island. In 1932 in accord with the 
findings of a committee appointed under the chairmanship of C.V. Brayne 
(SP 21, 1929) a State Mortgage Bank was set up to provide long term 
agricultural credit on the first mortgage of landed property situated 
in Ceylon. This was the first financial institution incorporated to 
operate autonomously outside the public service, the earliest 
institution of the kind, the National Savings Bank set up in 1859 having 
failed to receive corporate status. Apart from these every activity of 
the government up to world war II was centrally controlled and 
departmentally supervised and administered.
However by about 1939-40 when the state concern for industrial 
enterprises became serious, a system of 'advance accounts' was much in 
fashion to operate commercial and trading enterprises as separate 
activities outside the framework of the departmental accounts and finance 
(Balasingham 1968: 39). Thus when in 1937-38 the government undertook 
to buy and sell machinery and equipment to stimulate the coir industry 
an advance account was instituted to carry through its operation. This 
was the first trading activity to be organised under the advance account 
system and whatever commercial and trading activities government acquired 
thereafter were organised and operated within the department under the 
advance account system (see for details PAC 1961 b, Minute of Evidence,
18 August 1961). The essential features of that system were as follows:
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(a) Unlike an ordinary Department, business activities 
organised under the system were able to obtain their 
finances as advances from the Treasury. Parliament 
passed a token vote of Rs.10, 100, 1000 and the 
Treasury was authorised to make advances of cash to 
the activity in order to enable it to meet its 
working expenses. This simplicity in the method of 
financing the activities obviated the necessity to 
submit detailed estimates and avoided the practice of 
tying the expenditure to a head of the voted funds 
(Kanesalingham 1962: 76).
(b) In contrast to the Department, these advance account 
activities had the advantage of a separate account 
maintained in the form of receipts and payments. As 
a result all the incomings and outgoings were brought 
under a single account, which was a departure from the 
governmental practice of crediting revenue whatever 
its source to some head of revenue.
(c) Obtaining their capital expenditure through a vote out 
of the loan funds, these activities were made to pay 
interest, annuity (an hypothetical charge for 
depreciation) and insurance to the government just as 
any other business concern pays these charges to its 
creditors.
(d) At the end of each financial year these undertakings 
unlike the Department were expected to prepare a 
Trading Account, a Profit and Loss Account and a 
Balance Sheet showing their assets and liabilities.
(e) In the event of a loss parliament normally subsidised 
the activity by a vote in the operating Department to 
cover such losses and in the event of a profit a token 
vote sufficed to continue their operation.
In essence the advance account system offered a certain degree of 
financial flexibility, not often enjoyed by the Department, being
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fixed on an annual estimate, in >• regard to enterprises operated within 
the Department. (Hanson 1959: 240). Obtaining their capital 
expenditure out of loan funds and working expenses as advances from 
the Treasury, these activities were able to operate as any other 
business concerns within their own single account. The advance account 
system thus was an innovation within the departmental form in order to 
conduct business enterprises.
Partly because of the limited financial flexibility it introduced 
and partly because of the changing character of the government the 
advance account system was much in use at the time state industrial 
enterprises were initiated. Apart from railways, air transport, broad­
casting and electrical undertakings, several other activities such as 
dairy farming, canning and processing, rice milling and distilling were 
operated through this system. Further, many of the government's purchases 
and sales, involved in marketing some products to provide economic 
support to certain industries, were also conducted through the same 
system of advance accounts. Thus government had no obvious reason to go 
out of the orbit of an administrative Ministry to conduct its industrial 
activities. The Plywood Factory in 1938, Steel Rolling Factory in 1941, 
Glass Factory in 1942, Drugs Factory in 1942 thus became advance account 
activities within the Department of Industries. As in the cases of other 
advance account activities capital expenditure was obtained through a 
vote in the Ministry of Labour, Industry and Commerce for construction 
of the factory and purchase of machinery and equipment, while Treasury 
advances provided the working expenses of operating the industries. In 
fact, in the initial period, because of the near monopolistic conditions 
created by war-time scarcities, many of the enterprises proved a success 
and realised a good return on the investment.
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Despite this initial success of the industrial enterprises, the 
problems of running an industrial enterprise through an advance account 
system under Ministerial supervision and control soon began to surface. 
When in the latter part of 1940 many of the enterprises became heavy 
losers doubts began to be expressed on the wisdom of the existing 
organisation of industrial and commercial enterprises. Thus the then 
Director of Industries in his Report for the year 1940 saw the 
organisational arrangements for conducting these enterprises as a 
reason for their failure, apart from their technical and other 
deficiencies:
In normal business the machinery exists for making quick 
decisions whether an offer be made or accepted, whether 
staff be appointed or discontinued or whether a change be 
made to make a profit cutting losses previously made ...
This is not possible under the existing regulations ... 
designed to meet the needs of the state which governed and 
administered without intervening in the field of commerce 
and industries. Under the present set up a Head of the 
Department has considerable amount of authority but in 
many matters he can act only with the approval of the 
Tender Board, Public Service Commission and Treasury.
All these authorities have to be given full facts before 
they can make a decision ... and this takes time (ADR 1947:
9) .
This was the first clear statement to be made against the conduct 
of commercial enterprises through the advance account system within a 
Department. In the following year 1948, the Commission on Organisation, 
Staffing and Operative Methods also saw no reason for complacency about 
the running of the existing enterprises:
In our view no industry which has to make manufactured 
goods for sale to the public can ever be run successfully
by a government officer with government employees under
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him bound by government regulations even if those regulations 
are considerably modified in order to facilitate business.
We are emphatically of the opinion that a number of 
industries cannot be run efficiently on ordinary departmental 
lines (SP 5 1948: 172).
Because of the indecision over whether to run them as state concerns 
or to dispose of them to the public, government failed to come to terms 
with the organisational problems of state enterprises. In establishing 
the cement industry in 1950 under the advance account system it disregarded 
the earlier advice of the Sub-Committee on Industrial Development and Policy 
that 'the management of basic industries should be vested in separate
corporations styled National Industries Corporations' (SP 15 1946: 19).
0
Other enterprises started in this period of uncertainty continued to be 
organised as advance account activities and many others also adhered to the 
same system. Partly because of the technical and marketing difficulties 
and partly because of the organisational arrangements, financial losses on 
these enterprises began to mount, compelling the government for the first 
time to inquire into the organisational aspects of these enterprises. The 
Gunasena Commission (SP 19 1953) which undertook this inquiry into the 
'operation by government Departments of business and commercial uridertakings' 
condemned outright the advance account system as unsuitable to the operation 
of commercial and industrial enterprises:
We have considered many reports, we have heard many 
witnesses, we have examined many of the undertakings, 
we are unanimous in our view that the Advance Account 
System is entirely unsuited to the conduct of 
commercial activities (SP 19 1953: 19).
When an enterprise is established within the Department, the Commission 
said, several different governmental rules and regulations operate to stifle 
initiative and individual discretion and responsibility so essential to the
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conduct of commercial and business enterprises. When the rules 
regarding supplies are applied to business transactions, for instance, 
enterprises are forced to go through established procedures. This, to 
say the least, precludes an enterprise from taking advantage of an 
attractive offer and tends to ignore other aspects of supply such as 
quality and durability of the goods purchased. Furthermore, Financial 
Regulations which govern supplies do not always allow discretion to the 
management to conduct its transactions except through Tender Board 
procedures. This creates a delay since any deviations from such 
procedures must have the prior approval and consent of the Minister.
Trade [said the commission], demands prompt decision and 
quick action and it cannot wait until the circumlocution 
of reference to the Department, Department to the Ministry 
Ministry to the Treasury and sometimes Treasury to the 
Ministry has been inexorably gone through (oP 19 1953: 15).
Apart from the financial regulations and Tender Board procedures 
the Commission also brought to focus the stifling effect of the Public 
Service Commission (PSC) rules and regulations regarding appointment and 
dismissal of employees and the Treasury instructions on numbers and scale 
of pay. A business organisation in normal circumstances should be able to 
recruit and discontinue staff in accordance with the needs of the enter­
prise, a freedom so indispensable for a commercial organisation yet 
virtually denied to an enterprise when it is organised within a 
Department. Since anyone drawing his pay from the public funds - whether 
permanent or temporary - is a civil servant, no employee can be recruited 
or discontinued except as provided in the Publis Service Commission rules 
and no salary or wages can be paid except at government rates. In all 
staff matters - rates of pay, number of employees and holiday and leave 
facilities - the Treasury instructions must be strictly adhered to. Where
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any deviation is required to pay salaries and wages different from 
the government rates, prior sanction must be obtained. But to convince 
the Treasury of such a necessity was an uphill task.
Another fundamental and important weakness of the departmental 
arrangement, said the Commission, is the financial control wielded by 
the Treasury over the capital expenditure of business enterprises. In 
a system where capital funds are normally obtained through annual 
estimates and no provision is made for emergencies any excess over the 
estimated cost of any work undertaken by an enterprise within the 
Department requires prior approval and consent of several authorities, 
primary among which is the Treasury. If the excess, for instance, is 
Rs. 250,000 the Ministry of Industries, Treasury and the Cabinet must 
concur before funds can be released to the undertaking. In the meantime 
an enterprise may well be forced to stand still as it will be a breach of 
a financial procedure to continue operations where no certificate has been 
given regarding availability of funds. All this means that lengthy 
negotiations must take place between the Activity and the Treasury.
Financial control by the Treasury is not confined merely to capital 
expenditure. In the case of recurrent expenditure it sets three limits 
which the Activity is not expected to exceed. The 'limit of total 
debits' for instance, represents the maximum amount which an under­
taking can spend on working expenses in a financial year. There are 
limits of expenditure that an Activity should not exceed by the end of 
September. These and other boundaries set on expenditure are constraints 
on the management. If for example a manager of a factory is not alert
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he may well exceed his limits on expenditure in which case 'a serious 
situation will arise as he cannot incur further expenditure without 
cabinet sanction (SP 19 1953: 67). In sum, stringent control of 
expenditure and the lack of fluidity of funds are the twin evils of 
Treasury control and so long as enterprises are organised within the 
departmental framework these controls are unavoidable.
Lest we be misunderstood it should be made clear that Treasury 
controls as applied to government activities are not altogether 
indefensible. They are in fact the time honoured devices to ensure 
propriety and regularity in the employment of public funds necessary 
to prevent official extravagance and personal diversion. It is only when 
they are extended to business activities which require a certain measure 
of financial freedom to realise their overall objectives that Treasury 
controls become unacceptable.
One may wonder in this context whether a few modifications here and 
a few revisions there of the Financial Regulations and procedures might 
help to clear unnecessary or obnoxious restrictions out of the Financial 
Regulations to allow enterprises to be conducted through the Departmental 
System. This was in fact attempted in the case of a trading activity, 
the Co-operative Wholesale Establishment, and a manufacturing enterprise, 
the cement factory7', but deterred as they were by the bogey of 'accounta­
bility' the government officers who ran these enterprises failed to take 
advantage of the concessions and discretions guaranteed by the revision. 
The Auditor-General in his recommendations to the Commission also warned 
that such changes and revisions in the Financial Regulations would not 
bring about the desired effect..
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It is not to my mind a question of ending or revising 
certain Financial Regulations and attempting to apply 
them to activities for which they were never intended.
Industrial, commercial and in many instances agricultural 
undertakings require in fact a very carefully drafted 
code of procedure sufficiently concise to be placed on 
a statutory footing and containing those elements of 
elasticity which a business undertaking for its 
competition needs (Treasury Memorandum, SP 19 1953: 63) .
Thus outlining the problems with concrete examples of the rigidities 
and red tape from which the enterprises suffered within the Departmental 
arrangements, and seeing them as one cause for financial losses, the 
Commission on Commercial Undertakings submitted that all commercial and 
industrial activities of the government should be exempted from the 
government rules and regulations and corporations should be instituted 
to run industrial enterprises. 'The type of corporation we recommend for 
Ceylon' said the Commission 'is what is known in the U.K. as the classic 
type'. In this system a ministerially appointed board would be responsible 
to the government for the enterprises and in all cases in day to day 
administration the discretion would be vested in the board of directors.
The Minister however would have power to give directions to the board but 
that would be restricted to matters closely touching the national interest.
When the bill to convert the industrial undertakings to corporations 
was finally brought before the House in 1955 no member of the House 
questioned the appropriateness of the corporate form to run state enter­
prises. On the contrary members of the left as of the right came out 
strongly in favour of such a step. 'How often in this House have I argued', 
said Dr N.M. Perera, a well known left-winger and ardent sympathiser with 
the corporate form, 'that a reasonable latitude should be given to the
Leather Factory to operate successfully'.
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Over and over again I have in this House appealed to the 
government to see that the officers in charge are given 
reasonable latitude without imposing on them various 
Treasury instructions. When the Carpentry workshops 
wanted to buy hinges for desks for instance they had to 
call for tenders involving a delay of one month while men 
had to wait all that time. That is the kind of regulation 
under which the factories had to work and no wonder they 
lost (CHRD 4 April 1955: Col. 3674-5).
Summing up the case of the government, the leader of the House
J.R. Jayawardena explained succinctly why it became necessary for the
government to establish corporations to run industrial enterprises:
We have found that it is not possible to run factories 
through civil servants, factories where all the employees 
are appointed by the Public Service Commission, where every 
little day to day transaction is governed by Public Service 
Commission regulations and financial regulations. I don't 
suggest that they are there on purpose. But obstructions 
and delays have to be encountered in the working of a 
government department which is governed by Public Service 
and Financial Regulations. These regulations have led our 
factories to such a position that they cannot go further 
(CHRD 4 April 1955: Col. 3720-1).
The consensus in the House was that the Ministerial Department was an 
unsuitable medium for the conduct of state industrial enterprises and 
the corporate form, was the most acceptable alternative. The Gunasena 
Commission was partly responsible for such crystallisation of views on 
the corporate form and for popularising it as a device most appropriate 
for the administration of state enterprises. The choice of the public
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corporations was thus made on the grounds of the practical necessity 
to import business principles into the management of industrial 
enterprises and of the difficulty of operating them through the 
departmental system. The advantages seen in the corporate form for 
this purpose were:
(a) it would free state enterprises from governmental 
rules and regulations which are useful in their 
proper place, but had proved restrictive and 
negative to the conduct of business enterprises;
(b) it would give the enterprises the necessary financial 
flexibility without their being hamstrung by the 
financial regulations and governmental procedures, 
budgets and accounts system commonly applicable to 
the Ministerial Department;
(c) it would give the enterprises the necessary freedom 
to hire and fire personnel and build a personnel 
structure most suited to the needs of the business 
concerns;
(d) it would relieve business enterprises of unnecessary 
interference, jobbery and log-rolling and help achieve 
the right combination of commercial freedom and 
government control
The Government Sponsored Corporations Act (1955) which converted 
the industrial undertakings into corporations in fact carried every 
major feature of the British corporate administration into the system 
of administration it instituted for industrial management in Sri Lanka. 
Thus by section 13 (1) (2) it provided for the appointment and
dismissal of the corporate Board of Directors by the Minister and by
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section 32 (1) it empowered the Minister to give the Board general 
and special directions as to the exercise of its powers and discharge 
of its duties - characteristic of every British corporate statute.
Apart from the right to appoint and remove directors and issue general 
and specific directions the Minister also had the right under the 
provisions of this statute to direct and enforce an inquiry into the 
working of the corporations and fix the salary of the staff of the 
corporation and to do anything necessary for or conducive or incidental 
to the carrying out of its objects. The Act also contained other 
provisions common to the British statutes dealing with Accounts and 
Audits and the submission of Annual Accounts and Reports to the 
Parliament.
The State Industrial Corporations Act which replaced the Government 
Sponsored Corporations Act in 1957 embodies every one of the above 
clauses, while omitting those provisions and sections relating to the 
eventual transfer of these undertakings to private ownership which were 
part of the 1955 act. In every respect the corporate system that Sri 
Lanka established was to be a replica of the British one, but the extent 
to which Sri Lanka has worked this system in a similar way remains to 
be seen.
To summarise: public corporations are of recent origin in Sri Lanka
as is state enterprise itself. Before the year 1931 the government of 
Ceylon had perhaps never seriously considered whether it should have 
any industries at all. When the country achieved certain measure of 
self-government in 1931 the question of industrial development received
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its first serious consideration. Since then the development of state 
enterprises has been very rapid. But it was not until 1957 that the 
management of state enterprises was transferred to the state corporations 
partly because of the unsuccessful experience with ministerial operation 
and partly because of the necessity to import business principles into 
the management of business enterprises. The consensus of the time was 
that the corporate form was the most appropriate device to operate 
government industrial ventures.
In establishing these corporations however two basic questions arose: 
whether the various enterprises should be organised under the management 
and control of a single development corporation with comprehensive powers 
and responsibilities or as separate corporations established under a 
single statute, and secondly what procedures and methods should be 
adopted in creating enterprises since initial investigation find study 
are as important as the institutional arrangements to manage them. This 
aspect which is still being discussed in Sri Lanka is considered last in 
a concluding chapter following the discussion on personnel and control. 
But to set the scene the section that follows gives a brief account of 
the functions assigned and activities in fact undertaken by the selected
corporations.
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III A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF CORPORATIONS
In the following account of the corporations created under 
the State Industrial Corporations Act (SICA) No. 49 of 1957, only 
the salient features of their operation are noted. The objective, 
as stated earlier, is to provide a clear description of the functions 
legally assigned to these corporations and the activities actually 
carried out by them. Certain general features of their organisation 
and operation may be mentioned to preface this account. Of the 
twenty-eight corporations so far created under the above statute, 
twenty-three operate under the Ministry of Industries and Scientific 
Affairs (see Appendix 2) and five, i.e. Sugar, State Engineering, £e-ot(.Irser 
Fisheries, Fisheries Harbour operate under other ministries. Only 
two of them - National Small Industries and Ceylon Hardboard Board - 
have so far been disestablished (CBR 1973: 93) and their activities
In so far as the scope and scale of operations are concerned 
these corporations vary significantly. The biggest of them all employs 
as many as 7,000 persons and utilises capital to the value of Rs. 400 
million, while the smallest has a capital of Rs. 1 million with fewer 
than 50 persons in its employment. Since many of the small enter­
prises are at present in their initial phase of operations it is 
possible, given the present trend and concern for public enterprises, 
that they would grow to a scale of operations at least as large as
have been transferred to Cor-poro-boas
that of the Cement Corporation or the National Textile Corporation.
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As a group these corporations are of considerable importance to
the country with a total capital outlay of over Rs. 2,000 million and
the provision of employment for over 50,000 persons (CBR 1973).
Also they support an infra-structurai investment of high magnitude.
At present these corporations supply goods and services to the value 
of Rs. 1,500 million enabling the country to save annually around 
Rs. 342 million in foreign exchange (Review of Activities 1973: 2). 
Another feature noteworthy in the organisational history of these 
corporations is that many of them had their beginnings in the periods 
when the SLFP was in office.
Plywood was the first large scale commercial enterprise to appear 
in the public sector. The Plywood Corporation (PC) was first incor­
porated as a public sector corporation under the GSCA on 1 March 1956 
with an authorised capital of Rs. 2,800,000 and subsequently under 
the SICA. Functions assigned to this corporation were: (a) manufacture
and sale of plywoods and articles made from plywood; (b) sawing and 
selling of all kinds of timber; and (c) manufacture and sale of all 
kinds of furniture (Gazette No. 11632). Initially its main objective 
was to operate the Gintota Plywood Factory established by the Ministry 
of Industries to produce tea chests. In addition PC now controls a 
complex at Salawa equipped for the manufacture of plywoods, chipboards 
and furniture, a timber extraction unit at Kandaeliya and seven 
carpentry workshops transferred from the National Small Industries 
Corporation. PC's factory serves three-sevenths of the market for 
plywood, chipboard and other articles made by it. Expansion of its
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capacity should not prove difficult since it is one industry where 
the local input is very high. Because of its initial success at making 
a large profit, PC has had its capital increased several times and at 
present it has a total capital outlay of RS. 132 million, and a total 
workforce of 2,500 (CBR 1973).
Paper production in Ceylon was first attempted during the second 
world war when a semi-mechanised paper factory was set up by the 
Department of Industries at Kakkapelliya. The factory was designed 
to convert waste paper to wrapping paper. Then in 1952, after a 
comprehensive study of the technical and economic problems involved in 
the establishment of a paper factory in Ceylon on a commercial basis, 
the then Ministry of Industries, Industrial Research and Fisheries 
prepared and implemented plans for the erection of a paper factory at 
Valaichenai. Construction of the mill was completed in 1956 at a cost 
of Rs. 22 million. The Eastern Paper Mills Corporation (EPC) was formed 
under SICA on 1 January 1958 initially to operate this mill (a) to 
manufacture and sell all kinds of paper (writing, packing, printing, etc.); 
(b) to manufacture and sell all kinds of insulated boards (press boards, 
cardboards, mill board etc.); (c) to manufacture and sell stationery of 
all kinds made from pulp and paper (Gazette No. 11404). Paper production 
(CT August 1961, February 1969) is now a successful and well established 
public sector enterprise in Ceylon. For apart from the pulp and paper 
mill with which it started EPC has established another paper mill 
designed and constructed for the production of 10,500 tons of writing 
paper (EPC 1970) for constructing two other paper mills, one at 
Empilipitiba and the other at Rajangana. The present local demand for
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paper of all types is running around 60,000 tons a year and the 
Corporation in the near future should be able to meet the country’s demand 
for paper.
The first cement factory in Ceylon was started at Kankesanturai 
under the Department of Industries in the later part of 1950 at an 
initial cost of Rs. 23.4 million. For six years following inception, 
the cement industry continued to be managed by the Department of 
Industries. In November 1956 it achieved corporate status under GSCA. 
Subsequently it was reconstituted under SICA, with the following 
functions: (a) to manufacture and sell cement; and (b) to manufacture 
and sell articles made of cement (telephone and telegraph posts, hume 
pipes, tiling, etc.) (Gazette No. 11634). It was also entrusted with 
the monopoly of cement imports in 1963. Since its inception the Ceylon 
Cement Corporation (CCC) has presented a success story (CDN 1 January 
1969). The excellent site and raw materials at Kankesanturai combined 
with the efficient personnel charged with its affairs made its progress 
a rapid one. CCC today has an annual production of 400,000 tons, five 
times what it produced at the start icBR 1972: 55). The production and 
consumption of cement in a country is rightly considered to be an index 
to its industrial prosperity. Cement is one of the products that could 
be produced in Ceylon on a large scale (CT September 1967),with a 
minimum of imported inputs because plenty of the raw materials, lime­
stone and clay, is available in several parts of the island.
The Ceylon Ceramics Corporation is a multi-plant organisation with 
three factories located at Negombo, Piliyandala and the Matale district, 
and akaolin refinery located at Boralesgamuwa. The Negombo factory
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was established in 1956 while the Piliyandala factory started 
production in 1968. In 1973 the ceramic factory in the Matale 
district began producing porcelain and table ware. Like the Ceylon
Cement and Plywood Corporations, this corporation was first constituted 
under the GSCA, and later in 1959 reconstituted under the SICA. It 
has the following functions: (a) to manufacture and sell ceramic ware, china, 
pottery, bricks, tiles and porcelain articles of every description; and 
(b) to manufacture and sell artificial stones (Gazette No. 11466).
Total sales of the corporation have risen from Rs. 3 million in 1964-65 
to Rs. 27 million in 1972, and it has operated at a profit throughout 
its existence.
The Ceylon Mineral Sands Corporation (CMSC) was established on 
12 March 1957 with an initial capital of Rs. 8 million (CT June 1960).
Its objectives as stated in the incorporation order were (a) mining, 
refining and processing heavy mineral sands; and (b) the manufacture 
and sale of any product of commercial value from heavy mineral sands 
(Gazette No. 12212). CMSC at present is engaged in exploiting an 
estimated 4 million tons of heavy mineral-bearing beach sands on the 
north east of Ceylon. The minerals ilmenite, zircon and rutile are 
found in sufficiently high concentration for economic exploitation in 
beaches near Pulmoddai, Tirukkovil, Kaikawala and Polkotuwa. The 
Corporation has two plants, one at Pulmoddai for ilmenite recovery and 
the other at China Bay for the extraction of rutile and zircon. It has 
an annual production of Rs. 8 million. In 1972 it earned a profit of
RS. 3 million (CBR 1972: 57).
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The Ceylon Oils and Fats Corporation was one of the earliest to 
be set up under SICA. The functions assigned to the corporation were:
(a) the manufacture and sale of all kinds of oils, food products, 
detergents, fats, waxes and resinous substances; and (b) the manufacture 
and sale of chemical compounds of all kinds, including pharmaceuticals, 
medicines, plastics, dyes, manures, paints etc. (Gazette No. 11466). 
Initially the corporation has the responsibility of working the Seeduwa 
oil project planned and installed by the Department of Industries. The 
factory now operated by the Corporation has a number of production units: 
a continuous solvent extraction plant to extract oil from poonac, a 
provender plant to produce 60,000 tons of mixed animal feed a year, an 
oil refinery to upgrade vegetable oil and a fats splitting plant to 
distil the crude fatty acids. In 1967 a major reorganisation of the 
entire factory was carried out on the advice of an ECAFE expert. After 
a series of trials the Corporation commissioned the fats splitter and 
fatty acids distillation and sweet water evaporation plant. Since 
reorganisation the corporation has been running at a profit. The major 
items now produced by this corporation are coconut oil, provender, fatty 
acids, glycerine, white oil, and deodorised oil and they are valued 
at a total of Rs. 38 million a year.
The Ceylon Leather Products Corporation was established in 1959 
under the SICA to take over the management and assets of its predecessor, 
the Department of Industries Leather Products Corporation established 
under the repealed GSCA. The Corporation now controls the tannery and 
shoe factory at Mattakuliya and a leather goods factory at the Ekala
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Industrial Estate. When constituted under the SICA with an initial 
capital of Rs. 10.5 million, it had the following functions: (a) tanning 
and sale of hides and skins; (b) manufacture and sale of articles made 
of leather; and (c) the export of raw processed hides and skins (Gazette 
No. 11632). The Corporation at present produces shoes, chrome and 
bark leather and other miscellaneous leather goods. The value of its
output has risen from Rs. 6 million in 1966-67 to Rs. 15 million in 
1972. In 1968-69 the production of chrome leather was 61,000 square 
feet and the total output of shoes 275,000 pairs. The corporation 
provided employment in 1972 for 1,053 persons. A new tannery designed 
for larger output and better quality products commenced operation in 
March 1972.
The Parathan Chemicals Corporation, originally established in March 
1956, like others was subsequently dissolved and reconstituted under 
SICA in January 1959. The main activities of this corporation are:
(a) manufacture and sale of caustic soda, chorine, hydrochloric acid; 
and (b) manufacture and sale of by-products such as table salt, ferric 
chloride, zinc chloride etc. (Gazette No. 11632). From the very 
beginning of its career the corporation had several mishaps and was 
forced to abandon many of the projects planned for operation under its 
management (CHRD 10 April 1968 col. 3230-58). Having thus begun with 
such production units as caustic soda, chlorine, sulphuric acid, DDT and 
lauryl alcohol, it sold its DDT plant in 1959 to an overseas buyer in 
pursuance of a decision made by the Minister of Finance in consultation 
with the Minister of Industries, and contrary to the wish of the
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c h a irm a n  o f  th e  c o r p o r a t i o n  (PAC 1963: 7 3 ) .  I n  1960 i t  a l s o  
abandoned  t h e  l a u r y l  a l c o h o l  p r o j e c t .  The m ain  p r o d u c t s  o f  t h e  
c o r p o r a t i o n  to d a y  a r e  c a u s t i c  s o d a ,  c h l o r i n e  and  t a b l e  s a l t .  Even 
i n  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h e s e  i te m s  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  i s  f o r c e d  t o  work 
be low  c a p a c i t y :  w h ereas  i t  h a s  a s t e a d y  demand f o r  c a u s t i c  s o d a ,  i t
h a s  p ro b le m s  i n  d i s p o s i n g  o f  i t s  b y - p r o d u c t  c h l o r i n e .  S in c e  i t  i s  
u n e c o n o m ica l  t o  i n c r e a s e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  c a u s t i c  so d a  w i t h o u t  f i n d i n g  a 
m a rk e t  f o r  c h l o r i n e ,  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  f i n d s  i t  p r u d e n t  t o  work be low  
c a p a c i t y .  About h a l f  t h e  c h l o r i n e  i s  consumed by  t h e  V a l a i c h e n a i  
p a p e r  m i l l s  and  t h e  b a l a n c e  i s  u s e d  f o r  w a t e r  p u r i f i c a t i o n  (N a y lo r  1966: 
1 4 5 ) .  W ith  t h e  e x p a n s io n  o f  t h e  p a p e r  i n d u s t r y  and  t h e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  
p r o v i n c i a l  w a te r  s u p p ly  schemes t h e  demand f o r  c h l o r i n e  i s  e x p e c t e d  t o  
r i s e .  As t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  m a n u f a c tu r e s  o n ly  a t h i r d  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  
demand f o r  c a u s t i c  s o d a ,  i t  im p o r t s  t h e  b a l a n c e  on w o r ld  w ide  t e n d e r s .
I n  t h e  s p h e re  o f  f i n i s h e d  m e t a l s  p r o d u c t i o n  C e y l o n 's  f i r s t  e n t e r ­
p r i s e  was a p r o j e c t  f o r  t h e  m a n u f a c tu r e  o f  v a r i o u s  i t e m s  o f  h a rd w a re  
(CT May 1 9 6 7 ) .  I n  1961 Cekop o f  P o la n d ,  on t h e  r e q u e s t  o f  t h e  gov e rn m en t  
o f  C e y lo n ,  p r e p a r e d  and  p r e s e n t e d  a p r o j e c t  r e p o r t  f o r  t h e  s e t t i n g  up 
o f  a  H ardw are  C o r p o r a t i o n .  The C o r p o r a t i o n  was e s t a b l i s h e d  on 23 A ugus t  
1963 u n d e r  SICA w i th  an i n i t i a l  c a p i t a l  o f  Rs. 16 m i l l i o n  and  h a d  th e  
f o l l o w i n g  m a jo r  f u n c t i o n s :  (a) t h e  m a n u f a c tu r e  o f  h a rd w a re ,  s m a l l  t o o l s ,
a g r i c u l t u r a l  im p lem en ts  and  c u t l e r y ;  (b) t h e  m a n u f a c tu r e  o f  f i n i s h e d  
p r o d u c t s  o f  h a rd w a re ,  s m a l l  t o o l s ;  (c) t h e  m a n u f a c tu r e ,  a s se m b ly  and 
r e p a i r  o f  t o o l s ,  im p le m e n ts ,  m ac h in e ry  e t c . ;  an d  (d) t h e  i m p o r t a t i o n ,  
s a l e  and d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  h a rd w a re  ( G a z e t te  No. 1 3 7 3 7 ) .  The S t a t e
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Hardware Corporation is a good example of bad planning and project 
promotion. For the project was conceived, plans were drawn, site 
selected, loans obtained, contracts awarded long before the Board was 
constituted. When constituted the Board had the responsibility of 
continuing the project as planned and constructed the factory accordingly 
(Naylor 1966: 55). This resulted in several difficulties. Firstly 
some of the articles planned for production were not ideally suited 
to the local conditions. For instance the kind of mammoty (hoe) planned 
for production was quite unsuitable for the needs of the Ceylon farmer 
and consequently the corporation had to redesign the production process 
to perfect a mammoty to suit local conditions. The same problem was 
faced in the case of some other equipment which was not geared to 
produce the articles most in demand. Thanks to the effort of the 
corporate technical personnel a good part of the factory has now been 
put in use to produce such items as cutlery, water fittings, hinges, 
tower bolts, engineering tools, anvils and bench vices of high quality.
The foundry constructed at Enderamulla also produces cast iron water 
pipes, pressure pipes, pipe fittings etc. In 1971 the corporation 
produced Rs. 12 millions worth of the above goods, incurring a loss of 
Rs. 7 million (CBR 1972: 58).
The Ceylon Steel Corporation was established on 30 September 1961 
under SICA with an initial capital of Rs. 80 million (cr July 1961) .
The objectives of the corporation as stated in its incorporation order 
were (a) the manufacture of iron and steel and their alloys; (b) the 
manufacture of finished products from iron and steel; (c) the manufacture
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assembly and repair of tools, implements and machinery; and (d) the 
mining, refining and processing of raw materials required for iron and 
steel (Gazette No. 12684). Steel is one of the industries that was 
started with the Soviet Government's technical and economic aid. The 
plan was to develop the industry in three stages (CD 14 January 1970).
The first phase included a rolling mill and wire mill for the manufacture 
of merchant sections. The second stage involved steel manufacture utili­
sing local scrap and imported pig iron, while the final stage envisaged 
pig iron manufacture from locally mined iron ore. The corporation, when 
formed in 1961, had the immediate objective of implementing stage one 
of the project, which it successfully completed in Janaury 1967, 
producing rolled bars, barbed wire, wire mesh and a variety of other 
products made out of steel billets. The second stage of the project 
is expected to be operational in 1976-77. Action was continued in the 
meantime to establish a machine tool plant (CDN 21 January 1971) with 
technical assistance from Hindustan Steel Machine Tools Ltd. of 
Bangalore, and to manufacture twisted ribbed steel in collaboration with 
Tor-isteg Steel Corporation of Luxembourg. At present the corporation 
markets steel products to the value of Rs. 70 million, saving thereby a 
considerable sum in foreign exchange. Its full impact however will not 
be felt until it starts production with locally mined ore and carries 
through other programmes of expansion which it envisages for the future.
Along with the steel factory, the USSR also helped to establish a 
factory for producing tyres and tubes for motor cars and trucks. The 
Ceylon Tyre Corporation, incorporated on 1 January 1960, had the
59
objective of establishing this industry with Soviet aid. Construction 
work commenced in 19G2 and commercial production in 1967 (CT June 1967). 
The following were some of the main functions entrusted to the Tyre 
Corporation: (a) the manufacture, sale and export of rubber tyres,
tubes, and allied products; (b) the importation and sale of materials 
used in manufacture of tyres and tubes and allied products; and (c) 
the technical training of Ceylonese personnel for the rubber industry 
(Gazette No. 12842). The current production of the corporation is 
valued at Rs. 50 million and it makes an annual profit of Rs. 7 million 
(CBR 1972).
The State Flour Milling Corporation was the third project set up 
with Soviet technical and economic aid, in this case to establish 
and operate a flour mill. Construction work started immediately after 
the Soviet experts furnished feasibility studies recommending a plant 
at a capital cost of Rs. 16 million to mill 70,000 tons of wheat 
annually. The five-member board appointed on 12 March 1964 was given 
the following functions: (a) the milling of whole wheat and other
cereals; (b) the importation of whole wheat and other cereals for the 
purpose of milling; and (c) the conversion and marketing of by-products 
and residue resulting from the milling of whole wheat (Gazette No. 13982). 
The mill was commissioned early in 1969 and in the very first year of 
its operation the corporation was able to make a profit. In the following 
year, after making a few modifications to the plant, the corporation was 
able to increase its capacity to 100,000 tons. Currently a scheme to 
expand the present capacity to 130,000 tons is being considered. The
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island's demand for flour is estimated to be well over 400,000 tons 
per annum. The output of the mill consists of 72 per cent flour,
23 per cent bran and 3 per cent feed meal. Much of the wheat is imported 
under the Australian Commodity Aid Programme.
The National Textile Corporation (NTC) was established on 10 
January 1958 with the purpose of developing textile industries in Ceylon. 
When the corporation was formed (a) to plant and cultivate cotton and 
other plants producing substitutes of cotton; and (b) to undertake 
ginning, spinning, doubling, dyeing, weaving and sale of all types of 
fibrous substances used in the textile industry (Gazette No. 11237),
Ceylon was devoid of any textile industry of substance. Aside from the 
12 million yards of cotton supplied by the Wellawatte Weaving and 
Spinning Mills established in 1883, and a few thousand yards of cloth 
obtained through handlooms and powerlooms, Ceylon was virtually dependent 
on imports to meet her local requirements for textiles. In 1958 her 
import bill stood at Rs. 300 million. Initially NTC had the responsibility 
of operating the spinning mill established at Veyangoda, and in 1968 
to increase substantially its production of cotton an integrated textile 
complex was set up at Thulhiriya. Both these mills handle 18 million 
lbs of spinning, 28 million yards of weaving and 77 million yards of 
finishing. A third mill at Pugoda was commissioned in 1973. Ceylon's 
demand for textiles is estimated to be 300 million yards and at present 
the Corporation meets four-tenths of this demand. With the full 
commissioning of Pugoda and Thulhiriya textile mills local production 
of textiles is expected to rise substantially. At present the Corporation 
has an authorised capital of Rs. 400 million and employs over 7,000 persons.
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The State Engineering Corporation was formed on 1 January 1962 
to carry out activities in the field of building and construction.
The incorporation order No. 12841 which brought the corporation into 
existence defined its functions as follows: (a) the planning, designing,
and construction of industrial and engineering projects; (b) the 
training of engineering and other technical personnel required for the 
above; and (c) functioning as consultant to state sponsored corporations 
and government institutions. In the thirteen years of its existence the 
corporation has undertaken large scale projects in the construction of 
factories and housing schemes. Construction work for the steel factory, 
cast iron foundry, textile mill and state flour mill, to mention only 
a few, was carried out by this corporation. It has also acted as a 
consultant to all government departments on building and construction 
matters and has constructed hospitals, flats, warehouses, dams and 
roads for them. At present this corporation has become a major cons­
truction and building enterprise in Ceylon whose capital contracts run 
into millions of rupees. After ten years of successful operation under 
the Ministry of Industries, the corporation has now been working under 
the Ministry of Housing for four years (see SP 2 1973 for a recent 
proposal for reorganisation) .
The National Small Industries Corporation (NSIC) - successor to 
the Ceylon Carpentry Corporation - was set up in 1959 with a view to 
managing and integrating a series of small industries (Gazette No. 11840) , 
and over the fifteen years of its existence it pioneered a number of 
manufacturing industries such as boat building, beedi production,
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ayurvedic drugs, bricks and tiles and several relating to carpentry 
and furniture production ( CT March 1962). Partly because of the diversity 
of activities it attempted to pioneer and partly because of the high 
cost of their operation NSIC was a doubtful proposition from the start, 
losing at a rate of one million rupees a year. The government as a 
result decided to dissolve the corporation and to transfer its 
activities to other corporations. Thus in 1969 it handed over the drug 
making complex to a new corporation (Ayurvedic Drug) and the boat building 
yards to the Ceylon Fisheries Corporation. When it went into full 
liquidation in 1972 (CBF1973: 93) it transferred the remaining car­
pentry workshops, bricks, tiles and beedi manufacturing sections to 
the Ceylon Plywoods, Ceylon Ceramics and Ceylon Tobacco Industries 
Corporations respectively. NSIC is the first corporation to have been 
liquidated on account of financial loss.
The Ceylon Hardboard Board was established on 18 November 1959 
under the SICA with a capital contribution of Rs. 450,000. Among 
others it had as its major objectives to process, manufacture and sell 
products derived from agricultural produce, particularly hardboard, 
insulating board, wall board, mill board etc.(Gazette No. 11958).
Between 1962 and 1964 the activities of the corporation were suspended 
while the Ministry of Industries on its behalf undertook the task of 
investigating the feasibility of using hardboard for the manufacture 
of tea chests, and called world wide tenders for the supply (ADR 1963) , 
erection and commissioning of complete plant and machinery for the 
manufacture of hardboard and also acquired a fresh site at Horana.
The board recommenced its activity on 24 September 1964 only to be wound 
up in the latter part of 1969.
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The Industrial Estates Corporation was set up on 1 January 1960 
under the SICA for the purpose of establishing and developing indus­
trial estates and to offer promotional benefits to small and medium 
scale industrialists in need of industrial space. In particular it was 
to provide buildings, roadways, communications, electric power, steam, 
gas, water, storage, warehouses, repairworkshops and other facilities 
required for the establishment of any industry or industries by any 
person or body of persons (Gazette No. 12028). The first venture of 
this corporation started at Ekala, Jaela with a variety of the above- 
mentioned facilities to enable a collection of small scale industrialists 
to produce such wide ranging goods as leather goods, canned fruits, 
printed fabrics, electrical fittings and other small equipment (CT. May 
1962). The corporation had an initial capital of Rs. 2.5 million and 
in 1968 earned a gross income of Rs. 69,000. With the experience 
gained through this venture, the corporation has plans to establish 
similar estates on a regional basis in such areas as Jaffna, Kandy 
and Galle. The corporation now operates under the statutory framework 
of the Industrial Development Board having functioned for nine years 
under the control and supervision of the Ministry of Industries.
The Ceylon Fertilizer Corporation was established on 30 January 
1964 under the SICA for the purpose of importation, processing, sale, 
supply and distribution of fertilizer (Gazette No. 13936). It has 
an initial capital of Rs. 8,000 and a provision for a loan of Rs. 4^  
million as working capital. The corporation purchases its requirements 
of fertilizers at competitive prices from major suppliers all over the 
world, and supplies the entire fertilizer need of the Agrarian Services
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Department. In addition it makes its supply available to government 
fertilizer subsidy schemes such as those for tea, coconut and rubber 
cultivation. The import of raw materials and the mixing and distribution 
of fertilizer by this corporation have shown a steady increase during 
the last five years owing to the government's agricultural development 
programme.
The State Graphite Corporation (SGC) was constituted on 2 July 
1971 under the SICA (a) to mine, refine and process graphite and other 
allied minerals; and (b) to manufacture, sell and export products from 
graphite or other related minerals (Gazette No. 14964). In the short 
period of its existence the corporation has been vested with three 
graphite mines: at Kolongaha, Kahatagaha and Bogala. The corporation
has also been vested with the responsibility for the management of 
a prospecting mine at Langalla. The SGC up till now has been preoccupied 
with the modernisation of these mines, providing adequate ventilation 
and other facilities to permit the workforce to work long hours in the 
mine. For the future it has plans to expand the present mines laterally, 
to establish industries using graphite as a major raw material and to 
enter new areas of mining such as mica which is mainly for export. With 
the passage of the Mines and Minerals Act in 1973, vesting the absolute 
ownership of mineral rights in the state, the corporation is in a 
better position to achieve these objectives.
The State Pharmaceuticals Corporation was formed on 22 October 
1971 under the SICA with the following functions: (a) to import,
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e x p o r t ,  p u r c h a s e ,  s e l l  and d i s t r i b u t e  d r u g s ;  (b) t o  c o o r d i n a t e ,  
p ro m o te ,  d e v e lo p  and  r a t i o n a l i s e  t h e  m a n u f a c tu r e  o f  d r u g s ;  (c) t o  
m a n u f a c tu r e ,  p r o c e s s  and  s to c k  d r u g s ;  (d) t o  u n d e r t a k e  p h a r m a c o l o g i c a l  
an d  p h a r m a c e u t i c a l  r e s e a r c h  and s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n  o f  d r u g s ;  and (e) t o  
e x e r c i s e  q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  o f  d ru g s  ( G a z e t t e  No. 1 4 9 7 6 ) .  I n  t h e  f o u r  
y e a r s  o f  i t s  e x i s t e n c e  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  h a s  b een  o p e r a t i n g  m a in ly  a s  
an im p o r t  agency  f o r  t h e  d ru g  and  p h a r m a c e u t i c a l  n e e d s  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y .
At p r e s e n t  70 p e r  c e n t  o f  d rug  i m p o r t i n g  i s  d i r e c t l y  i n  t h e  h a n d s  o f  
t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  and  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  r e m a in d e r  i t  e x e r c i s e s  
r e g u l a t o r y  an d  s u p e r v i s o r y  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  q u a l i t y  and v a r i e t y  o f  d ru g s  
im p o r te d .  I t  i s  a l s o  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  w i t h  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  h a n d l i n g  t h e  
i m p o r t a t i o n  o f  d r u g s ,  t h e  c o u n t r y  h a s  b e e n  a b l e  t o  sa v e  m i l l i o n s  o f  
r u p e e s  i n  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e ,  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  i t s  c a p a c i t y  t o  o b t a i n  
c o m p e t i t i v e  p r i c e s  th ro u g h  b u lk  b u y in g .  The c o r p o r a t i o n  p l a n s  t o  s e t  
up m a n u f a c tu r in g  p l a n t s  i n  t h e  n e a r  f u t u r e  m a in ly  t o  f i l l  t h e  g a p s  t h a t  
e x i s t  i n  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  p a t t e r n .
The S r i  Lanka Tobacco I n d u s t r i e s  C o r p o r a t i o n  was e s t a b l i s h e d  on 
13 J u l y  1972 and  s t a r t e d  i t s  o p e r a t i o n  w i th  t h e  a s s e t s  o f  t h e  b e e d i  
s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  S m all  I n d u s t r i e s  C o r p o r a t i o n ,  v a lu e d  a t  Rs. 2 .8  m i l l i o n .  
A t i t s  i n c e p t i o n  t h e  s t a t e  f i x e d  a c a p i t a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  Rs. 1 m i l l i o n  
w i th  t h e  f o l l o w in g  f u n c t i o n s :  (a) t h e  im p o r t ,  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  an d  s a l e
o f  b e e d i  w ra p p e r  l e a f ;  (b) th e  m a n u f a c t u r e ,  p a c k in g ,  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  s a l e  
and e x p o r t  o f  b e e d i e s ;  (c) t h e  c u l t i v a t i o n  and t h e  p ro m o t io n  o f  t h e  
c u l t i v a t i o n  o f  k u d u m b e r iy a , and  t h e  p r o c e s s i n g  o f  t h i s  l e a f  f o r  u s e  i n  
t h e  m a n u fa c tu re  o f  b e e d i e s ;  and (d) t h e  c u l t i v a t i o n  o f  t o b a c c o  and th e
processing and manufacture of tobacco and tobacco products other than 
cigarettes (Gazette No. 15/9). The corporation's activities have so 
far been confined to the first two functions i.e. import and manufacture 
of beedies. Prior to 1956 no beedies were made in Ceylon and like 
most other things at that time they were imported. After 1958, instead 
of manufactured beedies, the wrapping leaves and tobacco were imported. 
Importing the finished beedi was prohibited in 1961. This paved the 
way for beedi wrapping to become a cottage industry. In the short 
period of its existence the corporation had made profits totalling 
Rs. 14 million and has extensive plans to broaden the scope of its 
activities.
The State Fertilizer Manufacturing Corporation was established 
on 10 May 1966 under the SICA for the purpose of manufacturing, 
processing and selling all types of fertilizer (Gazette No. 14694).
The initial capital specified in the incorporation was Rs. 190 million. 
During 1968 it acquired land for the factory and established a training 
centre for its technical personnel. The project on a later decision was 
capitalised to the value of Rs. 270 million to manufacture 500 tons of 
ammonia a day, and convert this to 850 tons of urea. When fully 
established fertilizer manufacturing will be the largest industrial 
undertaking in Sri Lanka.
The Ceylon Fisheries Corporation was set up on 1 October 1964 
under the SICA with the express objective of developing and promoting 
fishing industries in Sri Lanka. Its major functions as stated in
incorporation order were: (a) fishing operations - deep sea trawler
fishing etc.; (b) fish processing - canning, curing, drying, etc.;
(c) construction and maintenance of fishing harbours; (d) marketing 
and distribution of fish; and (e) import and export of fish and import 
of fishing gear, tackle and other equipment (Gazette No. 14186).
Having started with a token vote of Rs. 10 million, the corporation 
received a Rs. 36 million capital contribution in 1965. It started 
business in August the same year with the purchase and sale of wet 
fish supplied by beach consigners and fisherman organised into 
purchasing schemes, and the corporation's own staff. In 1969 the cor­
poration was able to supply 11 million pounds of fish, of which 
8 million pounds came from its own trawlers. It had its capital further 
increased in 1968 to enable it to establish fishing harbours, shore 
facilities, a gear factory, purchase of boats and transport vehicles 
and construction of markets and cold storage facilities. A Royal 
Commission appointed in 1970 to investigate its affairs and evaluate 
its performance criticised the lack of purpose in most of its 
activities (SP 9 1972).
The state industrial corporations are no doubt today important 
elements in the efforts towards economic development. Their success 
is thus crucial for the future prosperity and development of the 
country, not merely because they utilise Rs. 2,000 million worth of 
scarce investment capital in their undertakings and provide employment 
for half a lakh (50,000) , but far more because their success or failure 
would determine the future role of the state as no other factor would do. 
For if they succeed in achieving the objectives set, realising profit
for further investment as envisaged, there would be renewed hope in 
the ability of the state to pioneer development: but should they
fail^ , the whole programme of development would be slowed, incentive 
killed and state entrepreneurship discredited.
Thus it is important that they succeed in whatever they undertake, 
particularly at this point in development. But what could ensure their 
success and make their performance healthy? It is important that they 
have the right objectives, that is that they undertake only projects 
that are feasible. It is also important that such projects are carefully 
planned and evaluated and sited at places most suited to their develop­
ment. These are essential and important preconditions; but by them­
selves they cannot ensure the success of these enterprises. The state 
enterprises must be allowed to operate according to the norms of business 
rather than politics. And they should be free of corruption, malpractices 
and nepotism. These in turn depend on the type of men placed at the top, 
and the nature of supervision and control exercised from the centre.
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IV GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF CORPORATIONS
^How and in what way has Sri Lanka attempted to control 
corporations? What governmental instruments and organs of control 
perform what supervisory and coordinating functions? Can the pattern 
and procedures that exist to ensure efficiency and overall performance 
be justified? These are vital and important questions to answer 
because the view seems common in Sri Lanka that, in spite of the 
intentions of early legislators to give corporate boards the necessary 
autonomy, they have no more freedom today than they might have enjoyed 
as a specialised section of the Ministry of Industries (Naylor 1966: 17; 
ILO Report 1966 : 3) .
This chapter seeks to examine the system of control exercised 
over State Industrial Corporations. For this purpose the first question 
asked is why and where are public controls over state undertakings in 
fact necessary? With the understanding thus gained of the nature and 
type of control necessary to make corporations account or perform 
efficiently, the actual control exercised by the Ministry and other 
central organs of control are examined.
The Purposes of Control
Among the arguments advanced in favour of the use of public cor­
porations in Sri Lanka none was more forceful than that which urged that 
the state enterprises would require a degree of freedom that could not 
normally be ensured under the departmental form of administration
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T h is  a s p e c t  o r  v i r t u e  o f  c o r p o r a t e  form i n  f a c t  d o m in a te d  t h e  w hole 
d i s c u s s i o n  when th e  s t a t e  i n d u s t r i a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  b i l l  was b r o u g h t  
b e f o r e  t h e  H ouse. No member d i s a g r e e d ,  and  in d e e d  e v e ry o n e  f a v o u r e d  
t h e  v iew  t h a t  c o r p o r a t e  autonomy was e s s e n t i a l  f o r  t h e  e f f i c i e n t  and 
e c o n o m ic a l  c o n d u c t  o f  s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s . Such f reedom , h o w e v e r ,  can  by 
no means be a b s o l u t e  ( M a n i t i o s 1968: 5 1 3 ) ;  f o r  c o r p o r a t i o n s  a r e  an 
i m p o r t a n t  segm en t  o f  t h e  s t a t e  m a c h in e r y ,  and p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  a 
d e v e lo p i n g  c o u n t r y  such  as  S r i  Lanka t h e y  a r e  a v i t a l  i n s t r u m e n t  o f  
s o c i a l  and  econom ic d e v e lo p m en t  (B alog  1965: 40 ; G le n tw o r th  1973: 1 9 3 ) .  
I t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  and  o p e r a t i o n  s h o u ld  be  c l o s e l y  
w a tc h e d  and  w here n e c e s s a r y  b r o u g h t  i n  l i n e  w i t h  t h e  o v e r a l l  d e v e lo p m en t  
p rogram m e. I t  i s  e q u a l l y  i m p o r t a n t ,  a s  t h e y  employ a  g r e a t  d e a l  more o f  
p u b l i c  fu n d s  t h a n  an o r d i n a r y  gov e rn m en t  d e p a r tm e n t  o r  o t h e r  p u b l i c  
i n s t i t u t i o n ,  t h a t  t h e i r  o v e r a l l  p e r fo rm a n c e  and  p r o g r e s s  i s  s t u d i e d  
and  e v a l u a t e d .  I n  s h o r t ,  t h e  c a s e  f o r  c o r p o r a t e  c o n t r o l  i s  a s  s t r o n g  
a s  th e  n e e d  f o r  c o r p o r a t e  f reedom .
The m a jo r  o b j e c t i v e  o f  any s y s te m  o f  g o v e rn m e n ta l  c o n t r o l  o v e r  
p u b l i c  c o r p o r a t i o n s  s h o u ld  p r i m a r i l y  be  t o  o v e r s e e  o r  e n s u r e  t h e  
p u r p o s e s  f o r  w hich t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  i s  s e t  up a r e  f u l f i l l e d .  I t  i s  
h a r d  t o  g e n e r a l i s e ,  h ow ever ,  a b o u t  w hat a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  
a c t i v i t i e s  s h o u ld  come w i t h i n  t h e  p u rv ie w  o f  t h e  c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  
t o  s e rv e  t h i s  en d ;  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  c o r p o r a t i o n s  have  d i f f e r e n t  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  and  c o n t r o l s  t h a t  a r e  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  one ty p e  o f  c o r p o r a t i o n  
may n o t  be p r o p e r  f o r  a n o t h e r  (Webb 1955: 1 6 2 ) .  B e s id e s /  c o n t r o l s  t o  
be  e f f e c t i v e ,  m ust  a l s o  be d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  t o  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  w e l l
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established and ongoing enterprises from those not so well established 
and at the initial stage of their operation. The pattern of control 
moreover should be in accord with the objects and purposes of govern­
ment. in particular, it should vary with the needs of the planning 
adopted. Thus the control, and when and how it is exercised over a 
corporation, should vary with the nature of the corporation to which 
the control is directed and with the type of policies and programme 
pursued in the country.
Nonetheless there are some broad areas in corporate activities or 
operations that should be the subject of a control system. These 
relate to (a) attainment of stated targets or objects; (b) evaluation 
of overall performance; (c) co-ordination of individual targets to 
overall national objects and programme; and (d) ensuring public 
accountability (see Select Committee 1968: 17).
The attainment of state targets and evaluation of overall 
performance are aspects that no public control system can afford to 
ignore (Hanson 1962: 23). Public corporations are set up with 
public funds to provide goods and services. What should be produced, 
how much and at what cost are matters of public importance. The 
government as the guardian of public interest and the provider of 
capital funds and subsidies for the corporation should ensure to 
itself and to the public and parliament that their organisations are 
efficient and enterprising also that the goods that they produce and the 
services that they render are as economical as could be produced
under the public auspices (Pylee 1961: 355). It must also
12.
ensure that the public funds are committed in the best possible manner 
and no corruption and malpractices prevail to disadvantage the 
efficiency of the corporation (Ranganathan 1969: 70). Such concern 
over corporate performance is important as the corporate management 
under public auspices would have no direct financial gain of the kind 
associated with private ownership and the organisation itself 
being public would lack the profit motive or other incentives to 
optimise capital use, reduce production costs or to attain targets 
with minimum efforts and funds. In pursuing its stated objects, a 
corporate board could get on in a sloppy sort of way; or become involved in 
activities and trade practices, contracts and purchases not so well 
calculated to enhance the overall performance or interest of the 
business; or worse it could expand its organisation and activities 
contrary to the intentions of the parliament. The Fisheries Corporation, 
a body created to promote and develop the fishing industry, for example, 
had at one stage more men and materials committed to building and 
construction than were devoted to the production and sale of fish thus 
reversing the priorities and aims for which the corporation was 
established. 'Had the time, energy and money spent on the building 
operations' said the commission of enquiry into its affairs 'been 
devoted to the fishing the result would have been quite different'
(SP 9 1972: 173). The fact that corporate personnel have no stake in 
the capital fund employed in the corporation could make some corporations 
operate in a 'reckless' and 'thoughtless' manner and . invest public 
funds in activities without properly studying or evaluating their 
overall purpose. The first five years of the Salt Corporation operations,
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as the Salt Commission of inquiry established, is a good example of 
how careless a corporate management could become in handling develop­
mental projects and committing public funds ( TC 31 August 1963).
Public control over production targets and supervision over 
corporate performance are thus essential; the government at all times 
must have access to and greater say over the plans and projects of the 
corporation long before capital is committed to its programme and 
projects. None would deny the need for such controls; nor would 
such controls be considered to constitute any infringement upon 
corporate autonomy.
Apart from overseeing and evaluating corporate production and 
performance, governmental attention and control must also be directed 
to some of the important business decisions of corporations.
Public business enterprises differ only a little from private business 
in so far as management decisions are concerned (Patterson 1970: 94). 
The state corporations must decide like private businesses how much to 
invest, when to invest and in what form to make that investment. 
Besides, they determine the rate of pay and number of persons to employ 
in their undertakings. Also of importance to them is the profit margin 
and the end uses to be made of profit. The corporate device, some 
argue, can only be justified to the extent that state enterprises 
themselves have the power to make these decisions. This may be the 
ideal of a corporate system; but whether or not corporations 
in fact have full freedom to make these decisions depends on several 
factors, ranging from the government's economic policy and the capacity
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of the management to make these decisions to the position the cor­
porations themselves occupy in the economy (Coombes 1971: 41). The 
fact that some of these decisions - investments, wage structure and 
profit - have implications far beyond the bounds of the individual 
corporation and the fact that state corporations themselves are emerging 
as instruments of economic policy should make many of these decisions of 
critical importance to the government. No government - not even one 
committed to laissez faire - could free itself totally from expressing views 
or. these matters and reserving powers to assert its will. To what 
degree a government asserts itself and the areas in which it does so is 
another matter, but most of these decisions must undoubtedly be subject 
to the public control system.
Arising from these considerations, and equally important for 
public control is the need to co-ordinate the corporate activities 
and organisations with the overall plan and programme of the government 
(Hunt 1965). In essence what one corporation does should be in harmony 
with what is envisaged or planned for in the other sectors as well; 
otherwise its production and operations would tend to be out of tune 
with the rest of the economy; worse by tying up scarce capital in 
unrelated production, it could starve programmes and projects urgently 
in need of implementation. For instance, a government that sees 
'building and construction' as a major segment of its development 
programme may prefer to commit more capital funds and foreign exchange 
to the enterprises closely related to that programme than to 
others, while another government with a different emphasis may reverse
such allocations to serve its ends.
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Whatever the priority the government may choose - and this can 
change from time to time as from government to government - the organisation 
and operation of the corporations should be brought in line with those 
programmes; control for this purpose is therefore essential and 
inevitable. One may well argue that an enterprise/ with the proper 
study of the announced plan, could organise its operations and programme 
accordingly and that outside control on these matters is unnecessary.
Even such plans, though they may not be in conflict with the announced 
plans, should come under scrutiny to make them satisfy other requirements. 
For only the government can make a proper assessment of the competing 
demands elsewhere in the economy and therefore of the suitability or 
otherwise of a given project conceived by the corporation. Public control 
over corporations thus becomes essential to review and determine their 
goals within the national needs and priorities.
The need to account for the actions and omissions of corporate 
management at least in the sphere in which governments are made 
responsible is yet another reason for the exercise of control over 
corporations. On this view, although corporate boards derive their 
powers and objects directly from the parliament they should not be left 
wholly responsible for the exercise or non-exercise of their powers.
It is the minister and his government who should have to answer through 
the powers and responsibilities conferred in relation to supervision
and control over corporate affairs. Though the Minister may and can 
deny responsibility for the day to day conduct of business, he cannot, 
nevertheless, escape resposibility for the manner in which a corporation
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has discharged its objects and obligations and the way in which-it has 
progressed and performed. These are matters that should come directly 
under the authority of the government and its representative the 
minister responsible for its affairs.
It is appropriate at this stage to ask whether there are any forms 
of control that government in all circumstances must avoid or any 
freedom indispensable for productive efficiency. One can see four 
such areas where political control, if kept to the minimum, would 
enhance the overall efficiency of the corporation. The freedom to 
allocate its own resources within the limits of its capital endowment 
is undoubtedly one. Unless this freedom is guaranteed, corporate status 
can have no meaningful purpose and in fact it is to ensure this freedom, 
obviating thereby the need to refer to governmental rules and regulations 
framed for public expenditure, that corporate status is often conferred 
on business activities. Besides, the corporation must also have a large 
measure of freedom, if not complete freedom, to frame its own personnel 
policies and programme within the broad criteria set by the government. 
The government may, if it desires, reserve to itself the power of 
sanction for certain key appointments but at no time should it restrict 
the enterprise's freedom by tying it down to set procedures and 
practices. Thirdly, the corporation must have the freedom to devise 
its own internal organisation and procedures to carry out its activities 
without too much control imposed from above. It should be free to 
employ any work methods, procedures, or organisation depending on the 
nature of the tasks in hand. 'Competence in organisational matters
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i s  a h a l l  mark o f  a good m anage r ,  and one o f  t h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  g i v in g  
th e  u n d e r t a k i n g  some d e g re e  o f  autonomy i s  t o  e n a b le  t h e  management 
t o  e x e r c i s e  i t s  c r e a t i v i t y  i n  t h i s  f i e l d '  (Hanson 1967: 4 7 ) .  F i n a l l y  
t h e r e  i s  t h e  freedom  t o  c o n d u c t  i t s  day t o  day a c t i v i t i e s  w i t h o u t  
e x t e r n a l  i n t e r f e r e n c e .  F o r  i f  c o r p o r a t i o n s  a r e  t o  w a i t  f o r  
d e c i s i o n s  on t h e i r  day t o  day t r a n s a c t i o n s  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  c o r p o r a t e  
s t a t u s  w ould  be i n  q u e s t i o n .
T hese  a r e ,  i n  s h o r t ,  t h e  a r e a s  w here  c o n t r o l  s h o u ld  be  o r  s h o u ld  
n o t  be  e x e r c i s e d  o v e r  s t a t e  c o r p o r a t i o n s .  More p r e c i s e l y  t h e s e  a r e  
t h e  o b j e c t s  governm en t s h o u ld  se e k  th ro u g h  c o n t r o l  and  a r e a s  w hich  i t  
m ust a v o id  i n  p u r s u i n g  t h e s e  o b j e c t s .  W hether  o r  n o t  governm en t  c o n t r o l s  
o v e r  c o r p o r a t i o n s  i n  S r i  Lanka s u b s e r v e  t h e s e  e nds  o r  p e n e t r a t e  f u r t h e r  
down t o  c u r t a i l  m a n a g e r i a l  freedom  i s  t h e  fu n d a m e n ta l  q u e s t i o n  one 
m ust a t t e m p t  t o  a n sw e r .
The Legal Control
C e n t r a l  t o  t h i s  i s  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  s t a t u t e  t h a t  r e g u l a t e s  t h e  
o p e r a t i o n s  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n s .  'T he  s i n g l e  m ost c r i t i c a l  c o n t r o l  
p o i n t ' ,  s a y s  t h e  Rangoon r e p o r t ,  ' i s  t h e  law , d e c r e e  o r  o t h e r  b a s i c  
a u t h o r i t y  p r o v i d i n g  f o r  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a p u b l i c  e n t e r p r i s e ' ,  and ' t h i s  
i s  l i k e l y  t o  d e te r m in e  i n  l a r g e  m easu re  a l l  o t h e r  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s '  {UN 1954: 1 8 ) .  The S t a t e  I n d u s t r i a l  C o r p o r a t i o n s  A c t  
t h a t  r e g u l a t e s  t h e  o p e r a t i o n s  o f  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  e n t e r p r i s e s  i n  S r i  
Lanka i s  a  r e l a t i v e l y  weak document i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  i n  t h a t  w h i l e  i t  
d e f i n e s  t h e  pow ers  o f  t h e  gove rnm en t  c l e a r l y ,  i t  f a i l s  t o  e n u n c i a t e
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the organisational and operational principles that should govern the 
corporate activities. By comparison the statute governing, for 
example, the Ceylon Transport Board and the Port Cargo Corporation 
is clear in stating what a corporation must do and must not do, the 
actions it should take on its own initiative, and the actions for 
which it should seek the prior consent and sanction of the government. 
The State Trading Corporations Act, 1970, an enabling act similar to the 
State Industrial Corporations Act, thus sets out in Section 5 that a 
corporation under the Act discharges its functions and carries out its 
objects in such a way that its incoming revenue is sufficient to cover 
its costs . By section 24 it defines how it shall defray its revenue, 
and by section 22 where it may borrow and for what purpose borrowed 
money shall be applied. By section 5 it empowers the corporations to 
enter into contracts or other agreements with private establishments 
to carry out their objects and to formulate developmental plans and 
train personnel.
These provisions clearly show a corporation where it is free to 
operate and where it must seek governmental approval, thereby it 
minimises the area of ad hoc control. The greater the number of 
statutory provisions that regulate the corporate activities in the 
public interest - and very clear and specific they are ~ the less 
would be the need for central control on these matters. For 
corporations in obeying such regulations as have been imposed upon them, 
would be fulfilling some of the purposes for which public controls are 
essential. Statutory provisions which specify what a corporation
must do or must not do, or define the limits within which a certain
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decision may range, are the most satisfactory instrument of public 
control.. The board has the advantage of operating under defined terms; 
and the government is relieved of the frequent need to issue 
directions on particular questions' (Ramanadham 1964: 49).
Except for the few provisions relating to the form of accounts, 
borrowing and profit, which are vague and imprecise, the State Industrial 
Corporations Act does not contain any detailed instructions as to how 
a corporation should raise its funds, or apply its surplus, where it 
may borrow and for what purpose it shall apply funds. Only recently - 
that is with the passage of the Finance Act No. 38 of 1971 - have these 
corporations been brought under a clear set of obligations and conditions 
(Siriwardena 1972 : 55). This act now makes it obligatory that cor­
porations conduct their businesses so that the ultimate surpluses 
on revenue account shall at least be sufficient to cover the ultimate 
deficits on such accounts over a period of five years. The act also 
now enjoins the preparation of an annual budget projecting its revenue 
and expenditure which must be forwarded to the appropriate Minister, 
the Minister of Planning and the Minister of Finance. Thirdly, the 
act sets out how a corporation shall determine its revenue, surplusses 
and deficits for accounting purposes, and prohibits a corporation 
from incurring capital expenditure above Rs. 500,000 without ministerial
sanction.
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As opposed to the limited provisions regulating corporation 
activities, the act nonetheless reserves sufficient powers for the 
Minister to secure control over corporations. These can be grouped 
under two headings: (a) Administrative powers; and (b) Financial
powers. Administrative powers are those relating to the appointment 
and dismissal of corporate boards, issuance of ministerial directions 
and the like, and financial powers are generally those which require 
ministerial acquiescence or consent to financial decisions (Paul 
1957: 158).
By section 12 the act provides that the Minister shall appoint 
the directors from among persons who appear to the Minister to have 
had experience of and shown capacity in industrial, commercial and 
financial matters. By section 14 (1) (2) and (3) he is granted the
power to appoint the managing director, and to determine the terms and 
conditions of his employment. Section 3 (2) empowers him to alter the 
objects of the corporation by amending the incorporation order.
Important among ministerial powers is the power to issue directions 
to the board. According to section 31 (1), 'the Minister may from 
time to time give the board of directors general directions, and after 
consultation with such boards special directions as to the exercise 
of the powers and the discharge of the duties, and such directions 
shall be carried out by the board'. The presence of this clause 
emphasises that the ultimate responsibility for policy is that of the 
Minister. Also, it is in the overall power of the Minister to ask
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for and be furnished with any information concerning the affairs of 
the corporation, and to direct any person to hold an inquiry into the 
work and financial position of the corporation. The powers to frame 
rules, and prescribe various activities to be undertaken and the 
general procedures to be adopted as to budgets, annual accounts and 
financial statements are also assigned to the Minister.
These are direct and definite powers through the exercise of which 
the government can regulate, co-ordinate and supervise corporate 
activities. The then Minister of Industries himself explained, when 
he introduced these provisions in October 1957, that 'these are powers 
to transmit government policy to the board of directors and to 
prevent them from going counter to the government policy' (CHRD 18 October 
1957: 950). He justified powers by saying that such powers exist when­
ever the corporate form is present. 'I have not taken upon myself any 
dictatorial powers that are not obtaining in all nationalised enter­
prises in Great Britain. They have all these powers in U.K.; the 
Minister has special powers, general powers, powers of direction, powers 
of approval and powers of framing regulations. These are more or less 
powers that the Minsiter should have from one point of view namely to 
have the required amount of public control' (CHRD 18 October 1957: 950).
Sufficient powers thus exist for the Minister to control cor­
porations. But the question still remains as to how they have been 
exercised? For the existence of such powers, though necessary for the 
exercise of controls, does not tell us their extent or the manner in
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w hich  th e y  have  b e e n  e x e r c i s e d .  Nor does  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  such  pow ers -  
even  i f  d e f i n e d  an d  l i m i t e d  -  g u a r a n t e e  t h a t  t h e  c o n t r o l s  a r e  l i m i t e d  
t o  t h o s e  a r e a s  o r  a s p e c t s  w hich t h e  c o r p o r a t e  s t a t u t e  s p e c i f i e s .  In  
r e a l i t y  th e  d e g re e  o f  c o n t r o l  o r  i n f l u e n c e  w ie ld e d  by t h e  governm en t  
i s  a  f u n c t i o n  l e s s  o f  l e g a l  p r o v i s i o n s  t h a n  o f  c o n v e n t i o n s .  Hence f o r  
f r u i t f u l  i n s i g h t  i n t o  c o r p o r a t e  c o n t r o l  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  a p p e a l  m ust  be 
made n o t  o n ly  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  and c h a r a c t e r  o f  fo rm a l  pow ers  a s s i g n e d  
t o  t h e  M i n i s t e r  b u t  a l s o  t o  th e  a c t u a l  r e c o r d  o f  t h e  m anner i n  w hich  
t h e y  have  b e e n  e x e r c i s e d .
I n  th e  r e s t  o f  t h e  c h a p t e r ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a t t e n t i o n  i s  f o c u s s e d  on 
t h e  a c t u a l  c o n t r o l  f u n c t i o n s  p e r fo rm e d  by t h r e e  m i n i s t r i e s :  t h e  
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  M i n i s t r y ,  t h e  T r e a s u r y  and  t h e  M i n i s t r y  o f  P l a n n in g  and 
Economic A f f a i r s .  F o r  i t  i s  t h ro u g h  them  t h a t  t h e  g o v e rn m e n ta l  i n t e n t i o n s  
a r e  made known t o  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  and  t h e r e f o r e  c o n t r o l  by t h e s e  
b o d i e s  would  r e f l e c t  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  a c t u a l  freedom  t h a t  gov e rn m en t  
c h o o s e s  t o  c o n f e r  on c o r p o r a t e  b o d i e s .
Controls in Practice
I n  commenting on t h e  g o v e rn m e n t 's  c o n t r o l  o v e r  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  a 
UN e x p e r t  N a y lo r  G eorge rem ark ed  t h a t  ' c o r p o r a t i o n s  i n  C ey lon  s t a n d  
on t h e i r  own b o t to m s  i n  t h e o r y  o n l y ' . He w en t  on t o  sa y  t h a t  'w h a te v e r  
t h e  r e a s o n s ,  t h e  r e s u l t  i s  t h a t  t h e  c h a irm a n  o f  e a c h  c o r p o r a t i o n  r e t a i n s  t h e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  w h i le  a l l  o f  th e  a u t h o r i t y  r e s t s  i n  a d i v i s i o n  o f  t h e  
M i n i s t r y  o f  I n d u s t r y '  (N a y lo r  1966: 1 7 ) .  I f  t h i s  i s  a h a r s h  ju d g m e n t,  
i t  i s ,  n o n e t h e l e s s ,  t r u e .  F o r  an  a n a l y s i s  o f  c o n t r o l  e x e r c i s e d  by t h e  
M i n i s t r y  o v e r  c o r p o r a t i o n s  r e v e a l s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  t h a t  a c o r p o r a t i o n
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can do without the Ministry's consent and approval. Whether this is an 
imposition on the part of the Ministry or the result of a lack of 
confidence or competence on the part of the board is hard to say.
In certain cases, the Ministry has laid down the pattem and 
procedures for the conduct of the corporation's activities in such 
detail that no board can take any initiative on its own. There are, 
besides, actions and policies concerning the affairs of the corporations 
which only the administrative Ministry can undertake. The rigidity of 
some of these controls can be illustrated.
For instance, no corporate board can conduct its major transactions 
without reporting them to the Ministry; and indeed it is not unusual 
for corporations to seek ministerial approval and suggestions even 
before they are finalised. Besides, where corporations are not 
specifically exempted from Treasury and Financial regulations that 
regulate governmental activities, they are normally expected to observe 
them. 'Unless the Financial Regulations exclude them' , stated the 
Auditor General before the Public Accounts Committee, 'we see to it 
that the Financial Regulations are observed' (PAC 1963: 83). Thus 
it becomes the responsibility of the administrative Ministry to see 
that the conduct of corporate transactions is in conformity with these 
regulations (Interview with a former officer of the Department of 
Industries, who was also a former chairman of a corporation, June 1975). 
However, the extent to which the observance of such regulations is 
necessary can be seen in the comment made by the Salt Commission
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of inquiry. 'The Chairman has conducted his activities', the 
Commissioner said, 'as if he were unaware of administrative and 
financial regulations' (SP 9 1963, 104).
In the matter of purchase of raw materials and other supplies, 
the corporations are again compelled to observe Tender procedures in 
the same way as departments. A Treasury circular, for instance, charges 
that a corporation should give reasons if at any time it accepts 
quotations which are not the lowest tendered (TCL 29 May 1966). Further 
the ministry reserves the right to fix the upper limits of every such 
tender, and no contract exceeding Rs. 50,000 can be concluded without 
prior consultation and approval (interview June 1975). The restrictive 
nature of these conditions is obvious and in fact corporate chairmen 
are unanimous in complaining about their rigidity and unsuitability.
They say that in the case of purchase of equipment and machinery, for 
instance, the adherence to these procedures tends to leave them with 
goods that are not ideal for local conditions. For the lowest quotations 
and the quality of the goods needed sometimes do not tally.
In the case of appointment and dismissal of corporate personnel, 
ministerial control is further restrictive. For no appointment to 
staff posts, such as Engineers, Accountants or Chemists can be made 
without the Ministry's approval and they can only be made at a salary 
fixed by the Ministry. In a circular letter sent to the corporations, 
the Ministry further prescribes the scales at which the corporations 
should pay their other categories of employees (Ministry Directive
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No. EB 2300, 16 December 1957; also see Chapter 9, Report Salt Commission 
Inquiry, SP 9, 1963). No clerk is thus to be employed other than at 
a salary of Rs. 75 and no stenographer other than at Rs. 87 per mensem
a
initially. These conditions extend to peons, book-keepers, typists, 
storekeepers, messengers, watchers and time-keepers etc. (SP 9 1961:
75). Circular letters 312, 313, 314 {A.G.Report 1972: 292), further 
determines the loans and advances a corporation can pay its employees.
In the payment of allowances and allocation of overtime for corporate 
personnel constant reference to the Ministry is needed.
Apart from contract, purchase and personnel, 'price' is another 
important element in the operation of the corporations. Whether a 
corporation is successful or not as a business concern depends on its 
income and therefore in part on the price it can charge for its product. 
'A corporation that constantly shows a book loss', maintained the 
chairman of the Eastern Paper Mills Corporation in the memorandum he 
submitted to the government requesting an increase in the price for 
his product, 'would have wide ramifications not only on the political 
aspect of its operations, but also on the morale of those who work for 
it' (Memorandum 1965: 2; See also Kanesalingham, 1970). However no 
corporation is allowed to determine the price of its products, and 
the authority in full is assigned to the Ministry. According to the 
Treasury Circular Letter of 31 August 1969, the Ministry is required 
to frame the price policy for all corporations and in doing so it is 
required to take into consideration the following guidelines:
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(a) the unit cost of production and the level of operational
efficiency;
(b) the comparative level of markets and the C.I.F. prices of
the imported equivalent;
(c) the retum on capital invested by the government which the
corporation is expected to provide;
(d) the level of profitability which the corporations should
aim at.
Although these guidelines are comprehensive and well thought out, not 
all prices fixed by the Ministry conform to them: of the selling
price fixed for flour, for instance, the Auditor General said that 
'it does not include any proportion of the expenses relating to milling, 
establishment and administration', and that the corporation would 
continue to incur losses unless realistic prices based on actual costs 
were fixed (A.G. Report 1972: 300). On occasions corporations are 
also forced to sell at a lower price to the public sector, sometimes 
much below production costs (Naylor 1966: 52) . The complaint of the 
Paper Mills chairman brings out clearly the restrictive nature of this 
practice:
Since 1959, several attempts have been made to upgrade prices 
for the public sector in conformity with costs, but the 
Treasury has blocked. . In fact the formula adopted for 
pricing local products has not been applied in the case 
of this corporation. While it is appreciated that the 
primary responsibility of the Treasury is to keep down the 
cost of purchase for government departments, it is obviously 
undesirable to achieve this at the expense of beggaring a 
corporation. It is essential therefore that the Ministry should 
authorise purchase for public sector on the same terms and 
conditions as sales made to the private sector (Memorandum 1965: 3)
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On the production side, important and detailed controls are also 
exercised through the Ministry's right to receive and approve budgets. 
Three months before the commencement of the financial year every 
corporation under the charge of the administrative Ministry submits 
foi the perusal and approval of the Ministry a comprehensive budget 
containing the corporation's production targets, profit targets 
expected rate of return on government investments. Included in this 
budget are also the corporation's capital development programme and a 
list of other new services it expects to provide in the forthcoming 
financial year (Finance Act No. 38, 1971, section 8.3). Apart from 
the annual budgets, corporations also submit periodical reports 
stating the progress made, difficulty experienced, any shortcoming in 
performance and anything else to do with cost and stock position, to 
enable the Ministry to evaluate the performance of the corporation as 
against the budgeted targets (TCL 31 July 1969). The extent to which 
the Ministry could control corporations through these means need not 
be gone through here. It is sufficient to say that unless the above 
budgets and periodical reports are approved, the corporations have 
little or no authority to commit any funds to their schemes either 
current or capital.
The other matters that come within the purview of the Ministry 
in this connection are:
(a) Review of the draft Annual Accounts submitted within
four months of the close of the financial year;
(b) Consideration of proposals for the appropriation of
profits to Reserves and the shares to be paid to 
the Consolidated Fund.
88
Equally rigorous and detailed are the controls exercised by the 
Treasury over corporations. In some instances its controls are 
necessitated by the unique position it occupies in the administrative 
system and in other cases they are the result of its influence within 
the government. Though it is not empowered to deal with the state 
undertakings directly but is expected to act through the Ministry of 
Industries, its impact on corporate affairs is nonetheless real. This 
is clear in the number and variety of controls it has come to exert 
over the years. Among other things, it today (a) examines the annual 
budgets in association with the Ministry of Industries; (b) reviews 
the draft annual accounts and balance sheets which must be made 
available to it three months before the end of each financial year; (c) 
examines in association with the Ministry any proposals relating to 
appropriation of profits to reserves and the amount to be made available 
to the Consolidated Fund; (d) supervises procedures, rules and regulations 
formulated for the conduct of the financial business of the corporations; 
(e) initiates and promotes measures to improve financial administration - 
sound budgeting, accounting and reporting systems; and (f) appoints 
representatives to serve on the boards of various corporations (TCL 
31 August 1969).
Where changes in the organisation and operation of a corporation 
are necessary, Treasury is further empowered to issue circulars to 
regulate them. In fact it was through these circulars that in 1969 
the Treasury brought about changes in the budget format of the cor­
porations (TCL 30 August 1969); introduced uniform accounting and 
administrative procedures (TCL 1 June 1970) and prescribed the limits 
of remuneration and travelling expenses to be paid to the board of
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directors (TCL 2 July 1961). Where it thinks there is corruption,
malpractice or nepotism it initiates action to investigate them (TCL
30 September 1968). Elimination of fraud and irregularities has been
the object of many of its circulars. For instance, in the circular it
issued in 1967, Treasury instructs as follows:
You are therefore requested to ensure that the officers 
responsible for supervision in your department are vigilant 
in enforcing all internal control measures. In any case 
where the existing internal systems are considered in any 
respect inadequate, the advice of the Treasury financial 
division should be sought (TCL 2 February 1967).
However, the most important control functions of the Treasury are
those relating to the investment and borrowing of the corporations.
Since most corporations are dependent on Treasury loans and advances
for part of their capital expenditure, every new investment for expansion
and diversification must have the prior approval and consent of the
Treasury; and until such approval is granted, no capital expenditure
however big or small can be committed. Mr. Amerasinghe, the Permanent
Secretary, explained why such control was necessary:
The question has been raised by [every other] Ministries who 
put up projects. They say, "we have our own men who 
advise us.. Is there any necessity for a second examination 
by the Treasury? I think there is a very great necessity 
for another examination by Treasury. So far as the 
ministry is concerned, it is only concerned with its own 
sphere of responsibility. It does not generally consider 
how anything it does would conflict with something that 
somebody else wants to do (PAC 1963: 101).
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With a view to enabling the Treasury to play a more active 'role in 
the affairs of the corporations/ the government in 1964 decided to 
create a separate division within the Treasury with a primary res­
ponsibility to coordinate and regulate the financial/ management and 
establishment aspects of all corporations (CDN 10 August 1964; also 
ADR 1971: 30). When he proposed this the Minister explained why such 
a 'division' was necessary, thus revealing the enormous authority 
wielded by Treasury over corporate affairs today:
The experience of the past several years provides ample
indications that the corporate autonomy has had many
undesirable consequences.. I have decided to create within
the Treasury a 'unit' which will keep the finances of the
corporations under constant surveillance. All corporations
will be required in future to submit annual budgets of
revenue and expenditure for the Treasury approval and no
major departure from these budgets will be permitted
except with the sanction of the Treasury (CHRD 30 July 1964: 1634)
That is precisely what the Corporations Division within the Treasury
does today.
Apart from the Treasury, and the administrative Ministry, the 
industrial corporations are also subject to overall review and super­
vision by the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs. For instance 
all new7 proposals, such as those for increasing productive capacity or 
for the employment of additional men in the undertakings, should have 
the approval of the Planning Ministry. Its approval also must be 
sought for any increase in the corporation's authorised capital, or 
for additional loans and grants or for investment of its own funds
above five lakhs of rupees (TCL 31 August 1969).
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It also provides guidelines to the sponsoring Ministry for economic 
and financial evaluation of the corporation's activities and advises 
it on the measurement of efficiency in the enterprises. The other 
functions performed by the Ministry vis-a-vis industrial corporations 
may be stated as follows:
(a) examination of estimates of demand for the corporation
products, growth forecasts, etc?
(b) reviewing the quarterly reports for the purpose of
preparing an annual evaluation report on the activities
of each corporation;
(c) advising corporations on the format of their Annual Reports
and the details they should contain.
Much of the Ministry's control is of a general character exercised 
a step or two removed from the corporations. Nonetheless its overall 
impact on the corporations operations is substantial, for unless the 
Ministry is in favour of corporations' proposals on development schemes, 
prices, cost structure, estimation of demand forecast etc., it can 
largely stifle the operations.
There is no denying that wide powers of control exist in the 
Ministries and other organs of central control. Perhaps wider than they 
need be. Almost every aspect where corporate freedom is eagerly sought 
and conferred in countries elsewhere has been brought under the control 
of the above authorities. The board of directors are not completely 
free in the usual sense as they are made to observe directions on many 
matters which are purely internal to the corporate management.
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'Judging by modern management practices', observed an ILO expert,
'there is insufficient delegation of powers to the board of directors .. 
the interpretation of the State Industrial Corporations Act by Ministry 
officials has led to this large degree of control over day to day 
management of the corporation.(ILO Report 1966: 3). The same 
observation was made by the UN expert who made a study of these cor­
porations when he said that the Ministry of Industries is exercising more 
intimate control than was apparently intended when the State Industrial 
Corporations Act of 1957 was passed' (Naylor 1966: 39).
Why have such controls become necessary? Having created the 
board with the legal status to enable it to operate as an independent 
entity, what made government exercise such a wide variety of controls?
Are there any specific reasons peculiar to the Sri Lankan situation 
which make these controls imperative?
It would be pretentious to argue that all such controls are necessary 
or inevitable in the Sri Lankan situation; but some of them most 
certainly are. In the light of the statutory provisions most controls 
by the Ministry could be seen as unlawful. For instance, in the case 
of appointment and dismissal of corporate personnel, the Act clearly 
empowers the boards of corporations to appoint and dismiss their own 
staffs, and the exercise of controls by the Ministry in this instance 
appears to be a gross violation of the statute. The Permanent Secretary 
to the Ministry of Industries himself admitted the lack of legal validity
for most of the Ministry's authority over corporate administration 
(Samarasinghe 1964: 10). Nonetheless, it would be difficult to sustain 
the view that, in the context of Sri Lanka, an administrative Ministry 
or other organs of control should or could confine itself to matters 
that are specifically laid down in the statute. For most corporations 
that start their career under public auspices are raw organisations 
requiring a great deal of help particularly at the initial stage 
of their operations when construction of a factory, recruitment of new 
personnel and the institution of new methods and procedures are 
involved. The Ministry cannot avoid responsibility by saying that it 
would not act beyond what is stated in the Act, as it certainly has 
to play and in fact is called upon to play an active role (FAC 1972:
149), even to the extent of day-to-day supervision and control, to get 
the corporation and the enterprise off the ground.
Even after the corporations are well established, the introduction 
of detailed procedures - if not in all aspects of their administration, 
at least in some areas such as recruitment of personnel, purchases 
and contracts - may also be necessary in the Sri Lankan context. When 
two corporations maintain different pay scales for the same job, for 
instance, this tends to create a situation politically embarrassing to 
the government (for the Minister's view CDN 24 August 1963; for the 
Parliamentarians' view, CDN 26 August 1967; CO 17 February 1970). Unions 
organised on an occupational basis - clerks, stenographers, metal 
workers etc -tend to exert pressure on the government to get uniform pay 
and better living conditions for their members (for the role of Trade 
Unions, CDN 13 May 1963, 23 September 1963; CO 5 January 1970). loans
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advances and allocation of overtime have also been matters for union 
strikes (CDN 23 January 1965; CO 28 August 1963, 16 October 1970).
Aware of such situations, or as a result of previous experience in 
these matters, the government through the Ministries tends to regulate 
most such procedures on wages, salary and overtime etc. (TC 14 August 
1963). As regards its intervention in the case of tender procedures, 
contracts and other financial matters, the known and proven abuses and 
corruption of the boards and others in responsible positions have been 
the major reason for much of the centralised direction and control.
The two commissions of inquiry recently appointed to investigate alleged 
corruption and other malpractices did conclude by positively charging 
management with a wide variety of corruption and abuse of authority 
(SP 9 1963, chapters IV and IX; SP 9 1972: 79-120).
Aside from the existence of corruption and malpractices, the
absence of clear administrative and financial procedures and other
control measures within the corporate system itself has contributed to
the introduction of a great deal of control to rectify these matters.
The reports of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) contain convincing
evidence of the extent to which the corporate managements have been lax.
Even after repeated instruction by the PAC to do so, the corporations
have failed to adopt practices and procedures necessary for sound
financial management. As far back as 1963, for instance, PAC observed:
Your committee next desire to refer to the financial
and administrative regulations.. Your committee have
little doubt that had suitable regulations existed to
govern the conduct of business., many of the losses
might have been avoided.. The absence of suitable regulations
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m i l i t a t e s  a g a i n s t  th e  s a t i s f a c t o r y  s e t t i n g  up and  p r o p e r  
f u n c t i o n i n g  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  w hich a r e  e s s e n t i a l  f o r  
t h e  a v o id a n c e  o f  f r a u d ,  w a s ta g e  and  i n e f f i c i e n c y  (PAC 1963: 3 3 ) .
Even a s  r e c e n t l y  a s  1973 , t h e  same o b s e r v a t i o n s  ru n  th ro u g h  m ost  o f  
t h e  A c c o u n ts  Com m ittee r e p o r t s .  I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t ,  i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h e s e  
s h o r tc o m in g s  on t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i t s e l f ,  t o  
s e e  how th e  g ove rnm en t  c o u ld  rem a in  an i d l e  s p e c t a t o r .
P e r h a p s  a f a r  more i m p o r t a n t  f a c t o r  h e r e  i s  t h e  ' s y s t e m '  w i t h i n  
w h ich  c o r p o r a t i o n s  and  governm en t h av e  t o  o p e r a t e .  P a r l i a m e n t  w i t h o u t  
a d o u b t  e x p e c t s  t h e  governm en t t o  p l a y  a more p o s i t i v e  and  a c t i v e  
r o l e  and  h o ld s  i t  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  e v e ry  o m is s io n  and com m iss ion  o f  t h e  
c o r p o r a t i o n s  to  an e x t e n t  t h a t  w ould  b e l i e  t h e  s e p a r a t e  c h a r t e r  o r  
l e g a l  s t a t u s  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n s .  The P u b l i c  A cco u n ts  Com m ittee  a l s o  
demand a more c l o s e  and  i n t i m a t e  s u p e r v i s i o n  o f  c o r p o r a t e  a f f a i r s  
even  t o  t h e  p o i n t  o f  i n t e r f e r e n c e  i n  t h e i r  d a i l y  t r a n s a c t i o n s .  T y p i c a l  
o f  t h e  r o l e  e x p e c t e d  an d  a t t i t u d e  m a i n t a i n e d  by  t h e s e  b o d i e s  i s  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  recom m enda tion  w hich  t h e  PAC made t o  t h e  P a r l i a m e n t :
Your Com m ittee w ish  t o  r e f e r  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  s u p e r ­
v i s i o n  e x e r c i s e d  by t h e  M i n i s t r i e s  o v e r  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n s  
an d  B o ard s  f u n c t i o n i n g  u n d e r  t h e i r  c o n t r o l .  From 
p a s t  e x p e r i e n c e  and  from p r e v i o u s  r e p o r t s  o f  t h e  
A u d i t o r - G e n e r a l  and  t h e  recom m enda tions  o f  t h e  PAC, 
t h e  a r e a s  w here c o r p o r a t i o n s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  make m i s t a k e s  
a r e  known. However, i t  i s  a m a t t e r  f o r  r e g r e t  t h a t  when 
a new c o r p o r a t i o n  i s  s e t  up f o r  some p u r p o s e ,  e v e ry  
s i n g l e  m is ta k e  made i n  t h e  p a s t  i s  r e p e a t e d .  I n  t h e  
v iew  o f  y o u r  Com m ittee t h e  M i n i s t r i e s  a r e  p a r t l y  t o  
b lam e f o r  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n .  When a new c o r p o r a t i o n  i s
96
formed it is the duty of the Ministry to call up the 
management of the corporation and brief them of the errors 
that had taken place in the past and warn them against their 
repetition. There should also be established, at the highest 
possible level, a close liaison between the Ministry and the 
corporation to see that these errors are not repeated. Your 
Committee trust that some arrangements would be made on the 
lines suggested to enable the Ministry supervision to be 
effective and a continuing process (PAC 1972: 59).
Even stronger than this was the demand made upon the Permanent Secretary
to the Ministry of the Industries by the chairman of the Public Accounts
Committee, when he admonished him as follows:
The other matter is this. Every time a new corporation is 
started all the possible dangers are known from the previous 
audit reports and the previous reports of this Committee.
But every single mistake has to be repeated.. What is the point 
in a continuing ministerial supervision of this whole area unless 
when you start a new corporation you call these people and tell 
them, 'Look here, these are the mistakes that happened in the 
past, do not repeat them', and unless somebody in the Ministry, 
the Chief Accountant or the Permanent Secretary, keeps a 
liaison with the actual accountant of the corporation to see 
that these mistakes are avoided? .. There is a certain angle of 
Ministerial supervision that is necessary; otherwise there is 
no point in saying that the Permanent Secretary is the Chief 
Accounting Officer. That supervision is not there. (PAC 1972: 
148-9). (Emphasis added by author).
It would thus be hard to criticise the government for the close and 
detailed control it exercises over industrial corporations. The only 
valid criticism would be of their adequacy or effectiveness.
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The ( in ) e f f e c t iv e n e s s  of Government Control
How e f f e c t i v e  i s  t h e  governm en t  c o n t r o l  on m a t t e r s  w hich  a r e  
t r a d i t i o n a l l y  r e c o g n i s e d  a s  p o l i c y  m a t t e r s ,  w hich  b e lo n g  t o  t h e  g o v e rn ­
m e n t ' s  domain o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  a s  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from day t o  day 
o p e r a t i o n s ?  To be e f f e c t i v e  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d ,  s a i d  t h e  I n d i a n  Reform 
Commission i n  ad m o n ish in g  th e  I n d i a n  G overnm ent, c o n t r o l  ' s h o u l d  
be  c o n f i n e d  t o  b a s i c  t h i n g s  and key  p o i n t s .  By r e d u c i n g  t h e  s p r e a d  
o f  gov e rn m en t  c o n t r o l ' ,  i t  w en t on t o  s a y ,  ' i t  w i l l  be  a b l e  t o  fo c u s  
a t t e n t i o n  on v i t a l  and  s t r a t e g i c  m a t t e r s  and  t h e r e f o r e  e n s u r e  e f f e c t i v e  
c o m p l ia n c e  w i th  t h e  governm en t  p o l i c y .  A w e l l  r e g u l a t e d  c o n t r o l  
sy s te m  s h o u ld  t h e r e f o r e  n o t  be d i f f u s e d  an d  d i s p e r s e d '  ( I n d i a n  Reform 
Commission 1967: 3 0 ) .  When we lo o k  a t  t h e  S r i  Lankan s i t u a t i o n ,  we 
f i n d  num erous c o n t r o l s  a r e  b e in g  e x e r c i s e d  o v e r  a l l  and s u n d ry  m a t t e r s ,  
and  t h e  o b v io u s  q u e s t i o n  t h a t  a r i s e s  i s  w h e th e r  t h e  c o n t r o l  sy s te m  i s  
n o t  s e l f - d e f e a t i n g  by m is s in g  th e  wood f o r  t h e  t r e e s .
The R a ja p a k se  Com m ittee i n  1971, a f t e r  a  y e a r - a n d - a  h a l f ' s  s tu d y  
o f  t h e  s y s te m ,  c o n c lu d e d  t h a t  many o f  t h e  c o n t r o l s  a r e  w a s t e f u l ,  o v e r ­
l a p p i n g  and a t  t im e s  o b n o x io u s  b e c a u s e  u n r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  r e a l  n e e d s  
o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  The c o m m it tee  s a i d :  'V a r io u s  a g e n c i e s  
such  a s  t h e  M i n i s t r y  i n  c h a r g e ,  M i n i s t r y  o f  P l a n n in g  and t h e  T r e a s u r y  
c a l l  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s  o f  i n f o r m a t io n  from  p u b l i c  c o r p o r a t i o n s  t o  
re v ie w  and  exam ine t h e i r  o p e r a t i o n s .  T h i s  u n c o o r d i n a t e d  a t t e m p t  t o  
re v ie w  o n ly  r e s u l t s  i n  a  heavy  b u rd e n  o f  c l e r i c a l  work on t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n s .  
The f i g u r e s  s u b m i t t e d  c a n n o t  be c o n s id e r e d  r e l i a b l e .  T h e r e f o r e ,  w h i l e
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there has been the intention of the government to oversee and review 
the work of the corporations, in practice the operation has been a 
failure (Rajapakse Committee 1971: 214). The attitude of the Salt 
Commission of inquiry was the same: 'The present supervisory control
of state corporations is not adequate ... we therefore consider the 
state corporations should be subject to greater supervision than at 
present' (SP 9, 1963: 106). The difficulty with ineffective control is 
that while it inhibits operational initiative by imposing an external 
apparatus, it fails in its objective of regulating matters in those 
areas where control is essential. Several factors have combined to 
render governmental control ineffective.
Firstly, as we said before, and the Rajapakse Committee itself 
emphasised, the Ministry is so preoccupied with organisation and 
procedural details that it would be difficult for the Ministry to deal 
with them all and to effectively formulate an overall policy framework 
for the operations of the corporations. When one adds the total number 
and variety of corporations that exist and need supervision in this 
manner the conclusion is inevitable. Furthermore, the Minister and 
his Ministry cannot devote themselves entirely to corporate adminis­
tration as they are entrusted with other responsibilities as well.
For example, the Minister responsible for Industries in 1961 had 
several other portfolios to administer including Home, Cultural Affairs 
and Fisheries in addition to his onerous parliamentary responsibility 
as the leader of the House and Deputy Premier. In fact, even at this
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stage there were questions as to how effective a Minister's supervision 
could be when he had such an odd collection of Departments and subjects 
to administer:
Twenty-one departments are too many for even the ablest and
most energetic Minister.. He has to attend to Buddha Sasana
problems on one side, with cultural problems on the other
and he has to look after the Kachcheri affairs. He cannot
give his personal attention to directing policy.. The
Honourable Minister can look after Industries only if he
is concerned with this subject alone, only then can he
seriously study the various implications of our industrial
problems (CHRD 4 September 1961: 1732). [Emphasis added by author]
Despite these initial criticisms the situation did not alter over the 
years: the present Minister also has several other departments and
subjects under his care.
Secondly, the Ministry of Industries itself is not well equipped 
or manned to deal with all the problems of industrial corporations.
Nor is it suitably organised to control and direct corporations from 
the centre in the way it has attempted. Of the five sections that 
operate within the Development Division of the Ministry of Industries, 
the Public Sector Management section composed of no more than half-a- 
dozen officers is vested with the overall responsibility of supervising 
and controlling all the corporations. When all the problems of all 
the corporations are poured into this 'organisational bottleneck' control 
and supervision become unmanageable. The Development Division itself 
in fact failed to change over the years in accord with the needs and 
requirements of the corporate system. The Permanent Secretary to the
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Ministry of Industries, after comparing the Sri Lankan system of 
control and supervision with that prevailing in India, alluded to this:
It is clear from the picture drawn that much of the 
industrial development [India] is to a large extent 
dependent on the efficiency and competence, the speed of 
work and the availability of information and the expertise 
of the Development Wing., Obviously in Ceylon, it is not 
necessary to have so extensive an organisation as the 
Development Wing in India. But we feel that the question 
is not so much of size as one of form and quality.. One 
cannot say that the Development Division in Ceylon is adequately 
or competently staffed technically to perform the functions 
that it has as its objective (Samarasinghe 1964: 15).
Thirdly, an even more serious and limiting factor for effective 
control is the appointment of public officers as chairman, directors 
and members of the corporate boards to undertake full responsibility 
for managing state enterprises. So common has been this practice that 
there was not a single year in the seventeen years when departmental 
officers had not been on the boards of corporations. Thus at present, 
the Permanent Secretary, Additional Permanent Secretary, Assistant 
Secretaries and Directors of the Ministry of Industries are serving 
on the boards of several corporations, some of them as chairmen, others 
as directors (see chapter V for details). In addition, every other 
board includes some of the most senior officers of the Treasury. The 
damaging aspect of this practice is that when senior officers such as 
these serve as chairmen or directors of an enterprise they as controlling 
officers of the government cannot objectively or dispassionately study
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and evaluate the corporation's performance. In their departmental 
capacity they are merely reviewing or analysing their own decisions 
and actions taken as chairmen and directors of an enterprise, to the 
detriment of effective government control (PAC 1960: 32). Yet another 
consequence of this practice is that when mistakes are made and 
inefficiency or corruption sets in, officers can cover them up effectively 
from the public view. An embittered parliamentarian, after an unsuccess­
ful attempt to elicit information on alleged mismanagement by a state 
official, told the house: 'Even among highway robbers there is some
kind of loyalty one to another. In the Civil Service too they
have built up a tradition on those lines. This has had its own 
unfortunate effects in the matter of development of our industries' (CHRD 
4 September 1961: 1740). The Indian Estimate Committee saw the phenomenon 
in another light and context when it said:
The climax is reached when an officer on the Board of 
Directors who is generally the Secretary of the Ministry 
concerned does not agree with a proposed scheme and has 
the final right to get the whole thing shelved or vetoed 
when it comes to the Ministry for a decision... In 
practice, therefore, an officer of government, be he senior 
or junior controls an undertaking either in his capacity 
as Member of the Board or Managing Director or as 
Administrative Head of the Department, where he has the 
power to give advice to a Minister, in which case he takes 
a decision in the name of a Ministry. Parliament and 
government are asked not to take notice of these things 
because it may interfere with the autonomy of the under­
taking (Indian Estimates Committee 1954: 17-18).
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The appointment of senior officers, responsible for corporate affairs, 
to the boards of corporations thus makes a mockery of the whole system 
of control that exists today.
Fourthly, frequent changes in the composition of the boards and 
the use of directorate posts as political patronage (TC 22 October 1961; 
CHRD 2 November 1970) have also contributed to the weakening of the 
present system of government control. By making more and continuous 
control over corporations necessary these practices have frustrated the 
government's attempt at pursuing a coordinated policy essential to the 
healthy development and progress of the corporations. Had appointments 
been fair and careful, and had the right talent, experience, skill and 
business acumen been selected, many of the government controls over 
corporations would have been unnecessary, and the government itself 
could have concentrated more effectively on policy matters (Rajapakse 
Committee 1971: 231). In fact the whole vicious circle of corruption 
and control, more corruption and more controls, seems to start from a 
single source, viz. the lack of faith in those whom the Minister appoints, 
itself the result of appointing only those who please the constituency 
or the party apparatus. Properly speaking, the system of corporate 
administration for the most part rests on trust, trust in those who 
run the affairs and trust in their ability. When that fails the whole 
system fails and no system of control and regulation however meticulously 
or carefully planned can work. Thus once the problem of appointment is 
solved many of the other problems associated with corporate controls
can be solved.
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In fact, it was these weaknesses in the present system of control 
that prompted some of the commissions of inquiry and study teams to 
recommend the institution of an independent organisation to perform 
the functions of ministerial control. Thus the Rajapakse Committee, 
in its report submitted to the cabinet in 1971, proposed a Central 
Corporations Secretariat, while the Salt Commission of inquiry in 1963, 
suggested a Permanent State Corporations Commission.
Since both of these suggestions are a response to or a reaction 
against unsystematic and ineffective control, the supporting 
recommendations show certain common features. Thus as a reaction 
against corruption and nepotism and also to eliminate the political 
interference inherent in the present method of corporate appointments, 
both organisations would be vested with wide powers over corporate 
appointments. The Permanent State Corporations Commission would exercise 
full authority 'on all matters relating to all corporate appointments, 
discipline and dismissal' (SP 9 1963: 107). In the case of appointments 
with higher salaries the Commission would appoint a 'selection board' 
and would subject all transfers between corporations to its review and 
approval in order to ensure fair play and justice. The Central 
Corporations Secretariat on the other hand, in addition to the above 
mentioned powers would be entrusted with the responsibility to stream­
line procedures for recruitment and appointment to all corporate 
positions and to supervise the salary and wage administration.
Similar are the proposed powers relating to overall study and
evaluation of corporate performance in respect of investment, financing
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and production. The new bodies would receive and approve, for the 
fulfilment of the above purposes, all corporate budgets and trial 
balances would have to be prepared and submitted three months before 
the end of the financial year and monthly statements of receipts and 
expenditure submitted (SP 9 1963: 105). Also they would receive all 
annual accounts and reports on behalf of the government to be forwarded 
to the parliament through the respective Ministries. It would be 
the responsibility of the Commission , remarked the Salt Commission, 'to 
ensure that all necessary returns are received in time from the cor­
porations and to satisfy themselves that there are no irregularities, 
unnecessary expenditure of funds in the purchase of equipment or in 
the selection of tenders for the various purposes (SP 9 1963: 107).
It was emphasised at the same time that the Commission should not interfere 
in the day-to-day administration of a corporation and that 'each 
corporation should be at liberty to work out its own programme of work'
(SP 9 1963: 108).
The Corporations Secretariat, furthermore, would conduct special 
studies and investigations at the request of the government, and submit 
reviews and reports on the activities of the corporations to the 
Ministry in Charge, Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning 
and Economic Affairs, so as to enable them to issue necessary policy 
decisions to the public corporations. It would also coordinate and 
prepare long-range development plans for each corporation and provide 
advisory and centralised services for all corporations. The other functions
proposed for the Secretariat would be as follows:
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(a) review and examine pricing policies;
(b) review and examine purchasing, costing policies;
(c) prepare standards on personnel, finance, accounting and
administrative procedures;
(d) review structure and working of corporations including
their accounts, budgets procedure and systems;
(e) initiate and sponsor training schemes for the corporations'
personnel.
If instituted, the Central Corporations Secretariat, in particular, 
may well introduce order into some of the chaos that exists in the 
present system of control. In particular, it would reduce some of the 
present overlapping and wasteful control and to that extent help co­
ordinate or systematise the control over corporations. Corporations 
themselves would find it advantageous to deal with a single body, and 
therefore easier to transact their businesses. Introducing stability 
and standard procedures for the appointments, would also help to do 
away with corruption and political interference.
These are some of the advantages that the corporate system of 
administration stands to gain by the institution of a body of this 
kind, but it is uncertain whether such a body will be instituted as 
it would remove some of the political powers from the Minister.
What is significant to note, however, are the repeated suggestions 
for a separate and independent body to undertake the responsibility of 
supervision and control - in itself a sufficient indictment of the 
controls at present exercised over corporations. What is equally
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s i g n i f i c a n t  i s  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  su ch  b o d i e s  s h o u ld  w i e l d  pow er o v e r  
c o r p o r a t e  a p p o in tm e n ts  a s  i f  one i s  t i e d  up w i t h  th e  o t h e r .  I t  i s  
t o  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  o f  p e r s o n n e l  t h a t  we tu r n  ou r  a t t e n t i o n  now.
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V CORPORATE BOARDS
T h e re  i s  a g r e a t  d e a l  o f  t r u t h  i n  th e  s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  t h e  w o rk in g  
o f  an  o r g a n i s a t i o n  c a n n o t  r i s e  above t h e  l e v e l  o f  t h e  p e r s o n s  who 
c o n s t i t u t e  i t ,  and  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  o f  t h o s e  who form i t s  t o p  s t r a t u m  -  
B oard  o f  D i r e c t o r s .  The w o r s t  m is t a k e s  a r e  l i a b l e  t o  be  made a t  t h e  
t o p ,  and  u n l e s s  th e  p e r s o n s  a t  t h i s  l e v e l  a r e  e n t e r p r i s i n g ,  e f f i c i e n t  
and c a p a b le  o f  w o rk in g  a s  a team , no i n d u s t r y  can be  s u c c e s s f u l .  The 
s t r u c t u r e  o f  to p  l e v e l  management t h u s  a f f e c t s  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  
an  i n d u s t r i a l  e n t e r p r i s e  a t  t h e  m ost v i t a l  p o i n t s  and  t h e r e f o r e  
d e s e r v e s  c a r e f u l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  and  a n a l y s i s .  T h i s  c h a p t e r  a im s a t  
d i s c u s s i n g  i n  a g e n e r a l  way t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  to p  l e v e l  
management a d o p te d  t o  ru n  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  e n t e r p r i s e s ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  
t h e  ty p e  o f  b o a r d s  a p p o i n t e d ,  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  and  q u a l i t y  o f  p e r s o n s  who 
compose them and  t h e i r  o p e r a t i n g  m eth o d s .
I r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  s i z e ,  n a t u r e  o r  s t a g e  o f  o p e r a t i o n  e v e r y  s t a t e  
i n d u s t r i a l  c o r p o r a t i o n  w i t h o u t  e x c e p t i o n  i s  h e a d e d  by  a b o a r d  o f  
d i r e c t o r s .  Even a s  s m a l l  an u n d e r t a k in g  a s  t h e  I n d u s t r i a l  E s t a t e s  
C o r p o r a t i o n  w i th  l e s s  th a n  f i f t y  em p loyees  i s  u n d e r  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  and 
management o f  a  seven-m em ber g o v e rn in g  b o a r d .  T h is  f o l l o w s  from t h e  
p r a c t i c e  i n  o t h e r  p a r t s  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  s e c t o r  w here c o n c e r n s  such  a s  
p u b l i c  t r a n s p o r t ,  p o r t  c a rg o  o p e r a t i o n  o r  co m m e rc ia l  b a n k in g  a r e  
c o m m it ted  to  t h e  c a r e  and  c o n t r o l  o f  a  g ro u p  c o n s t i t u t e d  a s  t h e  g o v e rn in g  
b ody . The a l t e r n a t i v e  p r a c t i c e  o f  a p p o i n t i n g  one man a s  ' c o r p o r a t i o n  
s o l e '  t o  o p e r a t e  t h e  e n t i r e  b u s i n e s s  i s  u s u a l l y  r e j e c t e d  n o t  o n ly  i n  
t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  s e c t o r  b u t  a l s o  i n  t h e  o t h e r  p a r t s  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  s e c t o r .
D e s p i t e  th e  p r e f e r e n c e  shown f o r  m u lt i -m e m b e r  b o a r d s ,  some h o ld  t h e  
v iew  t h a t  i n d u s t r i a l  e n t e r p r i s e s  can be b e t t e r  managed u n d e r  s i n g l e  
d i r e c t o r s h i p .  'My own f e e l i n g ' , o b s e rv e d  a v e t e r a n  p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n  
i n  t h e  c o u rs e  o f  h i s  r e v ie w  o f  th e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  b o a r d s ,  ' i s  t h a t  
i t  i s  b e t t e r  t o  e n t r u s t  th e  work o f  t h i s  ty p e  to  a  man i n  whose 
c o m p e ten c e ,  e f f i c i e n c y  and  c a p a c i t y  Ithe M i n i s t e r  can  h av e  t r u s t  and 
c o n f i d e n c e  (CHRD 29 A ugus t  1963 C o l .  6 2 6 ) .  Hand o v e r  t h e  work t o  him  
and  sa y  ' t h i s  work i s  e n t r u s t e d  t o  you . Use y o u r  d i s c r e t i o n  and 
c a r r y  o u t  y o u r  work s u b j e c t  t o  any c o n t r o l  o f  p o l i c y  t h a t  I  l a y  down''. 
Some o f  t h e  s m a l l  s i z e d  e n t e r p r i s e s  su ch  a s  t h e  S t a t e  P h a r m a c e u t i c a l  o r  
Tobacco  I n d u s t r i e s  i n  f a c t  m ig h t  w e l l  have  b een  q u i t e  e f f i c i e n t l y  
m anaged l i k e w i s e .  What i s  m ost s t r i k i n g  h e r e  t h e r e f o r e  i s  t h e  r e a d y  
a c c e p ta n c e  o f  t h e  m u lt i -m e m b e r  b o a rd s  a s  t h e  b e s t  medium f o r  a l l  
e n t e r p r i s e s .  B u t  w ha t  en d s  have  b o a rd s  s e r v e d  i n  t h e  a f f a i r s  o f  t h e  
c o r p o r a t i o n  o r  w hat k i n d s  o f  b o a r d s  have  go v e rn m en ts  p r e f e r r e d  so  f a r ?  
To d e a l  w i th  t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s  e f f e c t i v e l y  t h e  t e n u r e ,  t h e  s i z e  o f  t h e  
b o a r d s  a p p o in t e d  and  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  a p p o i n t i n g  a u t h o r i t y  s h o u ld  
be  c o n s id e r e d .
The Tenure, Size and Appointing Authority
The s t r e n g t h  o f  t h e  g o v e rn in g  b o a r d s ,  t o  a l a r g e  e x t e n t ,  d e pends  
on t h e  p e r i o d  f o r  w hich  th e y  a r e  a p p o in t e d .  The t h e o r y  o f  t h e  
autonom ous c o r p o r a t i o n  s u g g e s t s  (Robson 1960: 240) t h a t  t h e  g o v e rn in g  
b o a r d s  s h o u ld  be a p p o in t e d  f o r  r e a s o n a b ly  lo n g  p e r i o d s .  F o r  i f  b o a r d s  
a r e  t o  be r e p l a c e d  m e re ly  t o  s u i t  t h e  v iew s  and  o p i n i o n s  o f  t h e  
M i n i s t e r  o r  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t ,  t h e  o b j e c t  o f  c r e a t i n g  a c o r p o r a t i o n  a s  a 
s e p a r a t e  and in d e p e n d e n t  i n s t i t u t i o n  t o  p u r s u e  a c o n t i n u o u s  p o l i c y
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and administration independent of the political fortunes of govern­
ment would soon be lost. The greater the number of dismissals and 
appointments to the boards and the more frequent the changes to their 
character and composition (tending to disrupt the board's working as 
a team), the less independent and more parochial the board would 
become both in its attitude and actions. Instead of evolving into 
a viable unit to accomplish the corporation's purpose it would soon 
turn out to be yet another public service organisation with its eyes 
and ears fixed more on the political executive than on the enterprise.
Thus the tenure of the corporate board is a crucial element in 
the corporate system. It is not suggested, however, that the Minister 
or the government should not have the right to dismiss or remove 
members if the government or the Minister consider that a member is 
incapable or unsuited to the task or that his actions are not in the 
best interests of the organisation. Far from it. It is implicit in 
the right of appointment that if the governing board fails to comply 
with a direction or with the government's declared policy, the Minister 
must be able to remove some or all of its members (Robson 1960: 241). 
Nor is it suggested that the board of directors should be appointed for 
a longer period than is necessary, for if security of tenure is too 
well established the opposite danger arises - that the board would tend 
to fall into a rut and fail to adjust itself to new conditions and 
circumstances. What is suggested, however, is that boards be appointed 
for a sufficiently long period to take an interest in their work and 
to try to achieve real improvements in their organisations.
110
The State Industrial Corporations Act provides a tenure of three 
years for all directors other than the managing director whose term 
of appointment is left to the discretion of the Minister. What is 
important is that a director who vacates office by efflux of time is 
eligible for reappointment. The act is also careful in defining the 
conditions under which the Minister may remove a director from office. 
These conditions vary from ill health and inability to discharge the 
duties to unauthorised excessive absence from the country. The Minister 
is not expected to give reasons: he may remove any director other than 
the managing director 'where he thinks it expedient' to do so.
These provisions do not tell us much of the way the boards in 
practice have been appointed and dismissed. Nor is the prescribed 
period any guarantee that a member will be allowed to continue in office 
for the full period and no longer. Some, like the Chairman of the 
Eastern Paper Mills Corporation, have held their position for fifteen 
years, while others have served only for a few months. Much thus 
depends on the way the Minister and the government choose to act in 
this matter. But the question is whether they have acted correctly 
as the theory of the corporate system demands.
Tenure 1958-1970
Ceylon Cement 10 boards 
5 chairmen 
22 members
Eastern Paper 7 boards 
2 chairmen 
18 members
Mineral Sands 8 boards 
4 chairmen 
20 members
Leather Products 8 boards
3 chairmen 
25 members
Ceylon Sugar 10 boards 
6 chairmen 
28 members




Ceylon Ceramics 8 boards Oils and Fats 9 boards
3 chairmen 7 chairmen
25 members 30 members
National Textiles 5 boards National Salt 7 boards
4 chairmen 5 chairmen
20 members 23 members
In the seventeen years this Act has been in operation, for 
instance, more than two hundred persons have filled the positions of 
directors in the top ten of the twenty-six corporations - a good measure 
of the extent of shifts that occur in the corporate directorate. Only 
three of the above-mentioned corporations had the advantage of being 
under the direction of two or three chairmen; others have had as many 
as six or seven chairmen in the short period of twelve years. Even 
those corporations which had the services of a single chairman had 
the disadvantage of working under seven different boards composed of 
different personalities. These statistics relate to some of the 
large-scale undertakings such as ceramics, oils and fats, cement etc.
The position is considerably worse in the case of the smaller under­
takings where the chances of a director surviving for his full tenure 
are markedly thin; the position of the chairman is even worse.
Another noticeable feature of the turnover of boards, directors 
and chairmen in the industrial corporations is the coincidence of 
those changes with changes in governments - a feature in direct 
contrast to the theory that corporations should be insulated from politics. 
A good example of this was the 'mass exodus' that took place in 1970
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coinciding with a government change-over. With the exception of the 
Eastern Paper Mills corporation and two others, the chairman of every 
industrial corporation was either forced to resign or dismissed 
(CO 27 June 1970). Every corporation without exception received a 
new board composed entirely of new persons and personalities. The 
position was similar after the change in government in 1965.
The making of the corporate directorate a reflection of party 
politics - unless used sensibly to introduce new ideas and talent - 
injures the system of corporate administration more than is realised, 
firstly because those who come to the board look upon their positions 
as a sinecure to be retained and enjoyed only for a limited period. 
Further the knowledge that they may soon be replaced by yet another 
person, even under the same government, significantly alters their 
attitude towards the position and its duties. When Dr N.M. Perera, 
a senior parliamentarian, complained about the lack of interest and 
enthusiasm on the part of some board members towards their work and 
responsibilities he was in fact identifying one of the results of 
uncertain tenure:
I am given to understand on very good authority that when the 
chairman, who is also a sort of managing director, submits 
very useful memoranda not one of the members on the board 
cares to read or show any concern about them. But, if 
there is an item on the agenda for the appointment of a 
clerk or labourer, everybody is alive about the appointment 
which has nothing to do with the prospects of the whole 
industry. That has been the experience not merely in 
respect of one board but of a number of boards (CHRD 29 
August 1963, col. 625).
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Secondly, the practice also has the disadvantage of discouraging 
the best talent from being attracted to directors’ positions.
Security of tenure is thus an important facet of the corporate 
system; politics should not be allowed to injure it and thereby 
the whole system.
Closely linked to tenure of the corporate board is its size.
For if care is taken to appoint only the necessary number of persons 
some of the problems associated with the instability of board member­
ship can be easily avoided. Further when the number of members is right 
it is easier for the board to act as a team. The alternative is mutual 
obstruction or even conflict, as the Fisheries Corporation Commission 
of Inquiry clearly shows. But what is the right number? It is 
difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule: the optimum size must
vary with the nature of the enterprise. Generally, 'a board should not 
have so many directors as to make free discussions impossible; nor so 
few that the necessary breadth of viewpoint is not obtainable’.
(Conference Board Reports 1953: 4). In practice the boards of industrial 
corporations have shown little or no variation in size. Almost every 
one from the smallest to the biggest has had the same-sized board.
There seems to have been no definite principle governing the number 
of appointments. In recent times all boards have had their membership 
increased to seven, the maximum allowed by the statute (CDN 20 June 1970). 
But this seems to have been more for the purpose of political patronage 
than for anything else; as is illustrated by the seventh member added 
to the board of the Mineral Sands Corporation (1970) who had neither
the appropriate qualifications and experience (having been chauffeur to
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an influential M.P.) nor enough fluency in the languages of other 
appointed members to converse (Interview June 1975). A recent 
commission of inquiry in fact recommends that board membership should 
not exceed five.
It is hardly necessary to put into the form of a 
recommendation that any future board of the corporation 
should consist of a board of directors not exceeding, say, 
five in number and made up of really top grade members 
chosen for their proven integrity and ability in lines 
of activity beneficial to the corporation. The calibre 
of the person chosen is all-important, because the 
presence of even one single person on the board whose 
standing leaves something to be desired, could be fatal 
to the success of a board of directors (SP 9 1972: 243; 
the Rajapakse Committee also recommended the same number 
for appointment, Rajapakse Committee 1971: 228).
The choice of the right persons for the boards is a task of immense
significance.
The functioning of the appointing authority is thus exceedingly 
important and difficult. It is important because it is more on the 
choice of the right persons than on anything else that the success of 
an enterprise depends; and it is difficult because the selection 
involves many variables and an evaluation of personal qualifications 
with the possibility of public comment and criticism of the appoint­
ments made. Unlike the Industrial Development Board (1969), the 
State Printing Corporation (1968) or the National Library Services 
Board (1970) where more than one Minister share the power of appointment
and dismissal, the state industrial corporations are fortunate in that
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the Act vests the power of appointment in a single Minister. Though 
it does not designate which Minister explicitly, the Minister 
responsible for Industries usually makes the appointments. His 
appointments also are not subject to review and comment by any other 
public organ nor by parliament as is often the case in India. The 
Minister is virtually free to choose anyone he thinks suitable. This is 
in line with the practice that obtains in countries such as the United 
Kingdom where the Minister's right to appoint and dismiss is considered 
essential as a means to secure public control. To critics who opposed 
this practice, Robson replied: 'If Ministers are not fit to make such
appointments for what task are they likely to be fitted?' (Robson 1960: 
220). That in fact seems to be the underlying thinking in so far as 
appointments to industrial corporations are concerned. (Significantly, 
a proposal to have an electoral college under the Prime Minister to make 
all appointments to boards, recently made at the Amparai Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party Sessions, was rejected.)
Linked to the question of the appointing authority is the question 
of appointing procedure - that is whether the Minister should consult 
outside bodies of opinion or the existing boards for that matter 
before he makes his appointments to the boards. In Britain the Fleck 
Committee, for instance, considered it useful for the Minister to 
consult the part-time members on full-time appointments to the board; 
and the opinion of the panel for part time appointments. Such a 
practice is also not uncommon in private business where the existing
members of the board may exert pressure and influence on new appoint-
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ments to restore a balance in the composition of the directors.
Nothing can be said of the procedures that govern the corporate appoint­
ments in Ceylon, for practically nothing is known of the way the Minister 
exercises his discretion, or in what manner he reaches his decision. 
Sometimes he apparently seeks the views of chairmen, but in most cases 
he makes his own decisions. It is not an established practice, however, 
for the Minister to consult the board or other members before he makes 
his appointment. As a result too often appointments are limited to 
those near the seats of power or personally known to those in authority, 
as is indicated by the following analysis of board members.
The Board Members
It is obvious that the selection of members of the boards of 
corporations is a matter of great importance. Unless able men constitute 
the board, men with insight, drive, imagination and a capacity to 
grasp large questions of policy without being immersed in details, 
industrial enterprises will not be run as efficiently as they should 
(Robson 1960: 216). As one parliamentarian put it: Boards should be
composed not of men of the "pilot type", nor of the "jockey type" but 
of men of understanding who could get on with the job with team spirit 
like a captain and his crew who can take a ship without being damaged 
by the storm or meeting with disaster (CHRD 4 April 1955: Col. 3711).
The State Industrial Corporations Act in fact lays down 'that the 
Minister shall choose the members from among persons who have had 
experience of or shown capacity in industrial, administrative, commercial, 
financial or legal matters'.
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N o t w i t h s t a n d in g  t h i s ,  t h e  m ost n o t i c e a b l e  t h i n g  i s  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  
o f  a  v e ry  h ig h  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  ' c a r e e r  o f f i c i a l s '  t o  s e r v e  on t h e  b o a r d s  
o f  c o r p o r a t i o n s .  Thus on t h e  tw e lv e  b o a r d s  c o n s t i t u t e d  i n  1958 f o r  
c e m e n t ,  c e r a m i c s ,  o i l s  and  f a t s ,  l e a t h e r ,  s a l t ,  s u g a r ,  m in e r a l  s a n d s ,  
t e x t i l e s ,  p a p e r ,  p lyw ood , sm a l l  i n d u s t r i e s  and  f i s h e r i e s ,  n e a r l y  s i x t y  
p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  members w ere  p u b l i c  s e r v a n t s  -  o r  t o  p u t  i t  d i f f e r e n t l y  
o n ly  t w e n t y - f o u r  o f  t h e  s i x t y - f i v e  a p p o in tm e n t s  made a t  t h i s  t im e  were 
from  o u t s i d e r s .  S .N .B . W ijey ak o o n ,  E .A .G . de S i l v a ,  C. Coomarasamy,
E .O .E .  P e r e r a ,  P .B .G .L .  S i r i w a r d e n a ,  C.A. H a r i s c h a n d r a , S .A . S e lv an a y a g a m , 
and  R.L. Rutnam w ere  t h e  o n ly  p r o m in e n t  p e o p le  among t h e  n o n - o f f i c i a l s  
on t h e  b o a rd s  a t  t h i s  t im e .  T h is  m ig h t  have  b een  e x c u s e d  a t  t h e  t im e  
by t h e  new ness  o f  t h e  e n t e r p r i s e s  and  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  f i n d i n g  o u t s i d e  
t a l e n t  t o  man t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  b u t  t h a t  e x c u s e  c o u ld  h a r d l y  a p p ly  t o  
l a t e r  p e r i o d s .  Y et i n  1962 t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  a p p o in tm e n t  r e m a in e d  more 
o r  l e s s  th e  same w i t h  53 o f  t h e  90 a p p o i n t e e s  coming from  t h e  p u b l i c  
s e r v i c e .  T h is  t r e n d  c o n t i n u e d  u n t i l  t h e  end  o f  1970 a s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
t a b l e  i l l u s t r a t e s :
The Composition of Corporate Boards
Y ear O f f i c i a l s N o n - O f f i c i a l s No. o f  1
1958 41 24 12
1962 53 39 17
1968 63 57 22
1970 40 112 26
I n  1970 th e  p a t t e r n  shows a n o t i c e a b l e  change  w i t h  fe w e r  t h a n  
t h i r t y  p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  a p p o in tm e n t s  b e i n g  made from  t h e  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e .  
Even th e n  one c a n n o t  c o n c lu d e  t h a t  t h e  e n t e r p r i s e  h a s  c h an g ed  h a n d s ,  
f o r  t h e  c a r e e r  o f f i c i a l s  s t i l l  d o m in a te  t h e  s c e n e  o f  to p  m anagem ent i n
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the corporate system. With the few exceptions such as paper, leather 
and salt most other corporations are headed by a career official either 
as part time chairman or as full time managing director.
The extent to which reliance was placed on civil servants can 
also be seen in the type of appointments made from outside the civil 
service. The assumption here is that had outside appointments been fair 
and objective, thus securing men of the right calibre for the enterprise 
in question, then the role expected of the civil servants might well 
have been minimal, but if appointments were made only for the purpose 
of political patronage, a more prominent role might have been posited 
for the civil servants on baords. The type of appointments made from 
outside over the years in fact support the latter thesis. For instance 
in 1962 of the thirty-nine appointees chosen from outside no more than 
twelve had some professional qualifications or other background 
experience associated with business enterprise. In 1969 only twenty of 
the outside members were either engineers, lawyers, accountants or business­
men. What qualities or experience other members possessed is hard to 
ascertain; the fact that a good number of them were ex-parliamentarians 
or persons closely associated with party politics might perhaps provide 
part of the explanation for their selection. It must also be observed 
that when qualified outside people such as accountants, architects or 
engineers were chosen, the choice seems to have been rather on account 
of their loyalty and sympathy to the party in office than for their 
professed skill and experience - a fact openly admitted by T.B.
Illangaratne (CDN 11 September 1961; TC 22 October 1961) the present
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Minister for Commerce and Trade, and often criticised by parliament­
arians. Mr Gamini Dissanayake M.P. had this to say on the appoint­
ments made in 1970:
Have we utilised in the public sector the talent, the 
managerial talent available in the private sector? 
Realistically speaking we have not. On the contrary - 
this government has also embarked on the task of packing 
various offices in the public corporations with its own 
stooges.. Thus in the Ceylon Leather Products, we have 
a proctor Kodikara Obeyasekara ... in the Insurance 
Corporation there is another lawyer Mr Walpita ... As 
chairman of Air Ceylon we have Sam Silva ... In the 
Ceramics we have an advocate Anura Weerartne ... In 
the Tourist Board we have Dharmasiri Senanayake who 
contested Dudley ... As a director of Milk Board you 
have put the person whom I have defeated. Now I wish 
to say, when you establish a funerals corporation, for 
goodness sake have a good undertaker as head, not an 
advocate from Hulftsdrop (CHRD 2 November 1970: Col. /3>33
The significant point here is that the selection of inadequately 
qualified persons from outside or the use of directors' positions 
for political patronage has tended to make the position of civil 
servants on the board more important, and their role crucial to 
the success of the enterprise. Acting as a team, the public servants 
in the board thus tend to identify and associate themselves more with 
the enterprise than those who come from outside. This contention is 
also supported by the tendency of the civil service officials to 
outlive and at times outnumber the outside members on the board. Thus 
career officials not only dominate the board on account of their office
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but are also forced into the position of virtually running the 
enterprise by themselves.
Jk
Two other aspects of corporate appointments also point up the 
importance of the position assigned to career officials. First is 
the placement of one career official on more than one board (multiple 
directorship) (CDN 2 September 1970) , second, the allocation of a good 
many of the directorial positions to senior civil servants of the 
sponsoring ministry (Ministry of Industries). Each of these aspects 
appeared in its extreme form in 1961, when nearly all senior officials 
of the department found multiple positions in the fourteen boards set 
up at this time. Thus E.C.S. Paul, then Director of Industries, served 
on four different boards, in addition to being the chairman of the 
National Textiles Corporation. Charles Abeyasekara, the Assistant 
Secretary, took directorships in three boards while being head of two 
other corporations. The various positions held by senior officials in 
that year may be summarised as follows:
Chairman, National Textiles Corporation; 
Director, Ceylon Cement Corporation;
Director, Ceylon Ceramics Corporation;
Director, Ceylon Sugar Corporation
Chairman, National Small Industries Corporation; 
Chairman, Ceylon Steel Corporation;
Director, National Salt Corporation;
Director, Mineral Sands Corporation;
Cirector, Industrial Estates Corporation.
Chairman, Ceylon Hardboard;
Director, Industrial Estates Corporation; 





Dr R.C. de Silva Director, Ceylon Oils and Fats Corporation; 
Director, Paranthan Chemicals Corporation
R. Bhuvenandram Director, Ceylon Plywoods Corporation
E.B. Tisseveeransinge Chairman, National Salt Corporation 
Director, Eastern Paper Mills Corporation; 
Director, Paranthan Chemicals Corporation
L.J.D. Fernando Chairman, Ceylon Mineral Sands Corporation; 
Director, Ceylon Cement Corporation
Though the present trend is towards having members from outside 
the Ministry and department, yet the practice of placing senior Ministry7 
officials on the boards of corporations has by no means been discontinued. 
Thus the present Additional Permanent Secretary, Senior Assistant 
Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries and Directors of the Ministry of 
Industries in 1972 held important positions in the boards of the 
corporations as the following table shows:
Permanent Secretary 
Sivananthan
Chairman, National Salt Corporation 
Chairman, State Graphite Corporation
Add. Permanent Secretary Chairman, Ceylon Steel Corporation 
L.N. de Bandaranaike




Director, State Graphite Corporation 
Director, Ceylon Steel Corporation
Director
I.O.K.G. Fernando
Director, State Pharmaceuticals Corporation 
Director, Ceylon Oils and Fats Corporation
Deputy Director 
M.Z. Mohideen
Chairman, Ceylon Oils and Fats Corporation 
Director, National Small Industries Corporatic
Add. Secretary 
A.R. Weeraratne
Chairman, Ceylon Ceramics Corporation 
Director, National Small Industries Corporatic
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Without a doubt the selection of career officials for the boards 
of corporations has been the most criticised aspect of corporate 
appointments. Parliamentary debates, Public Accounts Committee inquiries 
and newspaper editorials have repeatedly questioned the wisdom and 
propriety of having so many career officials on the boards of cor­
porations. In one of its many editorial comments the Ceylon Daily 
News on 6 November 1963 asked whether the country could afford to 
gamble with the appointment of 'amateur or gentleman' to the boards 
of corporations. 'In fact', it said, 'the people whom we have selected 
are language specialists, who control the destinies of eight out of 
the sixteen industrial corporations.. One would throw up one's arm if 
a foot ball team is chosen this haphazard manner, but apparently our 
corporations need only amateur and gentleman' (CDN 6 November 1963). 
Similar in attitude was the observation of the Reconnaissance Mission 
when it said: 'While it is logical and justifiable for the principal
shareholder to be adequately represented.. it would be advantageous to 
have at least half the board members from discipline other than the 
government services.. so that (outside) experience could be brought to 
bear on the corporation problems' (Naylor 1966: 18).
These are undoubtedly widespread criticisms, but are they fair 
to all appointments made from the public service? Here, for the sake 
of clarity and understanding, one must distinguish three categories of 
public officials who find a place in the corporate boards: (a) those
who come from the sponsoring department directly linked to the enterprise;
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(b) those who come from departments and agencies other than the 
sponsoring department on account of their specialised knowledge and 
experience; and (c) those who come from the Treasury. There is, in 
general, no major criticism levelled against the placement of Treasury 
officials on the boards of corporations even though the practice is 
largely discontinued today. As against the few remarks made by Dr N.M. 
Perera in parliament questioning the effectiveness of this group, board 
chairmen in general have favoured their presence. 'In spite of the dual 
loyalties., we support the idea of having a Treasury representative on 
the board as it brings the board closer to the government's point of - 
view and policies' was the reply of a chairman to a question by the Public 
Accounts Committee whether he would prefer treasury representation on 
his board (PAC 1961a: 112). Objection is also not shown against the 
appointment of professionally qualified and technically experienced 
members of the public service to the boards of corporations. No one to 
my knowledge, for instance, has seriously criticised the placement of 
persons like A.N.S. Kulasinghe (Engineer, Port Commission), or S.W. Rasiah 
(Water Works Engineer, Department of Public Works) on the boards of 
Ceylon Tyre and Steel corporations in 1962, or the placement of N.S.
Perera (Surveyor-General) or D.M. Ratnatunga (Department of Agriculture) 
on the board of the Sugar Corporation in 1960. When criticisms are made 
against career officials, they are mostly directed against the appointment 
of senior officials of the Ministry of Industries.
Even in the case of these appointments criticisms are strong 
against only one class of appointment. No one seriously objects, for
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instance, to Ministry officials being part-time directors on boards 
otherwise fully composed of qualified and experienced personnel from 
outside; or to a part-time chairmanship in an enterprise that has not 
started operation commercially. Such placements are viewed with favour 
and even considered necessary in order to incorporate the departmental 
or governmental viewpoint into the corporation's decision making process. 
It is only when departmental officers are appointed to managerial 
positions such as full-time chairmanship with executive functions or 
full-time directorship with managerial responsibilities that attacks 
over career appointments become pointed and severe (CDN 16 July 1963,- 
29 November 1963, 7 September 1970). For it is these appointments which 
are considered to be in conflict with the managerial requirements of 
an enterprise.
When the Public Accounts Committee decided in 1961 to investigate 
the question of public officers serving on the boards of corporations, 
much of its thought was directed towards this class of appointment.
One of the four principal witnesses summoned on this occasion, E.C.S. 
Paul, was a serving public servant whose position and placements we 
have referred to earlier. What concerned this committee most about 
career appointments, however, was their propriety, that is, as it asked 
E.C.S. Paul, whether it would be possible for a normal government officer 
to maintain efficiency in his work as well as carry on the work of the 
corporations, and whether it would be possible for him to advise the 
government with regard to the control of his own corporations:
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There is a more important principle involved here, that 
is that of the public officer who is playing a dual role.
An Assistant Secretary of a Ministry or Head of Department 
also functions as Chairman. In certain circumstances, he 
will be called upon to advise on that particular corporation.
Then it becomes difficult (PAC 1961a: 61).
None of the answers given to these questions was clear cut: often
they were evasive. Most of the officials took the occasion, for 
instance, to point out as a justification for the existing situation 
the difficulty of obtaining outside talent and the lack of enthusiasm 
to serve on the board shown by even those members chosen from outside.
The difficulty has been to get people of the right calibre 
to function as chairman of these corporations from outside.
We have no option but to fall back upon public officers.
This matter is now being further examined. We are trying 
to group corporations with allied activities as far as 
possible with a view to putting one chairman in charge of 
more than one corporation. He will be a full time chairman 
and he will be on his substantive salary. In any case the 
present position is unsatisfactory because one's attitude 
and approach when in charge of a commercial undertaking is 
totally different from that of a public officer (PAC 1961a: 58).
To the question whether a senior civil servant could, in fact, 
reconcile managerial or directorial duties on the board with his normal 
departmental functions, some of the answers were in the affirmative.
For instance, E.C.S. Paul, then Director of Industries, saw no conflict 
in the dual role he played both as an administrative head of Department 
and as executive head of the Textiles Corporation. 'Fortunately, I am
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in a position where I can take a detached view of my positions as the 
Head of the Department and as the Chairman of the Corporation. I have 
not found any occasion so far for a conflict of interest'. Further, 
when he was asked directly whether he could be efficient serving in 
both offices full time, he said:
It all depends on who is selected for appointments and 
whether he will take on his responsibility conscientiously,.
I have been twenty five years in the Department of Industries 
and I have very large experience which I think gives me 
sufficient knowledge to be able to discharge the duties of 
chairman satisfactorily.. To keep pace with my work, I 
start early in the day and carry on after office hours.
(PAC 1961a: 62).
The Committee however was apparently unconvinced and recommended 
the discontinuance of the practice of appointing senior heads to 
managerial positions on the following grounds: (a) 'that it would not
be possible for a public officer to devote his full time as an executive 
officer in a corporation in addition to his duties in his sbustantive 
posts as a public officer'; ‘ and (b) that 'such an officer's action as 
an executive of a corporation may have to be considered by himself as 
the Head of the Government Department, and his final decision may be 
biased on that account' (PAC 1961a: 32).
It must be emphasised however that the Committee was not altogether 
unsympathetic to the idea of having senior departmental officers on 
the boards of corporations. 'Where there is a permanent chief executive 
officer in a corporation', it said, 'public officer may function
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as chairman,as his duties in such a case would only be in the capacity 
of a presiding officer at board meetings'. Though it did not spell 
out what prompted it to this recommendation, it may have been 
influenced by some of the advantages that can flow from this practice; 
the facility to incorporate departmental views into the corporate 
system during board discussions with the on-the-spot information about 
ministerial policies and plans and the opportunity it therefore provides 
to coordinate the work of the corporation with governmental policies 
and programmes. Certainly nothing is lost by having senior officers 
as permanent advisers, as opposed to managerial directors. The 
important point to note, however, is that despite the Committee's 
recommendations the position of senior departmental officers in cor­
porate boards continued unchanged and they held the same number of posts 
as before.
This brings us to the more important question of the role envisaged 
for boards in the affairs of the corporation - a question made more 
crucial by the dominant position accorded to career officials. Given 
the character and composition of the boards as described above, what 
ends have boards served in the affairs of the corporation or what type 
of boards have they been?
Types of Boards
From an organisational standpoint two types of boards are 
possible: those which merely decide policy and those which in addition
administer policy. For convenience we can call these 'Policy Board' 
and 'Management Board'. In the case of the former, members of the
128
board would have no executive responsibility for the running of the 
enterprise, while in the case of the latter the directors themselves 
would usually head a section or branch - such as production, finance 
or staff - of an undertaking and personally direct and control the 
whole organisation and operation of the enterprise. The State 
Industrial Corporations Act in a sense seems to favour a board of 
the latter type. By section 14 it clearly provides for the appointment 
of a board member to the position of the Managing Director and in 
addition offers no objection to the chairman of the undertaking being 
the managing director. Even more emphatic is the sub-section which 
states 'The Managing Director of the Corporation shall be eligible for 
appointment as the chairman of the Board of Directors'. When this is 
taken along with the statement in the early part of the Act that the 
Minister may appoint only persons with administrative, technical and 
managerial experience the tenor of the Act may well be in favour of a 
board with functional directors, to link policy with administration as . 
in the case of the 'management board'. But nowhere does the Act 
specify precisely what type of board a Minister may constitute and the 
choice is thus left entirely to the discretion of the Minister.
None of the boards so far set up is a management board in the 
strict sense of being composed entirely of full-time members carrying 
out line functions. At the same time to call all boards only policy 
boards would be to misstate the position. For some boards like that of 
the Cement corporation or Eastern Paper Mills corporation in 1864, or 
Sri Lanka Sugar corporation in 1969 have in fact operated more or less 
as functional-cum-policy boards, with some of their members having full
129
time executive responsibility in addition to their chairmen being 
chief executive officer. When the Fisheries Corporation was formed 
in 1964, for instance, most members of the board had some responsibility 
associated with the development of that industry. Thus Sam Silva, 
chairman of the corporation, with the assistance of the director-economic 
became responsible for day-to-day decisions relating to marketing; 
while Godvin Withana - director-technical became responsible for the 
engineering services and procurement of supplies and the director- 
marine operations Commander Kadirgamar became responsible for all 
marine operations (SP 9 1972: 235). Noteworthy in this connection 
are the boards constituted for the Cement corporation which often had 
many insiders in its composition and thus consistently tended to operate 
as a management board. When an outside appointee C.H.Z. Fernando 
resigned his position on the board in 1964, he in fact gave the manage­
ment character of the Cement board as his reason for the resignation.
However the overwhelming majority of the boards constituted for 
industrial corporations are of the opposite kind, dominated by part-time 
outsiders. The boards of Oils and Fats, Ceylon Leather Products,
National Sale, Ceylon Textiles, Ceylon Plywoods, State Engineering,
Ceylon Steel, Ceylon Tyre, Ceylon Mineral Sands, National Small Industries, 
Ceylon Hardware, State Flour Milling and State Fertilizer as constituted 
in 1969, for instance, had a majority of part-timers among their members, 
the only exception being the chief executive officer or managing director 
appointed to serve on the board. In the case of others such as Ceramics, 
Paranthan Chemicals, Hardboard, and Industrial Estates all board members
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were part-timers including their chairmen. Eastern Paper, Sugar, Cement, 
Fisheries were the only exceptions which had more than one full-time 
member in their boards at this time. The recently constituted boards 
(1975) also show a similar pattern: nearly fifteen of the twenty-eight
corporations have a part-time board with a full-time chairman or 
managing director, and the rest operate wholly with part-time members.
Thus the policy of the government seems to be in general to have 
part-time boards for all corporations: wholly part-time for small
undertakings, mainly part-time (that is with the exception of the 
chairman and managing director) for medium-sized undertakings and a 
mixed composition for large-scale undertakings (TCL 24 September 1970). 
Judging by the experience of other countries such as India or Canada 
where the pattern of boards' composition is not far different from 
what we described, one would have little to say against this practice. 
Even though the Fisheries Commission of Inquiry made it a part of its 
recommendations (SP 9 1972: 244, 247) not to appoint anyone including 
the chairman in a managerial and/or administrative capacity, this 
practice is not without precedent or advantage. For instance, in Canada 
the combination of chairmanship with the chief executive of the enter­
prise evolved after years of unsatisfactory experience with the purely 
part-time board as explained by Professor Hodgetts:
When the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation was set up in 
1936 a large part time Board of Governors was presumably 
put in charge of policy matters, while execution of policy 
was vested in a General Manager who was not a member of 
the Board. This separation broke down in practice, for
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policy issues arose from day to day and had to he determined 
by the General Manager... His decisions were then ratified 
ex post facto by the Board. In 1944-45 the chairman of the 
Board was made a full time, permanent official so that he 
could offset the de facto power which the General Manager 
had come to exercise over policy matters... The Boards of 
more recent corporations provide stronger evidences of this 
tendency to bring the chief operating official to the 
policy level. In some instances, indeed, the chief operating 
(executive) officer is not only put on the Board but is made 
chairman of the Board (Hodgetts 1950: 288).
But the critics of corporate boards in Ceylon express 
dissatisfaction with the present manner of operation of most boards 
of industrial corporations, and in fact some see in the present boards' 
composition and operation the weakest part of the corporate administration. 
For efficient performance and operation (they point out) the board should 
consist of full-time men in addition to their being well-qualified for 
their job. 'To make a success of corporation', wrote the Political 
Correspondent observing the role of the boards in the industrial 
corporations 'their Directors must be full time men. There is no 
justification for any man to serve on more than one corporation or be 
a part time director. It is not a question of money. It is a question 
of time and attitude and part timers are never likely to be devoted 
and determined men and success can come only if all corporations 
directors are of such people' (CDN 15 February 1964).
Even more apposite are the observations of the Rajapakse Committee, 
which had no doubt about the need for a full-time board for the success
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of industrial corporations. 'We find that Boards have not been in a 
position to make sufficient contribution to the affairs of the 
corporations because members are part timers. [Being part timers] they 
approve the proposals coming from the executives or delay the 
implementation of such proposals. In either case they are superfluous.. 
The board should consist of full time functional directors selected 
on the grounds of competence to handle main management functions' 
(Rajapakse Committee 1971: 231). Similar are the comments and 
suggestions of others who have taken a critical view of the corporate 
boards. Sam Silva the ex-chairman of the Fisheries Corporation in his 
evidence to the Commission of Inquiry also clearly specified that boards 
of corporations in Ceylon should be composed of full time top career 
officials of the unit concerned if they are to operate efficiently 
(SP 9 1972 : 247).
Should the boards as the critics claim necessarily be full-time 
and should they be functional to perform efficiently? This of course 
would depend on the assumptions one makes about the role of the board 
or the type of functions one expects it to perform in the undertakings. 
There is nothing inherent in the corporate form of organisation to 
suggest that boards should be either policy or functional for them to 
be efficient. Some boards certainly could be of mixed type (like those 
of the Cement and Paper corporations) with some of their members 
carrying out full-time executive responsibility while others as part- 
timers contribute their knowledge and understanding to the policy 
making of the undertaking. What is required after all is a body of 
men talented and experienced to study and evaluate the overall needs
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and requirements of the enterprise and carefully plan and formulate 
policies for its efficient operation, i n addition to supervising 
and checking on the management for results.
There is an important area of sub-policy and decision making 
midway between the overall action of the Congress amd 
the point where the administrators take over. It is this 
area that a representative and resourceful board of directors 
should occupy if government corporations are to operate with 
efficiency and accountability (Dimock 1949: 916).
This in fact is the role expected of a board in public undertakings. 
Whether the board for the performance of this function should be full­
time or whether it should consist only of managerial personnel should 
certainly depend on the extent of work involved in the undertaking and 
the nature of problems and needs of the enterprise. The type of board 
or the nature of men placed at the top of management should in other words 
reflect the needs and requirements of the enterprise.
But what makes the critics so persistent in their argument that 
the board should be full-time and functional? Why do they fail to see 
the sub-policy-making role that a part-time board could effectively 
perform? Though one cannot conclusively say why they maintain this 
position, two reasons continually appear in their public criticism: 
one is that the members who constitute the boards as part-timers in 
their opinion are not paying sufficient attention to their work, and 
secondly coming with limited experience they are unable to perform the 
functions expected of them. This seems, as already indicated, to be 
the thinking of the Rajapakse committee underlying their recommendations
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for a full-time functional board. The critics may also be seeing in 
the full-time management board a solution to the problem of political 
patronage as it would then be necessary to appoint someone who is 
really qualified and experienced.
Potentially more serious however is the proposal often made for 
the abolition of boards (TC 31 August 1963) and the institution of a 
general manager at the top of the management.
In a private company, so runs the argument, directors play 
a logical role as the representative of the shareholders 
and are generally responsible for the formulation of the policy... 
in a government corporation where there are no private share­
holders the role of the directors appears to be rather nebulous 
since the formulation of policy in relation to corporations 
is principally a matter for government (CHRD 30 July 1964 col. 1635).
This argument is also strengthened by the presence of a large number of 
government servants on the corporate boards, who in discussion with the 
ministers are said to arrive at major policy decisions without consulting 
the boards. This can often reduce the board to a mere advisory role and 
make the board room only a place for approving decisions already reached 
outside it.
In spite of these criticisms it would be difficult to argue that 
a board is altogether unnecessary7 in corporations, or that the institution 
of a general manager would improve the situation. For to 'scrap' the 
board as the critics demand is to leave the management readily exposed 
to political pressures and to make the organisation and operation too 
well tied with the central administrative process. Already one can see
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a noticeable trend towards centralised control and supervision over 
corporate management, and to scrap the board in this instance would 
be to accelerate this trend. This to say the least could very easily 
defeat the very purpose of instituting an independent administration 
to run industrial enterprises.
Further the complex nature of industrial enterprises and the 
pioneering role of most of them also call for a constitution of more 
than one man at the top of the management. For no general manager however 
competent can be expected to be a universal expert on all things that are 
of concern and importance to the best running of the enterprise. The 
need is therefore for collective leadership; the pooling of experience 
and talent, wherever possible to guide and direct the enterprises. It 
would be difficult for anyone to deny that in the case of these industrial 
enterprises to bring in more men of experience and talent is far better 
than to rely on one single individual and his capacity and efficiently.
Much of the criticism calling for the abolition of boards has been 
made on the grounds of inexperience and the lack of quality. There seems 
little doubt that the boards as presently constituted have not performed 
well. But the fact that they are less than satisfactory at present 
should not be used as an argument against the institution of the corporate 
board. The argument should clearly be for reform of the boards rather 
than for their abolition.
To conclude: no act of government in respect of public corporations
can be more important than that which decides who should constitute the
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board of directors. For the character and quality of the men so chosen 
and their capacity to make crucial decisions will eventually make the 
difference between the success or failure of a state enterprise. The 
partisan character of board appointments or the use of directorial 
positions for political advantages, and the selection and placement 
of career officials in important places in boards seem to beset the 
present method of constituting boards. For more often than not one sees 
the phenomenon of men with no background experience or professionalised 
qualifications finding themselves in responsible positions on corporate 
boards merely because of their loyalty and sympathy to the party in 
office. Further one also sees the phenomenon of officials responsible 
for policy and overall supervision and control of corporations also 
taking an active role as members of the board. The trend at present 
seems to favour the appointment of officials as chairman, managing 
directors or chief executives and the appointment of part time members 
to other positions; which often makes the board a superfluous body 
and its role ineffective. This was the complaint of the Rajapakse 
committee.
If industrial corporations are to operate as autonomous 
institutions and to realise their aims and objects effectively, there 
is a clear need for improvements in the present method of constituting 
boards. Any reform in this area should certainly contribute substantially 
to making the industrial corporations more effective and responsible 
institutions for national development. The boards as presently constituted 
however remain a -weak spot in corporate administration today.
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VI PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL
Broadly the purpose of this chapter is to study the nature 
and extent of parliamentary control over industrial corporations.
Public corporations are the creatures - the creations - of Parliament 
It is by statute that their aims and means, the main directives, and 
often the rules for their organisations are fixed. Parliament which 
makes these laws can also unmake them at will. In a sense therefore 
Parliament has an unlimited potential power of control over corporations 
(Vickers 1952: 80). It can also control corporations by controlling 
the general framework within which they operate. In practice, however, 
Parliament has conferred comparatively few detailed specific powers 
of control upon itself and upon the Ministers responsible for cor­
porations (Potter 1959: 321). Nonetheless as the ultimate guardian 
of the public interest Parliament must hold corporations accountable 
for their activities. It must satisfy itself that the corporations are 
operating efficiently and economically and ensure that their operations 
and policies are consistent with and in furtherance of the aims and 
objectives for which they have been set up. It is imperative that it 
keeps itself informed of the progress that corporations are making in 
order to fulfil its role of ultimate guardian of public interest and 
public funds.
A period of five years between 1965 and 1970 has been selected for 
examination. Questions asked, debates conducted, and reports received 
by the parliament in this period, particularly in relation to the 
twenty-eight state industrial corporations, have been studied with a
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view  t o  e v a l u a t i n g  t h e  m anner in  w hich  t h e s e  t e c h n i q u e s  o f  c o n t r o l  have  
b e e n  u se d  t o  a c c o m p lis h  t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  P a r l i a m e n t .
B r i e f l y  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  P u b l i c  A cco u n ts  Com m ittee  i s  a l s o  exam ined  
f o r  i t s  e f f i c a c y  and  l i m i t a t i o n s .  S in c e  t h i s  i s  t h e  o n ly  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  
C om m ittee  i n  e x i s t e n c e  w i t h  some pow er o v e r  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  i t s  r o l e  i s  o f  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  im p o r ta n c e  from t h e  p o i n t  o f  v iew  o f  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  
c o n t r o l .
The Position of Parliament
U n l ik e  t h o s e  i n  t h e  w e s t ,  i n d u s t r i a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  i n  a d e v e lo p in g  
n a t i o n  l i k e  S r i  Lanka a r e  en g ag ed  i n  p i o n e e r i n g  t a s k  u s in g  t e c h n i q u e s  
and  m ethods  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  somewhat u n f a m i l i a r  t o  t h e  n a t i o n .  When S r i  
Lanka u n d e r to o k  i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  t h e r e  was a l a c k  o f  t e c h n i c a l  and 
m a n a g e r i a l  s k i l l s .  I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  d e pended  on t h e  m ere t r a n s f e r  o f  
w e s t e r n  t e c h n o lo g y  and  m a c h in e ry .  B e s id e s  t h e r e  were num erous d i f f i c u l t i e s  
i n  r e g a r d  t o  a c t u a l  p l a n n i n g  o f  t h e  e n t e r p r i s e s  w hich  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n s  
u n d e r to o k  t o  m anage. Thus t h e r e  was a lw a y s  t h e  t e n d e n c y  t o  be  f e a r f u l  
and  a n x io u s  t h a t  a l l  was n o t  w e l l  w i th  c o r p o r a t i o n s .  To add  t o  t h e s e  
f e a r s  t h e r e  were f a i l u r e s ,  b rea k d o w n s ,  and  w a s t a g e ;  w orse  t h e  a l l e g e d  
c o r r u p t i o n ,  a b u s e ,  and n e p o t i s m  t h a t  s u r r o u n d e d  t h e  w ho le  o p e r a t i o n  o f  
p u b l i c  c o r p o r a t i o n  a c t i v i t i e s .  The c a u s e s  f o r  c o n c e rn  w ere  many and  
p r o v e d  th e  n e e d  f o r  s t r o n g e r  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  c o n t r o l .
To a l l  i n t e n t s  and  p u r p o s e s  P a r l i a m e n t  i n  S r i  Lanka i s  t h e  v e ry  
r e p l i c a  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  P a r l i a m e n t  (K earney  1973: 39; W ilson  1974: 1 8 9 ) .
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For it has inherited many of the practices and procedures that obtain in 
the United Kingdom. Under the Sri Lanka constitution Cabinet is 
responsible collectively to the House of Representatives for all its 
actions, programmes and policies. All laws and estimates of expenditure 
must be approved by Parliament (Perera 1959: 24-28). But for the 
conduct of the day-to-day administration, it is the individual 
minister who is held responsible for actions he or his department has 
taken or not taken. Parliamentary control over the ministerial depart­
ment is absolute in that Ministers must account for every single detail 
of the activity of the ministerial departments.
In the case of the public corporations the position is somewhat 
different. Since it is to the Board that Parliament grants the power 
and authority for the conduct of activities organised under corporations, 
it is the Board that becomes directly responsible for the affairs of 
the corporation. However in order to ensure its control over corporations 
Parliament usually confers certain powers on a minister and retains 
certain powers of its own. The extent of control that Parliament desires 
over corporations can thus be seen in the nature and extent of the powers 
and responsibilities it has conferred upon the Minister.
In the case of the State Industrial Corporations, these responsibi­
lities are very wide indeed, including of course creation and deter­
mination of the objects of the corporation.
By section 2 (1) of the State Industrial Corporations Act Parliament
empowers the Minister, with approval of the government, to:
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(a) establish any corporation for purposes of setting up
and carrying on any industrial undertaking;
(b) assign a name to the corporation; state its principal
place of business; fix the number of members of the 
Board within the limits of 3-6; and appoint one of 
them as the chairman of the Board.
More importantly it is to the Minister that the determination of 
the objects of the corporation is given and also the necessary powers 
to amend the objects of the corporation when it becomes necessary. 
Section 3(1)(2) is very explicit on this point.
To enable the government to control the activities of the cor­
poration once it is established, Parliament grants several other powers 
to the Minister. They may be enumerated as follows:
(a) giving special and general directions as to the exercise of
the powers and discharge of the duties of the Board;
(b) conducting inquiries into the financial position of the
corporation;
(c) approving the amount of funds that should be set aside
for reserves; and
(d) appointing auditors, managing directors etc.
Besides, a variety of other provisions require government's or 
Minister's approval for specified kinds of Board actions.
Because substantial powers have thus been given to ministers in 
relation to state industrial corporations the extent and area of
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parliamentary control is wide. By making ministers exercise these 
powers, parliament is in a position to perform very effectively its 
functions of supervision and control over corporations. By applying
Jt
pressure on ministers and holding them responsible for the exercise 
or non-exercise of these powers, Parliament can make corporations and 
ministers take proper steps and put matters right if it is dissatisfied 
with their performance.
It is necessary at this point to stress another equally important 
aspect of public control over business undertakings, namely that it 
should not be too extensive or too detailed. If it is, Parliament 
runs the risk of undermining the very purpose for which corporations 
have been set up, namely to introduce flexibility, initiative and drive 
into the management of these enterprises. Theorists of corporations 
have frequently emphasised the need for this self-denying ordinance 
on the part of Parliament in regard to corporate activities. No less 
a person than Herbert Morrison maintained:
I am certain that if we are to run these public corporations - 
highly commercial, highly industrial, highly economic - on the 
basis of meticuluous accountability to political channels, we 
are going to ruin the commercial enterprises and the adventurous 
spirit of the public corporations in their work (Morrison 1933:
The concern of Parliament as trustee should be for major policy.
Detailed interference will lead to delays, overcaution and lack of 
confidence and it is to avoid them that the corporate system was evolved.
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K enneth  G a l b r a i t h ,  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  S r i  L anka , p o i n t e d  o u t  y e t  
a n o t h e r  r e a s o n  why P a r l i a m e n t  s h o u ld  n o t  a t t e m p t  to o  c l o s e  a c o n t r o l .
He m a i n t a i n e d  t h a t  i f  any P a r l i a m e n t  d i d  s o ,  t h e  i n t e r e s t  g ro u p s  
r e p r e s e n t i n g  w o rk e rs  and consum ers  would  t a k e  a d v a n ta g e  o f  t h e  l e g a l  
pow er  o f  t h e  P a r l i a m e n t  t o  make s h o r t  work o f  t h e  autonom y o f  c o r ­
p o r a t i o n s  by b r i n g i n g  p r e s s u r e  t o  b e a r  upon c o r p o r a t e  a c t i v i t i e s .
S in c e  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  t e s t  o f  p e r fo rm a n c e  i s  e a r n i n g s  t h e  
p u b l i c  e n t e r p r i s e  m ust be i n  a p o s i t i o n  t o  r e s i s t  t h e  
undue demands o f  i t s  em ployees  o r  c u s to m e r s .  T h is  i s  
a n o t h e r  r e a s o n  why i n d i v i d u a l  a c t i o n s  s h o u ld  n o t  be 
s u b j e c t  t o  m i n i s t e r i a l  o r  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  r e v ie w .  I f  t h e y  
a r e ,  w o rk e rs  and  c u s to m e rs  w i l l  soon  l e a r n  t o  go t o  t h e  
u l t i m a t e  s o u r c e  o f  pow er w hich i s  t h e  M i n i s t e r  o r  P a r l i a m e n t .
Good p o l i t i c i a n s  a r e  s e n s i t i v e  t o  su c h  demands. I t  i s  t h e i r  
b u s i n e s s  t o  b e .  B u t t h e  p r i c e  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  r e s p o n s e  
t o  i n d i v i d u a l  p r e s s u r e s  w i l l  a g a in  be  o v e r a l l  f a i l u r e  o f  
t h e  e n t e r p r i s e  ( G a l b r a i t h  1959: 1 0 0 ) .
Thus on t h e  one h a n d  P a r l i a m e n t  m ust  o r g a n i s e  i t s e l f  t o  e x e r t  i t s  
c o n t r o l  o v e r  c o r p o r a t i o n s  i n  o r d e r  t o  f u l f i l  i t s  r o l e  and  i t s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
t o  t h e  p u b l i c ,  b u t  a t  t h e  same t im e  i t s  c o n t r o l  s h o u ld  n o t  be  so  e x t e n ­
s i v e  a s  t o  make t h e  e n t e r p r i s e  y e t  a n o t h e r  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  M i n i s t r i e s .
To b a l a n c e  t h e  two i s  no e a s y  t a s k  and  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  w hich  t h e  r i g h t  
s y s te m  o f  c h e c k s  and  b a l a n c e s  e x i s t s  d ep e n d s  t o  a l a r g e  e x t e n t  on t h e  
s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y .
The Question Period
Among means a v a i l a b l e  t o  P a r l i a m e n t  f o r  c o n t r o l l i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  
t h e  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  q u e s t i o n  i s  one o f  t h e  m ost e f f e c t i v e  and i m p o r t a n t .
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As a technique of control it is widely used and commonly known 
(Johnson 1961: 80). As in other parts of the world where the par­
liamentary system obtains, question time occupies an important place 
in the order of business of the House. A period of half an hour is 
allotted to Questions every day on which parliament meets (CHRSO 35).
Every member has the right to ask any number of questions requiring 
written answers, but he is not entitled to ask more than three questions 
for an oral answer on any one day. Besides, any member may put a 
supplementary question for purposes •of further elucidating any matter 
of fact regarding which an oral answer has been given.
Thus as a parliamentary device to hold ministers and corporations 
responsible Questions provide a potentially valuable opportunity. If 
questions are intelligently put and properly directed they can elicit 
valuable information regarding the activities of the corporation.
Members can also seize upon this opportunity to air their grievances 
about the shortcomings of public enterprises and may therefore force 
government and ministers to consider action on any matter they may raise 
on the floor of the House. Government can also take the opportunity of 
question hour to clear any misconception, fear and doubt that members 
and public may have about the working of public enterprises. Parliamentary 
questions may also have the effect of making enterprises more responsible 
for their decisions because of the fear that they might become the subject 
of parliamentary questions.
In so far as the admissibility of questions is concerned, no 
restriction has yet been placed, as in the case of India or the United
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Kingdom, on the type of question that may be asked on corporations 
(Hanson 1951: 55; Mallya 1971: 131; Bhambri 1967: 72). The normal 
procedure regarding admissibility of questions, (a) that it must be 
related to the subjects with which the member questioned is concerned;
(b) that the proper object of a question should be to obtain information on 
a matter of fact within the special cognisance of the member to whom it 
is addressed (CHRSO: 31-34), also applies to questions on corporate activities
In spite of the wide open opportunity thus available to members of 
parliament, full use has not been made of the Question Time as a technique 
of control. Questions on corporations are sporadic. In the period between 
1965 and 1970, for instance, not more than sixty questions have been asked 
on the activities of the twenty-six state industrial corporations which 
is 12 per year and two per corporation. In fact not all of the cor­
porations in the industrial category have been the subject of parliamentary 
questions. Corporations like Eastern Papermills, Leather Products, Cement 
and Sugar seem to have attracted most attention and account for a large 
proportion of the questions asked in Parliament on corporations. Moreover 
a single aspect of a given corporation has constituted at times the main 
subject of questions. A good example of this is the questions on the 
dismissal of employees in the Ceramics Corporation. Even though state 
industrial corporations constitute only one-fifth of the total number of 
corporations existing in Sri Lanka, they are typical of all corporations 
in this respect. Only two corporations, the Cooperative Wholesale Establish­
ment and the Ceylon Transport Board, have been the subject of a large 
number of questions; even that is on a comparative basis; the majority 
of the corporations are normally ignored.
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Q u e s t io n s  on c o r p o r a t i o n s  seem t o  depend  on two f a c t o r s :  (a) t h e
s o c i a l  and  p o l i t i c a l  c l i m a t e  a t  t h e  t im e ;  and  (b) t h e  know ledge and 
e x p e r i e n c e  o f  members o f  P a r l i a m e n t  in  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  
t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n s .  In  f a c t  m ost o f  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  h av e  come from t h e  members 
o f  s e n i o r  r a n k ,  l i k e  Dr N.M. P e r e r a  and  Dr W ic k re m a s in g h e , whose know ledge 
o f  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  c o r p o r a t i o n s  i s  f a i r l y  th o ro u g h  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e i r  
l o n g  s t a n d i n g  m em bersh ip  o f  t h e  H ouse. N o n e t h e le s s  a s  a  means o f  c o n t r o l  
p a r l i a m e n t a r y  q u e s t i o n s  l a c k  t h e  c o m p r e h e n s iv e n e s s  an d  n e c e s s a r y  c o v e ra g e  
t o  be  o f  any  e f f e c t .
I f  q u e s t i o n s  a r e  s p a r s e  an d  u n s y s t e m a t i c ,  an a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  
q u e s t i o n s  a s k e d  b r i n g s  o u t  f u r t h e r  t h e  n a t u r e  and  scope  o f  t h e  ty p e  o f  
c o n t r o l  t h a t  P a r l i a m e n t  h a s  te n d e d  t o  e x e r c i s e .
Roughly  o n e - t h i r d  o f  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  a s k e d  on c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  on s t a t e  i n d u s t r i a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  c e n t r e  .ro u n d  s t a f f  
m a t t e r s  such  a s  r e c r u i t m e n t ,  d i s m i s s a l  and  p r o m o t io n  on t h e  one h a n d ,  and  
s a l a r y  and  wages o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  p e r s o n n e l  on t h e  o t h e r .  The f o l l o w i n g  
a r e  some o f  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  a s k e d .  The M i n i s t e r  o f  I n d u s t r i e s  and 
F i s h e r i e s  was a s k e d  on 27 J u l y  1965 why c a s u a l  em p loyees  w o rk in g  a t  t h e  
C e ra m ics  C o r p o r a t i o n  were d i s m i s s e d  and  when t h e y  would  be  r e i n s t a t e d ;  
on 19 O c to b e r  1965 why a s e n i o r  em ployee a t  t h e  E a s t e r n  P a p e r  M i l l s  was 
n o t  d o in g  any more r e s p o n s i b l e  work t h a n  t o  open m a i l  and  d e s p a t c h  i t  
t o  t h e  M i n i s t r y ;  when he was a p p o in t e d  an d  a t  w ha t  s a l a r y ;  on 27 J u l y  1965 
when t h e  s a l e s  o f f i c e r  was a p p o i n t e d ,  w i t h  w hat q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  and
w h e th e r  t h e  p o s t  was a d v e r t i s e d ;  on 9 A ugust 1965 how many a c c o u n t a n t s  
w orked  a t  t h e  h e a d  o f f i c e  an d  a t  t h e  f a c t o r i e s ;  on 7 June  1966 w'hy an
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employee dismissed for misappropriation was reinstated; on 29 July 1966 
why the secretary/accountant was removed; on 19 August 1966 how many 
temporary supervisors were employed by the State Engineering Corporation 
and what were their salaries; on 19 November 1965 how many were 
recruited from the Kalutara District for work at the Hardboard Cor­
poration; on 8 September 1965 why a good proportion of workers at the 
National Textile Corporation came from the constituency of the Minister. 
The following were the only questions on the general policy of 
r recruitment: Minister was asked 27 July 1965 whether it was the
policy of government to recruit personnel through the Employment Exchange 
and if so, whether the policy would be followed uniformly; on 24 August 
1965 whether corporation employees would be given concessions on 
railways and holiday warrants normally granted to public servants; on 
21 June 1966 whether all those trained in personnel management by the 
Bureau of Personnel Services would be given employment.
The next largest category of questions concerned the contract, 
purchase and other tendering procedures adopted by corporations. The 
following will illustrate the type of questions asked on these matters.
The Minister was asked on 23 August 1965 why the National Textile 
Corporation purchased 7^  million rupees' worth of cotton without adopting 
the normal tender board procedures and issuing proper advertisements; 
on 31 August 1965 whether tenders were called for construction of a 
laboratory at Kankesan Cement Factory and who were the contractors; on 
9 August 1965 when and by whom and at what cost a macnine for making 
exercise books was purchased; on 21 June 1365 what procedures were 
adopted in selecting firms and other business houses for the purpose of
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supplying papers and what were the names and addresses of those firms 
and establishments to whom Eastern Paper Mills Corporation supplied 
paper; on 27 July 1965 why a car was purchased by the Eastern Paper 
Mills Corporation for the use of the consultants; on 25 August 1966 
why a vehicle from a private source was purchased in spite of the 
Board's decision to the contrary; on 24 April 1968 what procedures and 
contracts obtained in retailing ceramics and was he aware of the 
corruption and malpractices in the trade; on 4 September 1968 why 
aerolite glue was purchased from a British firm and whether any other 
tenders were called. On the matter of purchase of land and buildings 
and construction for the use of corporations, several questions were 
asked: on 9 August 1968 who was the owner of the land on which the
Eastern Paper Mills was constructing buildings; who was the contractor; 
was it proper for him to be paid Rs. 20,000 in advance; on 22 July 1968 
why land in Salaawa Estate was purchased for the second plywood factory.
The third type of questions were those intended to specify and 
publicise the malpractices, corruption and nepotism allegedly prevalent 
in corporations. For instance, on 4 June 1966 the Minister was asked 
about the procedures governing the use of official cars by full-time 
and part-time directors. On 21 May 1961 the question was why the 
chairman and other members of the Sugar Corporation used official cars 
to attend a private wedding. In addition almost every question asked on 
tender board procedure, recruitment and purchasing inevitably referred 
also to alleged abuse and corruption. For instance in the question about
the Ceramics Corporation's agreement with private traders, mention was
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made of the discretion granted to the sales manager to discriminate 
against local citizens and favour Indians and distinguished citizens. 
Questions described the failure to recruit personnel through the 
Employment Exchange as an abuse of the powers and responsibility 
granted to the Boards. A question on 8 September 1965 on the employment 
of personnel from the Minister's constituency, for instance, had the 
following parts: (a) why was the rule that all recruitment to a govern­
ment agency should be through the Employment Exchange dispensed with 
in this particular case? (b) why were no qualifications called for and 
why was there no advertisement of such intention to recruit?
The majority of the questions asked on corporations can be subsumed 
under one or other of the foregoing headings. Some of the questions 
tend to be quite trivial and most of them concern matters purely internal 
to the corporations. A large part of the questions search for details 
on a particular appointment or dismissal; the tender procedure adopted 
for a given purchase or sale by an individual corporation as opposed 
to overall efficiency, the capital programme, and the personnel policy 
and training programme which in fact should be the main concerns of the 
Parliament. In the last analysis it is these matters that determine the 
success or failure of an enterprise under the corporate system of 
administration. Searching queries about the performance of the corporations 
should have been the subject of many a question, but they were rare.
Members seemed to forget that inquisitorial, detailed questions could 
kill initiative and make managers measure their success in terms of not 
being the subject of such questions.
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Writing on Indian enterprises, Professor V.V. Ramanadham 
observed:
The efficacy of the parliamentary question as a means 
of control over the public sector is best seen if members 
of Parliament scrupulously avoid emphasis on local details, 
trivial incidents and purely operating matters which are 
either within the normal routine of internal administration 
of enterprises or can be settled more effectively by a direct 
negotiation between the enterprise on the one side and the 
interest concerned or affected on the other for example, 
consumers and workers (Ramanadham 1964: 114).
But the practice in Sri Lanka seems to be the very reverse of what he 
has observed to be the sound principle.
However, members of Parliament may have believed in different 
principles from those enunciated by Professor Ramanadham judging by the 
nature of the questions they asked. Parliament may have held the view 
that question period is best used to highlight the specific abuses and 
corruption that are brought to the notice of members of Parliament.
In fact Dr N.M. Perera, a senior parliamentarian of the House of Rep­
resentatives and the author of a large number of questions, gave 
expression to this view when he rose to justify his inquisitiveness for 
details on the ground of the unbelievable amount of corruption that was 
going on in a particular corporation. He said: 'I have got authentic 
information on the kind of corruption that is going on at the corporation 
under the Hon. Minister. Otherwise I would not have put these questions'
CHRD 5 June 1966, Col. 1446).
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In‘a country where people are not distinguished for their financial 
realiability, where respect for public property is not highly developed, 
and where there is not an accepted tradition of meticulous expenditure 
controls, the absence of which would be regarded as a charter not of 
liberty, but of licence' (Hanson 1959: 381) justification may well be 
found for the attitude of Parliament towards Question Time.
.But Parliament must always be aware that to adopt that attitude 
to the extent it has done in Sri Lanka would bring about results harmful 
to the very system of administration it has created for operating the 
enterprises. For the greater the amount of questioning on details, 
the less will be the initiative that the corporate official will show 
and the more numerous will be the bureaucratic procedures that will 
result within the corporation in order to be able to account for 
details of their operations. It is to avoid these weaknesses that the 
corporate system was evolved. If parliamentary questions were given 
freer play over the whole field of activity, half the advantage of 
having public corporations rather than government departments would be 
lost (Robson 1960: 176).
Secondly, to ask ministers for details of the kind that members 
have called for blurs responsibility between boards and ministers.
If ministers were to continue to answer questions on the daily 
activities of the corporations and on matters wholly within the purview 
of the Beard of Directors, they would be accepting responsibility on
matters over which they have no specified powers of direction or control.
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For these reasons it is important that Parliamentarians should exercise 
their power to ask questions with more discrimination. Not to do so 
will create a situation where the Minister may assume the position of 
Managing Director of the corporation.
The main purpose of questions is to gain information. It offers 
members of Parliament an opportunity to draw immediate public attention 
to any phase of administrative activity or policy. In Sri Lanka the 
limited use of questions has been in the main to make known to the public 
details of alleged abuses and corruption that obtain in the corporations.
Debates
Apart from question time, debates provide an important opportunity 
for members to review, examine and discuss the affairs of the cor­
porations. Occasion to debate the issues of public corporations on 
the floor of the House arise in two general ways:
(a) when the subject matter for debate is wide open under the
rules of the House;
(b) when some aspect of the affairs of the corporation is on
the order of business of the House.
In the first class may be placed the debates that take place annually 
on such occasions as the speech from the throne; and the presentation 
of budgetary proposals by the Minister of Finance. These two are the 
most important parliamentary events of the year and often in Sri Lanka 
they follow close upon one another, the speech from the throne being 
read at the beginning of July, and voting on the Budget taking place 
in the middle of August every year.
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The purpose of the speech from the throne is to provide an outline
of the policy of the government for the ensuing year and to review its
activity and achievement in the year that has elapsed; this may
include the performance and achievement of some corporations and
proposals to set up new ones. It may also include proposals to augment
the sphere of activity of some. An example of such an announcement may
be given. In the year 1967 the speech from the throne, while declaring
government's intention to set up such authorities as the Coconut Fibre
Board and the Ceylon Broadcasting Corporation . (CHRD 8 July 1967 Col.31-3) r
also took note of the progress so far made in the activities organised
under the State Industrial Corporation Act. It said:
Much progress has been achieved in the field of Industry; the 
Steel Rollong Factory, the Tyre and Tube Factory, the Hardware 
Factory, the Cement Plant at Galle, and Ceramics Factory at 
Piliyandala were brought into commercial production during the 
year. Production at Kankesanturai Cement Factory was largely 
increased. Work in connection with the setting up of an 
integrated textile mill at Thulhiriya - one of the largest in 
the East - started during the year (CHRD 8 July 1967 Col. 35).
Besides, the speech from the throne went on to make reference to a number 
of projects that would be brought under the control of state industrial
corporations (CHRD 8 July 1967 Col. 36).
The importance of the budget speech as an occasion to discuss the 
affairs of the public corporation arises from the fact that it usually 
embodies the demands of corporations for capital funds as part of its 
proposals for capital expenditure. Because of the reliance of most 
corporations on government for capital funds, the activities of 
corporations constitute an important part of the budget speech. Also
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it is customary for the budget speech to review the 'state of the
economy' and references to state corporations are inevitable as the
following part of a budget speech indicates:
The growth achieved in the sphere of industry has been 
significant. All industrial corporations in the public 
sector have registered significant increases in production. 
Several major industrial projects which were in various 
stages of gestation were speedily completed and brought 
into commercial production during the period. Between 
1965 and 1968, the total value of production of 
industrial corporations increased from Rs. 70 million to 
262 million. With the exception of two all industrial 
corporations are viable institutions making profits. Work 
on several new industrial projects was commenced during 
this period. In addition expansion programmes were 
undertaken by many corporations particularly by the Paper 
Leather and the Mineral Sands corporations (CHRD 2 August 
1969 Col. 26).
The pattern is much the same every year, the speech from the throne 
touching on several corporations' performance while the budget speech 
as a statement of income and expenditure takes stock of the financial 
position of the corporations in order to get the approval of the 
House for whatever increase in expenditure it proposes to meet the 
capital demands of the corporations.
Nevertheless, despite the place given to the corporations in 
these speeches they have rarely become the subject of the debates that 
ensue. In the year 1967,for instance, in the debate on the speech from
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the throne 42 members discussed the proposed programme of the government, 
of whom only four made any direct reference to these enterprises, while 
there were few indirect references. None of the speeches was thorough 
in its assessment of the activity of corporations. One speech - that 
of the Minister of Industries and Fisheries - not surprisingly included 
the following:
It took us two years to put into working order the corporations 
started by the last government; the Iron and Steel Factory at 
Oruwela, the Tyre and Tube Factory at Kelaniya, the Hardware 
Factory at Yakkala ... The government is going ahead with the 
development of the Puttalam cement industry which will produce 
220,000 tons of cement. Work is progressing ... and we expect 
to complete the plant at the end of 1968 (CHRD 18 July 1967 Col.796).
He went further to illustrate the progress made and expected by other 
corporations under his charge. For instance, he said: 'The Oils and
Fats Corporation was a corporation that lost continuously till last 
year. It was only last year that we made a profit in spite of the fact 
that machinery was old and outdated...'. Referring to the salt cor­
poration the Minister said 'During Mrs Bandaranaike's regime, the salt 
industry was in a bad way. We had to import salt from Pakistan. But 
during the last two years we have been able to increase our production...'
(CHRD 18 July 1967 Col. 794). These references to state enterprises 
were part of the speech he made on the address of thanks.
The member who followed the Minister in reply said:
I wonder sometimes what the purpose of Throne Speech and 
Throne Speech debates ... I think the last speech of the 
Minister will probably hit a new low as far as the House 
is concerned ... He talked about the mess made of
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industries by the S.L.F.P. just what exactly he has done 
to set right the mess over the past two years... In the 
first instance he appointed incompetent persons who did 
not know their job as chairmen of corporations, people 
"without educational qualifications.. Look at the Fisheries 
Corporation he appointed a gentleman who had never had 
any contact with the sea or fisheries.. All I can say is 
that if there was a mess before in industries he has made 
that mess a hundred times worse {CURD. 18 July 1967 Col. 810-11).
The position is much the same as regards the budget speech debate.
The above are typical examples of the few references to state 
corporations that do occur in these speeches, government members 
predictably rising to congratulate the government on the achievement 
of the corporations, and the members opposite decrying the inefficiency, 
nepotism and corruption occurring in state corporations. There is no 
objective discussion of corporate affairs nor any proper evaluation 
of the roles and policies of the corporations.
However as occasions to debate the problems of corporations, the 
budget and speech from the throne debates are the least important 
and effective. In the first place the time available to debate the 
issues arising out of these speeches is at a premium, for not more 
than 15 days in all are allocated to them. In the second place, members 
are not bound to confine the debate to matters set out in the speeches. 
They may debate any aspect of governmental activity or policy which 
they think important and consequently it is not unusual for members to 
be carried away by parochial considerations, and become involved in 
a 'labyrinthine maze of irregularities' (CDN Editorial 16 July 1962).
156
With the conclusion of the second reading of the Appropriation 
Bill, the House resolves itself into Committee of the Whole to debate 
the departmental estimates. This is yet another opportunity for members 
to discuss the working of corporations on the floor of the House. By 
proposing a cut in the vote of a given ministry members can subject 
any activity under the ministry or its policy to the closest scrutiny. 
Since most of the votes of some ministries are for purposes of financing 
corporations' activities, and also since a large part of their work is 
concerned with supervising and controlling the activities of these 
corporations, the public corporations become a necessary part of the - 
debate on the vote of the ministry.
This is clearly the case with the vote of the Ministry of Industries 
under which more than twenty state industrial corporations operate.
For instance in the year 1968 when the votes of this Ministry came 
up for discussion about twenty members had the opportunity to debate 
the vote of the Ministry, and nearly all of them took the occasion to 
express their views on corporations functioning under the Ministry.
The member who opened the discussion on this occasion in a long-winded 
speech mentioned Ceramics, Cement and the Fisheries Corporation 
specifically (CHRD 4 September 1968 Cols. 1656-77). He was concerned 
by (a) allegedly political factors in the selection of sites for the 
corporations; (b) a drop in the sales and distribution of goods of 
some corporations; and (c) the contradictions between the figures of 
production and sales as shown in the Central Bank Report and in a 
ministerial statement. But for the member who followed him the attainment 
of solvency by two industrial corporations which had long been in the 
red was enough to justify congratulating the Minister on his efforts
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and concern for industrial development (CURD 4 September 1968 Col.
1678-83). The industrial policy of the government, however, said 
the member, had not reached far enough and certain industries that 
could have been developed in his locality were simply ignored by the 
Minister and the Corporations. The tone and style was thus set for 
the rest of the debate.
This government [one member said] was trying to take credit 
for these ventures. It had been the socialist countries 
which had set up these industries. In the newly established 
industrial corporations such as Steel and Tyre, production 
had exceeded the original expectation but these were 
industries financed by the socialist countries whereas the 
Cement Factory which had been set up with the western aid 
by the previous government produced only 50% of the total 
capacity. Similarly the Paper factory was running at a 
loss in its early stages; but it was doing good work now 
because of the efforts of the previous government.
In regard to the State Hardware Corporation, he had been 
informed that Mr Somaratne, M.E.P. candidate for Wettegama, 
had been appointed to be in sole charge of smelting and 
foundry which was to be established near Hardware factory.
This person had no qualification at all, for this post; 
it was not surprising that Hardware Corporation had come 
to be called as Rampala Workshop (CDN 5 September 1968).
'That was not all' said another ' that was happening at the 
corporation'. He was here talking about the Leather Products Corporation. 
'The secretary of the corporation had been given the position of sales 
manager for which he was paid Rs. 300 extra per month. Then there was 
the peon who was made a salesman. Mr Linus de Silva (chairman) was 
not efficient or capable of improving the place (CDN 5 September 1968: II) 
The same was the substance of a speech by yet another member. Having 
heard these criticisms, a government M.P. rose to say that the
158
brunt of [members'] attacks were directed against the 
chairman of Leather Products Corporation. He did not see 
why they had developed that animosity. In so far as the 
government side was concerned they were satisfied with the 
work of the Ministry (CDN 5 September 1968: 8).
These were not considered opinions based on a proper evaluation 
of facts and figures relating to corporations, but were those dictated 
by the views of the party to which the member belonged, government M.Ps. 
using most of the occasion to defend the government policy and that of 
the corporations and the opposition mainly trying to discredit them 
wherever possible.
Thus even though members take the opportunity of the vote of the 
ministry to debate corporation activities the discussion can by no 
means be said to be an objective assessment of corporations. Members 
naturally approach the occasion with a political bias and their criticisms 
are directed more to embarrassing the government of the day than 
to considering the enterprises critically. One cannot blame the private 
member for this. He is given no more than fifteen minutes to speak 
on the day of the vote and it is impossible for him to enlarge and 
elaborate on any topic or any aspect of the working of corporations.
In his eagerness to cover them all he tends to generalise and 
criticise in a fashion that makes his speech shapeless and at times 
pointless from the point of view of parliamentary control. It 
might be possible for members of a political group to come to an 
understanding for a division of labour, with each one taking up on 
enterprise or group of enterprises; it is not possible for any one
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member to deal with all of them, as he is in the habit of doing now, 
or even to do full justice to one of them.
However, it is worth noting points that recur in these debates, 
in order to specify the kind of concern members express about 
corporations. They are:
(a) Political bias in appointing board members;
(b) Corruption and nepotism in staff appointments made by
corporations;
(c) The need to standardise wages and salaries between
corporations;
(d) Political factors in the siting of enterprises.
Apart from the failure of parliamentary debate to examine the 
enterprises objectively, there is the failure of members and ministers 
to treat enterprises as a category and activity quite separate and 
removed from the normal system and process of central administration. 
Members tend to identify ministers too often and too closely with the 
enterprise itself; as though running of it is his full and personal 
responsibility. The ministers for their part accept full responsibility 
for sins of omission or commission by the enterprise as if it was in 
fact managed by themselves. These attitudes are not wholly unsatisfactory. 
It is valuable that ministers should recount the activities of cor­
porations giving whatever details possible and reviewing their policies. 
But if they become too much identified with the enterprise and defend 
it blindly, as most ministers do in Sri Lanka, they lose objectivity 
and encroach upon areas where they are supposed to have no authority.
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The pressure by members for detailed information and accusing 
ministers of the corporations' failures forces ministers, in the last 
analysis, to control corporations more than necessary in order to be 
accountable to the Parliament. This pressure is harmful for the 
working of the corporations, but it seems to have become the norm in 
Sri Lanka.
The budget debate, the speech from the throne, the debate on 
ministry vot4s are however opportunities for a general review, analysis 
and criticism of the government's activities. It is as part of this . 
general attack on government and its policies that corporations become 
the object of these debates.
Even though they provide important opportunities for members to 
bring up the problems of corporations, by their very nature occasions 
such as these do not allow members to sustain them for long in a 
coherent and coordinated manner so as to impress effectively on the 
authorities what they see as important in the organisation and 
administration of public enterprises and what they w7ould like to see 
being done in them.
More objective and better coordinated discussion on corporations 
is likely on occasions when some aspect of the corporations is the 
order of the day. These arise when:
(a) the House adjourns to debate the subject of corporations 
on a 'motion for adjournment';
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(b) the annual reports and accounts of corporations are
tabled before the House;
(c) a motion is brought before the House for the approval
of a corporation's initial capital and for any increase 
in the capital funds already provided.
Parliament may also discuss corporations when the minister presents 
for its approval the rules and regulations made in regard to corporations, 
or proposes to amend and modify the existing framework of the corporate 
legislation. Since these two opportunities are somewhat rare they 
are not considered here. Debate on public corporations on the motion 
of adjournment is also fairly rare; for instance between 1965 and 1970 
only twice did the Parliament take this opportunity to discuss the 
corporations and then merely to clarify certain misunderstandings about 
Board appointments and the selection of sites.
Thus the debates on annual reports and accounts and capital 
requirements of corporations are the two important occasions when 
Parliament gets the opportunity to review, scrutinise and examine the 
affairs of the corporations more closely than in the debates on the 
budget speech and throne speech.
A n n u a l  R e p o r t s
The annual reports and accounts are vital documents from the point 
of view of parliamentary control, for it is through them that Parliament 
expects to get first-hand information on the details of the working of 
corporations to ensure that public funds are put to proper use, and 
that policies and actions pursued by corporations are in the best 
interests of the nation. Thus debate on annual accounts and reports
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may well be regarded as an event of immense importance.
By statute every minister in charge of a public corporation should 
lay or cause to be laid before the House (a) a copy of the statement 
of accounts and Auditor-General's comment thereon; (b) a copy of 
the profit and loss account; (c) a copy of the balance sheet; and (a) 
a report by the Board of Directors on the working of the corporation 
for the period for which the profit and loss account and the balance 
sheet have been drawn up.
In the case of the State Industrial Corporations the act not 
merely stipulates that these documents must be tabled but specifies 
that they must be approved by the Parliament. 'The Minister shall 
cause copies of all the documents specified to be laid before the House 
of Representatives for approval' (Sec 30(2)). Mr William de Silva, the 
Minister responsible for this act, took pride in stating that he was glad 
that the State Industrial Corporation Act, unlike the act which it 
superseded, had this provision for the House to approve because it 
afforded opportunity for the House to review the work of the corporations 
whenever such reports were presented for approval (CHRD 2 December 1958 
Col. 2051).
In spite of this important and mandatory legal provision regarding 
submission of accounts and reports, public corporations in Sri Lanka 
have been quite slack in complying with the requirement. The reports 
are usually in arrears (See Appendix 6), sometimes by as much as
163
six years or more. For example in the year 1970 the National Textiles, 
Leather Products, and Eastern Paper Mills corporations were able to 
submit accounts and reports only for the year 1964-65; and Ceylon 
Tyre, State Flour milling and Ceylon Plywood corporations only for the 
year 1966-67. The other corporations were no better.
Not only do corporations delay their reports for up to six years, 
but when they do take time to submit their accounts and reports they 
tend to submit several years' accounts in one single year. A good 
example of this was the reports and accounts of the Paranthan Chemicals 
Corporation which had seven years' accounts (1959-60; 1960-61; 1961-62; 
1962-63; 1963-64; 1964-65; 1965-66) before the House in one single day 
(10 April 1968). Several other corporations could match this record.
The time-lag in presenting annual reports and accounts results in 
fewer being debated and a desultory debate when it does occur. For 
instance, if all corporations had submitted their accounts and reports 
in time Parliament would have, had far more than one hundred in the 
period from 1965 to 1970; in practice it had less than a quarter of 
that number. Of course when debate does take place it is upon an 
outdated document. Parliament naturally finds itself in a rather hopeless 
situation when trying to analyse long past events and activities. Thus 
instead of the debate taking up points raised in the annual reports and 
the achievements and performance recorded therein, it tends to revolve
around general statements and other points of interest which the member
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might have come upon in reading newspaper articles and parliamentary 
papers such as the reports of the Public Accounts Committee and Auditor- 
General. It is not uncommon for some members to ignore altogether the 
particular corporation under review and take up some other corporation 
and its activities which he thinks important for the purpose. Some 
may not discuss any corporations at all, but concentrate on general 
problems such as wastage, corruption, financial procedure and the 
like in relation to corporations. 'There were many important things 
raised in the report ', said an M.P. 'but I do not think it worthwhile 
referring to them because six years later the position could have 
changed completely' (CDN 14 September 1970) .
Some examples from the debates may bring out the validity of the 
points made here. In the year 1970 when the 1964-65 Leather Products 
Corporation report was brought before the House for its approval, all 
eight members who took part in the discussion, while emphasising the 
need for the corporation to submit its report in time, made most of 
the occasion to drive home the necessity of all corporations, including 
Leather Products, to make profits; the need to streamline procedure 
regarding recruitment and finance; and the desirability of maintaining 
good working relationships with corporation employees. As regards the 
activities of the corporation under review, except to compliment the 
corporation on its achievements so far, particularly under the chair­
manship of Mr Robin Ratnam - appointee of the present government when 
it was previously in office - and to ask whether it would be possible 
for the corporation to perform its sales function mainly through the 
present distributory centres, no member took any interest in the
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s t a t i s t i c s  p r e s e n t e d  o r  m a t t e r s  n a r r a t e d  i n  t h e  B o a r d 's  r e p o r t s  a s  
t o  t h e  p e r fo rm a n c e  and  a c h ie v e m e n ts  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n .
To g iv e  y e t  a n o t h e r  exam p le :  i n  t h e  d e b a te  on t h e  a c c o u n t s  and
r e p o r t  o f  1965-66  o f  t h e  N a t io n a l  T e x t i l e  C o r p o r a t i o n /  w h ich  to o k  
p l a c e  on 5 A u g u s t  1970 , m ost a t t e n t i o n  c e n t r e d  on t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  c o t t o n  
c u l t i v a t i o n  w h ich  t h e  members s a i d  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  had  ig n o r e d  f o r  
q u i t e  a  lo n g  t im e ;  and  on th e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  p r o m o t in g  t h e  handloom  
i n d u s t r y »  B oth  o f  t h e s e  were i m p o r t a n t  s u b j e c t s  from  t h e  p o i n t  o f  v iew 
o f  m em bers ' c o n s t i t u e n t s ,  b u t  t h i s  m ean t t h a t  t h e  a c c o u n t s  and  r e p o r t s  
o f  t h e  C o r p o r a t i o n  w ere  ig n o r e d .
A p a r t  from  t h e  b e l a t e d n e s s  o f  t h e  r e p o r t s ,  t h e i r  q u a l i t y  p r o v i d e s  
a n o t h e r  r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  l a c k  o f  p o i n t e d  and  p r o b in g  d i s c u s s i o n  on th e  
a c h ie v e m e n ts  o f  t h e  i n d u s t r y .  As P r o f e s s o r  A.H. Hanson s a y s ,  t h e  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  s u p e r v i s i o n  w h e th e r  th ro u g h  q u e s t i o n s ,  
d e b a t e s  o r  co m m it tee  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  w i l l  depend  on th e  q u a l i t y  o f  a n n u a l  
r e p o r t s  w hich  p a r l i a m e n t  r e c e i v e s  from t h e  e n t e r p r i s e  (Hanson e d .  1963: 
306) . I d e a l l y  t h e  a c c o u n t s  and  r e p o r t s  s h o u ld  p r o v i d e  P a r l i a m e n t  and 
t h e  g e n e r a l  p u b l i c  w i t h  a c l e a r  p i c t u r e  o f  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  and t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n s .  They c o u ld  f o r  i n s t a n c e  s t a r t  
w i t h  t h e  d e t a i l s  o f  p h y s i c a l  o p e r a t i o n s ,  t h e  amount p r o d u c e d ,  an d  t h e  
c o s t  i n c u r r e d .  They c o u ld  a l s o  g iv e  a d e q u a te  c o m p a r is o n s  w i th  p a s t  
y e a r s  so  a s  t o  r e v e a l  t h e  lo n g  te rm  t r e n d s .  They c o u ld  a l s o  s e t  
o u t  t h e  f u t u r e  p l a n s ,  program mes and  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  c o r p o r a t i o n s  a r e  
h o p e f u l  o f  p u r s u i n g  s i n c e  t h e  P a r l i a m e n t  w ould  v,Ta n t  t o  know t h e
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n a t u r e  and e x t e n t  o f  f u t u r e  com m itm ents . T h i s  k i n d  o f  r e p o r t i n g  w ould  
h e l p  t h e  o v e rb u r d e n e d  P a r l i a m e n t  to  g e t  a c l e a r  and  c o m p re h e n s iv e  
i d e a  o f  t h e  w o rk in g  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n s  i n  a s h o r t  t im e  and  h e l p  members 
u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  s a l i e n t  f e a t u r e s  t h a t  c o n c e rn  t h e  B o a rd s  th e m s e lv e s  i n  
r u n n in g  th e  i n d u s t r i e s .
I n  p r a c t i c e  m o st  o f  t h e  a n n u a l  r e p o r t s  p u b l i s h e d  s i n c e  t h e  
b e g i n n i n g  b o th  i n  form and  c o n t e n t  a r e  f a r  from  o b j e c t i v e  and  l a c k  
r e l e v a n t  an d  v i t a l  d e t a i l s  r e g a r d i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n  p e r f o r m a n c e ,  p ro b le m s  
and  f u t u r e  p l a n s .  T h in g s  t h a t  have  gone wrong a r e  n o t  r e p o r t e d  o r  a r e  
a s c r i b e d  t o  o u t s i d e  f o r c e s  o v e r  w hich  t h e  e n t e r p r i s e  h a s  no c o n t r o l .
'S o  f a r  a l l  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n s  h a v in g  G overnm ent a s s i s t a n c e  h av e  i s s u e d  
a n n u a l  r e p o r t s s a i d  a member o f  t h e  PAC, ' b u t  t h e s e  r e p o r t s  a r e  n o t  
i n f o r m a t i v e  i n  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  a c t u a l  w o rk in g  o f  t n e  p a r t i c u l a r  c o r p o r a t i o n s  
As t h i n g s  a r e  members o f  P a r l i a m e n t  h av e  t o  p r o c e e d  on a l l  k i n d s  o f  odd 
s t a t e m e n t s  and  draw a l l  k i n d s  o f  i n f e r e n c e s . .  We do n o t  h a v e  s u f f i c i e n t  
i n f o r m a t i o n  on v a r i o u s  c o r p o r a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  f a i r  c r i t i c i s m  
i n  t h e  H ouse ' (PAC 1959 : 22 , 4 3 - 5 2 ) .
T h a t  i n  f a c t  i s  t h e  p r e d i c a m e n t  o f  members o f  P a r l i a m e n t ,  f o r  th e y  
h a v e  n o t h in g  b u t  f r a g m e n ta ry  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  b a s e  t h e i r  c r i t i c i s m  upon . I f  
P a r l i a m e n t  i s  t o  p e r f o r m  i t s  f u n c t i o n  a d e q u a t e l y  and  p r o p e r l y  i t  r e q u i r e s  
n o t  m e r e ly  t h e  r a t e  o f  d i v id e n d s  d e c l a r e d ,  w hich  m ost r e p o r t s  i n  S r i  Lanka 
seem v i t a l l y  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  e m p h a s i s in g ,  b u t  a l s o  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  p r o ­
d u c t i v i t y ,  c o s t  o f  p r o d u c t i o n ,  em ployment t r e n d s ,  l a b o u r  r e l a t i o n s ,  o r g a n i  
s a t i o n a l  c h a n g es  e t c . , i n  o r d e r  t o  g e t  a c o m p re h e n s iv e  p i c t u r e  o f  t h e
c o r p o r a t i o n .
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That seems, however, not to be the intention of corporation 
Boards in Sri Lanka. In fact the reverse seems to be the case: the 
fewer the details given on corporations, the smaller the amount of 
criticism that Parliament can make of the affairs of the corporation. 
This is borne out by the observation made by the Commission of Inquiry 
on the Salt Corporation when it said:
It appears to us to be probable that the failure to submit 
the annual reports and statement of accounts was due to the 
fact that these documents would have been tabled in the 
House of Representatives by the Minister for approval., the 
reports were not sent because the Board of Directors 
anticipated criticism in Parliament if the reports were 
laid before[it](SP 9 1963: 80; see also SP 1 1973: 25).
One may also point out a weakness in the statute as another 
probable reason for the failure of corporations to submit accounts and 
reports in time (see Naylor 1966: 20). For this act does not lay down 
as the other statutes do a specific date for the submission of accounts 
and reports.
Whatever may have been the reason for the failure of corporations 
to submit reports in time, and to produce informative reports on the 
affairs of the corporations, the quality of supervision that Parliament 
can exercise over corporations suffers on this account.
To sum up: debates can be an important means for members to
exercise control over corporations. They afford a broader coverage of 
the activities of the corporation than is possible through questions. 
There are several such occasions for members in Sri Lanka to debate
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t h e  i s s u e s  o f  c o r p o r a t i o n s .  VThile t h e  b u d g e t  s p e e c h ,  t h r o n e  sp e e c h  
an d  v o te  o f  t h e  M i n i s t r y  a f f o r d  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  g e n e r a l  d e b a t e ,  a n n u a l  
r e p o r t s  and  v o t e s  on c a p i t a l  fund  g iv e  members th e  chance  f o r  a d e e p e r  
a s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  a f f a i r s  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n .
However, t h e  e f f e c t  o f  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  d e b a t e s  on c o r p o r a t i o n s  depends
t o  a l a r g e  e x t e n t  on t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  t h e  d e b a t e s .  The f o r e g o in g
e x a m in a t io n  o f  t h e  d e b a t e s  c o n d u c te d  r e v e a l s  t h a t  t h e y  l a c k  t h e  c h a r a c t e r
a n d  form t h a t  a r e  n e c e s s a r y  t o  b r i n g  a b o u t  th e  d e s i r e d  e f f e c t  on t h e
p u b l i c  c o r p o r a t i o n s .  More o f t e n  t h a n  n o t  t h e y  a r e  c o lo u r e d  by  p a r t y  '
b i a s  and  p e r s o n a l  i d i o s y n c r a c i e s  and  r i v a l r i e s  to  t h e  p o i n t  w here  K e l f -
C o h e n 's  o b s e r v a t i o n  becom es t r u e :
F o r  g o v e rn m en t  members o f  p a r l i a m e n t  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n s  can  do 
no wrong and any c r i t i c i s m  o f  them i s  an a t t a c k ;  w h i l e  i n  
t h e  e y e s  o f  members o p p o s i t e  i t  i s  d o u b t f u l  w h e th e r  t h e y  can  
do a n y th i n g  r i g h t ;  m ost p r o b a b l y  a n y th i n g  t h e y  do i s  wrong 
(K e lf -C o h e n  1958: 1 5 7 ) .
D iv id e d  a s  t h e y  a r e  by p a r t y  p o l i t i c s ,  se ldom  do members s u b j e c t  
c o r p o r a t i o n s  t o  t h e  i m p a r t i a l ,  c a r e f u l  and  t h o u g h t f u l  r e v ie w  t h e y  
r e q u i r e .
Public Accounts Committee
I n v e s t i g a t i o n  t h r o u g h  c o m m it te e s  i s  a n o t h e r  m ethod by w hich  
P a r l i a m e n t  can  b r i n g  p u b l i c  c o r p o r a t i o n s  u n d e r  s c u t i n y  and  c o n t r o l .
I n s t e a d  o f  t h e  w hole  House s i t t i n g  t o  d i s c u s s  t h e  a f f a i r s  o f  t h e  c o r ­
p o r a t i o n s  , t h e  c o m m it tee  t e c h n i q u e  can a l l o w  s e l e c t e d  members a p p ro v e d  
by  t h e  House t o  exam ine  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n s  more t h o r o u g h l y  and  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y
and  t o  k eep  th e  P a r l i a m e n t  and t h e  p u b l i c  in fo rm e d  o f  t h e i r  p r o g r e s s  and
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achievements. The Parliaments of the U.K. and India have successfully 
adopted this device for purposes of review and control. The 
Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings in India (1963), for 
instance, conducts a wide range of studies on corporation activities 
and has so far made about 40 reports to the Parliament for its con­
sideration and action (Gupta 1968: 583; Mascarrenhas 1968: 247).
No such select committee has yet been adopted by the Parliament 
of Sri Lanka in spite of repeated recommendations to do so (PAC 1959: 3; 
PAC 1963: 4). Parliament instead has relied on the traditional 
instrumentality of the Public Accounts Committee for the fulfilment of 
its role of supervision over the corporations' finance and administration. 
Parliamentary control through committee has thus come to rest on the 
abilities of this one committee to examine corporate activities.
Composed of seven members and entitled to sit notwithstanding 
any adjournment of the House, the Committee of Public Accounts has been 
active for well over 20 years and has been responsible for a wide variety 
of inquiries and for the investigation of numerous activities of 
corporations as well as of the departments. It has an influence far 
more than its size would suggest; and commands a wider respect than 
its actual use of powers. Basically the Public Accounts Committee, as 
its name implies, is a committee to examine all public accounts to 
report to the House on the legality, propriety and regularity of public 
expenditure by the executive. The Committee must satisfy itself:
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(a) that the funds were spent for the purpose for which
they were allocated;
(b) that funds were spent in accordance with the rules and
regulations;
(c) that the actual expenditure did not exceed the budget
allocations (Chanda .1960: 112).
Guided by the Auditor-General, whose duty it is to examine and 
certify the accounts of the administration, the PAC generally inquires 
into any excesses, irregularities, mismanagement and negligence in 
the use of public funds that the Auditor-General may bring to the notice 
of the Parliament (CHRD 10 April 1968- Col. 3251).
So far as the activity of the public corporation is concerned,
PAC derives its authority to scrutinise its affairs from two sources.
Firstly, PAC has the power to examine any reports and accounts laid on
the table of the House. Secondly, the Auditor-General, on whose knowledge
and guidance the PAC depends, has the power and authority to examine
and report to the House on the accounts of the corporations. In terms
of the Standing Orders relating to PAC the committee should examine:
the accounts showing the appropriation of the sums granted 
by Parliament to meet the Public Expenditure and of such 
other accounts laid before Parliament as the Committee may 
think fit, together with the Auditor-General's reports thereon 
(CHRSO: 125).
Since any state corporation is obliged by law to submit annual 
reports and accounts to the Parliament and also because nearly all
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corporations' accounts are either audited by the A/G or brought under 
his scrutiny, PAC's position and power in regard to the financial side 
of corporate activities is nearly absolute. It can investigate and 
report on any corporation's activities on which the A/G may report from 
time to time.
From the very beginning PAC has been very conscious of its position 
in relation to corporations and also of the problems posed by the growth 
of a large number of corporations. More importantly the committee became 
aware of the inadequacy of the existing methods of control over cor­
porations; for instance, as early as 1958 it observed:
Your committee's inquiries have made it apparent to them that 
the degree to which Parliament is at present able to keep 
itself informed in regard to the working of State Corporations 
is wholly inadequate. It may broadly be stated that the only 
means at present available to Parliament of obtaining 
information in regard to these Corporations are through 
Answers to Questions asked by Private Members from the 
Ministers concerned, and the examination of the Annual 
Reports and Audited Accounts of the respective Boards 
of Management (PAC 1959 : 3).
Both these means in the committee's view were insufficient and 
ineffective. The management reports, it observed, can hardly be 
expected to be critical of the working of corporations to which they 
relate, while the accounts are only of limited value in forming an 
assessment of the working of the corporations. It made the same 
observation in 1963 (PAC 1963: 34), with the vain hope, however, of 
making Parliament adopt a select committee for investigation and
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i n f o r m a t i o n .  C o n c e rn e d ,  t h e n ,  by t h e  i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  o t h e r  m ethods 
o f  c o n t r o l ,  c o n v in c e d  o f  t h e  s p e c i a l  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  i t  had  come t o  
o ccupy  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  any o t h e r  s p e c i a l i s e d  s t a n d i n g  c om m ittee  to  
s tu d y  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  and  n o t i n g  t h e  u n w i l l i n g n e s s  o f  P a r l i a m e n t  t o  
i n s t i t u t e  o n e ,  th e  P u b l i c  A cco u n ts  C o m m it te e 's  i n t e r e s t  i n  c o r p o r a t i o n s  
became th o ro u g h  and c o n s i s t e n t .  Y ea r  a f t e r  y e a r  t h e  c o m m ittee  t e n d e d  
t o  b r i n g  more and more o f  t h e  e x i s t i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n s  i n t o  i t s  f o l d  -  
f rom  15 i n  1959 t o  60 i n  1971 -  and s u b j e c t  some o f  them t o  s p e c i a l  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  and s tu d y ,  e . g .  t h e  P a r a n th a n  C hem ical C o r p o r a t i o n  i n  
1963 an d  th e  Tea P ro p a g an d a  B oard  i n  1968.
No c o r p o r a t i o n  h a s  t h u s  f a r  e s c a p e d  i t s  a t t e n t i o n  i n  t h i s  p r o c e s s  
and  t h e r e  i s  no p ro b le m  r e l a t i n g  t o  c o r p o r a t i o n s  t h a t  i t  h a s  n o t  
v e n t u r e d  t o  o f f e r  i t s  comments upon . The c o m m ittee  i n  a  way b e g a n  t o  
s e e  i t s e l f  i n  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  s e l e c t  c om m ittee  i t  recommended (PAC 
1963: 34) f o r  a d o p t i o n ,  f o r  much o f  i t s  i n q u i s i t i o n s  and t h e  scope  o f  i t s  
i n q u i r i e s  g r a d u a l l y  t e n d e d  t o  f o l l o w  t h e  p a t t e r n  i t  s u g g e s t e d  f o r  a d o p t i o n  
by  t h a t  s e l e c t  c o m m it te e :  (a) p r o p e r  u s e  o f  c a p i t a l ;  (b) o p e r a t i o n a l
e f f i c i e n c y ;  (c) e v a l u a t i o n  o f  p e r f o r m a n c e ;  (d) s t a f f i n g ;  (e) r e m u n e r a t io n ;  
(f)  l a b o u r  p ro b le m s  and (g) l i n e s  o f  f u t u r e  d e v e lo p m e n t .
The k e e n n e s s  o f  t h i s  c o m m i t t e e 's  i n t e r e s t  and  t h e  c o n c e p t io n  o f  
i t s  r o l e  r e l a t i n g  t o  c o r p o r a t i o n s  a r e  e v i d e n t  i n  t h e  number and  n a t u r e  
o f  r e p o r t s  i t  h a s  i s s u e d  on t h e  a c t i v i t y  o f  c o r p o r a t i o n s .  Even th ough  
t h e  c o m m i t t e e ' s  p u r p o s e  i s  p r i m a r i l y  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  a c c o u n t s  o f  
t h e  d e p a r tm e n t s  o f  t h e  g e n e r a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  w hich  i s  i n  i t s e l f  a 
t a s k  o f  c o n s i d e r a b l e  p r o p o r t i o n s ,  t h e  amount o f  t im e  and  a t t e n t i o n  t h e
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committee has been able to give to the accounts and problems of 
corporations is significant. Of the 130 meetings the committee has 
held over a period of twenty years to consider the accounts of the 
government, more than a third have been devoted to corporate matters. 
Moreover of the 45 reports it has submitted to the House on the accounts 
of the government up to the end of 1971, nearly 15 have concerned the 
affairs of corporations. For instance one out of the two reports in 
1961, one of the two reports in 1963, two of three reports it submitted 
in 1965 have been entirely devoted to corporations. With the changes 
it brought into being in 1966, as a result of its recommendations to 
issue the A/G's reports in instalments, the Committee of Public Accounts 
has been submitting on the average two reports annually on the activity 
of the corporations alone. Thus none would deny the active involvement 
of this committee in the affairs of corporations for not only has the 
committee attempted to give wide coverage to corporations in its 
deliberations and reporting, but it has now made it a practice to give 
corporations an important place in its annual reporting.
Apart from the number of comments and criticisms that the committee 
offers on the details of accounting matters reported by the A/G, it has 
been responsible for a large number of suggestions and recommendations 
relating to the general improvement of corporate administration. They 
have covered financial arrangements, accounting methods, capital outlay, 
personnel and management practices. The fifteen reports of the committee 
are laden with these suggestions and recommendations and many of them 
have new become accepted parts of the administration of corporations.
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For instance in the 1966 report the committee, having examined twenty 
corporations, noted the following as their shortcomings: (a) absence
of properly drawn up budgets; (b) the lack of proper accounting systems; 
(c) the lack of clear procedures for administrative and financial 
transactions; (d) the absence of satisfactory costing systems; (e) 
inadequate internal controls; (f) failure to maintain proper accounting
records (PAC 1966: 125).
In the report it made in the following year the committee made 
suggestions and comments on the problems of capital outlay and the 
verification of fixed assets. On the first head the committee referred 
to a number of instances where machinery purchased at considerable 
cost (a) had not been put into use; (b) had been working below capacity. 
As regards the first the committee suggested that the Ministry of Planning 
along with the responsible administrative Ministry 'should evolve a system 
that would obviate the purchase of equipment which bears no relation­
ship to the needs of the enterprise'. On the question of under-capacity 
caused by the inadequate supply of raw materials the committee said:
'the Ministries concerned should take steps to ensure the procurement 
of supply of materials to enable the plant to work economically'.
On the verification of fixed assets, the committee admonished the 
authority concerned to take steps to put matters right. 'Unless this 
matter is rectified it would not be possible for auditors to satisfy 
themselves that the amounts given in the balance sheet correctly 
represent the value of the fixed assets which were in existence on 
that date' (PAC 1967b: 97-99).
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Of s p e c i a l  im p o r ta n c e  h e r e  a r e  t h e  t h r e e  recom m enda tions  t h a t  
t h e  c o m m it tee  made in  r e g a r d  t o  (a) a u d i t  p r o v i s i o n s ;  (b) a c c o u n t s  
a n d  r e p o r t s ;  (c) im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  t h e  reco m m en d a tio n s  o f  PAC. F o r  
t h e s e  t h r e e  to u c h  on t h e  b a s i c  p o s i t i o n  o f  th e  PAC i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  
c o r p o r a t i o n s  and  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  i t s  c o n c e rn  t o  im prove t h e  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  
o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n s .
Audit Provisions
When t h e  A/G p o i n t e d  i n  1956 t o  t h e  w eakness  i n  t h e  a u d i t  p r o v i s i o n s
i n  some a c t s  o f  c o r p o r a t i o n s  and t h e  a d v e r s e  e f f e c t  on p a r l i a m e n t a r y
c o n t r o l  a s  a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  a u d i t  o f  t h e  a c c o u n t s  b e in g  c a r r i e d  o u t  by
p r i v a t e  p r o f e s s i o n a l  a u d i t o r s ,  t h e  co m m it tee  l o s t  no t im e  i n
i n v e s t i g a t i n g  t h e  m a t t e r  and  making t h e  f o l l o w i n g  rec o m m e n d a tio n s :
Your c o m m it tee  a r e  o f  th e  o p i n io n  t h a t  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  
t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n s  s h o u ld  be s u b j e c t  t o  a th o ro u g h  and  s e a r c h i n g  
a u d i t  . . Your com m ittee  were in fo rm e d  how ever t h a t  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
a l l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  s e t  up , p r i v a t e  a u d i t o r s  have b e e n  a p p o in t e d  
and  n o t  t h e  A u d i t o r - G e n e r a l .  Your co m m it tee  c o n s i d e r  t h e  
fo rm a l  a u d i t  c e r t i f i c a t e  s u b m i t t e d  by  t h e  p r i v a t e  a u d i t o r s  
q u i t e  i n a d e q u a te  f o r  p u r p o s e s  o f  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  c o n t r o l  and  an 
e n d e a v o u r  s h o u ld  be  made t o  s e c u r e  r e p o r t s  c o n t a i n i n g  such  
i n f o r m a t i o n  a s  may be o f  u se  to  PAC and  o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  
P a r l i a m e n t  (PAC 1957: 5 ) .
The c o m m it tee  p o i n t e d  o u t  f u r t h e r :
Your co m m it tee  d e s i r e  t o  s t a t e  t h a t  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t h a t  
t h e y  s h o u ld  have  t h e  a s s i s t a n c e  o f  t h e  A/G f o r  t h e i r  
e x a m in a t io n  o f  su c h  a c c o u n t s  and r e p o r t s  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n s  
a s  t h e y  may d e c id e  t o  exam ine . M a n i f e s t l y  t h e  A/G w i l l  
be  u n a b le  t o  be o f  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  y o u r  co m m it tee  i n  su c h
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examination unless that audit were either carried out by 
him or, if it were carried out by private auditor, unless 
he had been afforded facilities for discussions with the 
private auditor and had been granted access to the books 
and records of corporations (PAC 1957: 5).
The latter part of these observations became the substance of its 
recommendations:
that private auditor could be appointed, but 
he should be directed to carry out his audit in 
consultation with the A/G; when the audit has been 
completed, the private auditor should discuss his draft 
report with the A/G who should have right of access to the 
books and records of the corporations (PAC 1957: 6).
This recommendation in fact became the accepted practice as from 
the day the House approved the committee's report, and corporations 
created after these recommendations had this part of the committee's 
recommendations carried into their enabling act. The committee however 
did not stop with this arrangement. It went on to point out, in its 
later reports, the desirability of making the A/G responsible for all 
corporate audits. Consequently the Finance Act of 1971 now empowers 
the A/G to audit the accounts of all the corporations. The position 
that the A/G has now reached, as the only authority to audit accounts 
of corporations, is mainly the work of the committee of Public Accounts.
A prompt rendering of accounts is needed as well as an audit, it 
the committee's role is to be effective. Any loss of time will make
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the work of the committee almost useless and control over them
ineffective. Realising the importance of this need and the negligence
of corporations in failing to submit them promptly, the committee
solicited Parliament's attention in these words:
Your committee observe from the A/G's report there has been 
considerable delay on the part of large number of corporations 
in rendering their annual accounts for audit. In view of 
the important role played by corporations in the
economy of the country, your committee consider that the 
timely rendering of accounts is of paramount importance. .
Your committee trust that the Ministries concerned will
take necessary steps to ensure that the final accounts
for any year are prepared and rendered for audit in an
acceptable form within a reasonable period after the close
of the financial year of the corporation concerned (PAC 1966: 124) .
The committee repeated the same observation the following year and 
emphasized:
If the accounts should fall into arrear by even a few years, 
the raison d'etre of the system of annual accounts is lost 
in so far as the Parliament and the public are not kept 
informed of the working results of the activity in due time, 
while at the same time, the opportunity for putting to right 
promptly any remedial matters is lost (PAC 1967b: 97).
Almost every other report of the committee up to 1971 took note 
of delays whenever they occurred and insisted on the necessity of 
making corporations render their accounts in time. Because of the 
committee's attention and pressure the Finance Act of 1971, which the 
Parliament passed without a division, now makes such negligence a
legal offence. By section 13 (6) ;
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Any such corporation which contravenes or fails to comply
[render accounts in time] shall be guilty of an offence
under this Act and shall on conviction after the summary
trial before a magistrate be liable to a fine not exceeding 
one thousand rupees.
The committee saw its position further strengthened and its role
recognised with the success it achieved in influencing Parliament
to make its recommendations a legal imperative through the Finance Act
of 1971. For the act by sec (15) lays down:
The appropriate Minister may direct the governing body of 
a corporation to give effect to such recommendations made 
by the Public Accounts Committee in its reports to the House 
of Representatives relating to corporations as may be 
determined by the Minister.
Even though the act is of recent origin, the basic idea of this
provision started with the recommendations it made in 1967. It said:
Your committee feel ... attention of government [should be 
drawn to] making statutory provisions to ensure follow up 
action in respect of recommendations made by the Public 
Accounts Committee, in regard to various activities of the 
Boards and Corporations (PAC 1967a: 74) .
In the year that followed the committee went on to give the reasons 
behind this suggestion, to convince Parliament of the necessity to
make its recommendations legally binding.
Your committee appreciate the fact that the purpose of creating 
corporations was for the decentralisation of governmental 
activity and to secure certain amount of flexibility in the
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conducting of such activity.. It is therefore not the 
intention of your committee to suggest anything that 
might give the impression that they want these corporations 
"converted to the status of government departments.. Con­
sideration of public accountability and plan implementation 
would appear to require that affairs of corporations and 
boards should not only come up before the PAC for periodical 
review but follow up action too should be ensured on 
observations made by the PAC. Public accountability would 
imply amongst other things a statutory obligation on the 
part of corporations and boards to furnish to officers of 
Parliament and its agents the necessary information to 
enable an independent and impartial appraisal to be made 
for the better financial administration of the public 
bodies (PAC 1969: 139).
From whatever angle - reporting, recommendations, deliberations on 
corporate matters - it is difficult not to recognise the extent of the 
work and attention the Committee of Public Accounts has given to the 
consideration of corporate activities. Unlike committees of its kind 
elsewhere, the Committee of Public Accounts in Sri Lanka has been 
consistent and thorough in investigating and reporting to the House 
on the activities of the corporations. It is the only body, so to speak, 
which has sought to maintain a continuous watch over the corporations 
and keep alive the concern and interest of Parliament.
To conclude:
Except for the role played by the Public Accounts Committee,
Parliament seems not entirely to have succeeded in controlling corporations. 
The question period, an important opportunity to raise the subject of
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corporate affairs seems to suffer on account of a lack of comprehen­
siveness of questions, which often tend to require information only of 
a few corporations and this in the form of harassing details rather than 
a wide view of their efficiency and performance. The debates in most 
cases seem to take no more than a cursory look at corporate administration 
though on occasion detailed aspects of their activities are raised.
The paucity of objective information about corporations and the 
obsession of members with sectional and party interest rather than with 
corporate efficiency seem to weaken the present method of parliamentary 
control. There is therefore a real need for a select committee of the' 
kind repeatedly suggested by the PAC to improve the present system of 
control. For although the Accounts Committee of the Parliament has so 
far been active and keen in its investigation of the affairs of cor­
porations on parliament's behalf, it is nonetheless limited by the 
accounting view and its inability to apply to corporations criteria 
other than those applicable to ordinary departments. A select committee 
set up on the lines proposed by the PAC specifically for purposes of 
study and supervision could prove effective in this respect. Apart from 
taking a broader view of the corporations affairs such as their overall 
efficiency and effectiveness, such a committee could be able to provide 
parliament with an independent source of information. Parliamentary
control as at present operates seems more theoretical than real.
VII NEW STRUCTURES
181
A basic difference between public corporations in a developing 
country like Sri Lanka and those in a developed country like Britain 
seems to lie in the kind of enterprise they manage. Whereas the 
corporate form in a developed country is often an institutional 
arrangement to socialise and control already established enterprises, 
in a developing country it is increasingly used as an instrument to 
initiate and develop new enterprises (Baldwin 1957; Milne 1961b;
Rao 1964). 'Nationalisation in Great Britain can be conceived as 
the final stage in the long historical development of industrial 
organization, whereas in South East Asia it is the first step towards 
creating an industrial society' (Chester 1955:52). Understanding 
of this difference in the roles of public corporations is important 
as it underlies much of the problem concerning organisation and 
assignment of corporate functions.
Since nearly all state industrial enterprises in a developing 
country, unlike those in the west, are of a pioneering nature and as 
they are often conceived as necessary and important elements in its 
plan for industrialisation, they demand proper evaluation and careful 
planning and study even before they are set up as operating industries 
(Bryce 1960;1962). Partly because of this need for initial study 
and research, and partly because most enterprises in such countries 
are small-scale concerns, limited in size and scope, with similar 
problems and needs at least in their initial stages, the question is 
often raised as to the appropriateness of a single development 
corporation to undertake the entire functions of creating and managing
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all state industrial enterprises (Prakash 1957:46; Hanson 1961:625). 
The idea behind this thinking is that such a combination of 
entrepreneurial and managerial functions (Bryce 1962:240) should 
enable a single administrative body to specialise in and coordinate 
every activity relating to the development of state enterprises thus 
preventing the enterprises being entangled in central administrative 
bureaucracies and procedures.
As recently as 1970, in presenting the first budget of the 
United Left Front government, the Minister of Finance Dr. N.M. Perera 
advocated a similar arrangement for Sri Lanka to coordinate functions 
of development and management of state industrial enterprises 
(Karuntilake 1971:356). The announced plan of the Minister was to 
form sector development corporations both to initiate ana develop 
new state enterprises and organise and administer others that existed 
in the industrial sector. 'The sectoral development corporation 
will be the instrument through which the state will direct the 
course and regulate the activities of that industrial sector...All 
existing public sector corporations will vest in the appropriate 
sectoral corporations which will then manage each factory unit 
through a board of directors appointed by it at factory level' (CHRD 
25 Oct 1970:Col. 510). The Cabinet Sub-Committee on terms and 
conditions of employment in the following year also supported the 
idea of grouping functionally related enterprises under sectoral 
corporations (Rajapakse Committee 1971:227).
Long before in the early fifties when the management of state
enterprises was at its formative stage, the Commission on Organisation
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and Operative Methods of Government Departments (SP 5 1948), the IBRD 
Mission on economic development (IBRD 1952) and the Commission on 
Commercial Undertakings {SP 19 1953) did consider the suitability of 
development corporations for organising and operating state industrial 
enterprises in Sri Lanka. The development corporation has thus been 
a recurrent theme whenever the productive and creative aspects of 
state enterprises were discussed and today the idea is acquiring new 
force.
Though every industrial enterprise is now organised under the 
charge of a separate board, the possibility of their coming under the 
control and management of a sector development corporation still 
looms large in view of the above mentioned announcement. And no 
doubt there are advantages to be gained by such an arrangement as 
opposed to the independent existence of enterprises as it prevails 
today.
This chapter therefore analyses the concept of the development 
corporation particularly in regard to the nature and type of 
corporations that exist and the nature and type recommended for 
adoption in Sri Lanka by the Mission and Commission just mentioned.
Unlike the conventional public corporation whose function it is 
to produce or provide a given good or service, a development 
corporation is largely characterised by its entrepreneurial or 
promotional role (Hanson 1959:22, 1966:117). By initiating and 
pioneering new enterprises and coordinating and managing others it 
has become today a popular means of organising the state's
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entrepreneurial functions. Depending on the character and the need 
of the economy, a development corporation can be either a comprehensive 
body to undertake the entire developmental functions of the country 
(Hanson 1959:210), or in the alternative confine itself to the 
development of a given sector: agriculture, industry or commerce.
Whatever its scope, limited or comprehensive, a development 
corporation is normally assigned wide powers, and a general 
authority to operate over a wider area than a conventional public 
corporation.
A comprehensive body like the Chilean Fomento (Finer 1947), for 
instance, can undertake the production of coal, metal, chemicals, 
rubber, textiles and cement to achieve industrial progress, while at 
the same time initiating schemes such as irrigation, reclamation of 
wastelands and supply of fertilizer to help organise the agricultural 
sector. It can besides operate public utility enterprises to 
facilitate infrastructure services necessary for economic growth.
The Chilean Fomento in fact carried out all of these services in an 
effort to achieve economic development in Chile, and whatever success 
Chile has achieved in the fields of industry and agriculture is now 
attributed to the Fomento.
Undoubtedly the Chilean Fomento is a special type of development 
authority and its advantage is immense for a nation which has to 
start from scratch without the necessary administrative, political 
and social organisations. For in such circumstances 'it may provide 
an impetus which will otherwise be lacking, and may impart into the
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early developmental stages a coherence otherwise unobtainable' (Hanson 
1959:226). It can besides evolve its own administrative organisation, 
devise its own operative procedures and remain free from the rigidities 
and inefficiencies of traditional governmental methods.
Despite these important and distinct advantages to be derived, 
the IBRD Mission in Sri Lanka considered that a comprehensive development 
corporation would be unsuitable in Sri Lanka. Though it would help 
overcome the problem of lack of coordination and planning that had 
beset the developmental programmes in Sri Lanka and subject many of 
them to critical and professional review, and prevent the wastage of 
resources seen in the duplication of developmental functions, the view 
of the Mission was that to institute it would involve too great an 
invasion of the well-established responsibilities of the existing 
departments (IBRD 1952:70). The Mission also pointed out other problems 
that would arise in setting up a body like Fomento. In particular it 
made reference to the dearth of technical and managerial personnel 
available in Sri Lanka to staff such an institution. The Mission 
however advocated (a) a Cabinet Sub-Committee, and (b) an Economic 
Planning Secretariat as a solution to the problems of coordination and 
planning of state projects. The Cabinet Sub-Committee was to study 
all development proposals involving capital expenditure with a view 
to advising the cabinet on the suitability or otherwise of individual 
projects, and the Planning Secretariat was to provide this committee 
vjith technical and economic information to evaluate economic programmes. 
Both these bodies have since been instituted and today they exercise
a great deal of influence over several projects.
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'Ceylon Development Corporation' Proposal
Though the Mission rejected a comprehensive development corporation 
of the Chilean type, it nonetheless favoured the formation of a general 
development corporation to carry through the industrial programme of 
the country (IBRD 1952:84) . This body was to be slightly different 
from the comprehensive development corporation, with defined powers 
and responsibilities directed mainly to promotion and development of 
new enterprises.
Under the title 'Stimulation of new production' the Mission in
its report saw (a) lack of knowledge about the real potential of local
raw materials, and about the necessary adaptation of modern techniques
\
and (b) lack of enterprise, managerial capacity, and finance as the 
primary obstacles to industrial growth (IBRD 1952:80). To remedy the 
first the Mission suggested the establishment of an Applied Research 
Institute independent of government control but enjoying its support 
to do research on the technical and productive aspects of industrial 
production. It was to overcome the problems of lack of enterprise, 
managerial capacity, and finance that the Mission argued a development 
corporation was necessary.
The Mission found there were certain features in the Ceylonese 
situation which particularly called for an overall development 
corporation. Firstly, on the financial side it observed the general 
reluctance of the commercial banks to invest in long-term industrial 
projects, having been used to short-term advances in the more profitable 
trading activities (IBRD 1952:82), and the absence of such an 
organisation as the joint stock company form to raise investment capital.
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Secondly, on the production side it noted the lack of experience and 
enterprise associated with the industrial activities. What was 
prevalent, said the Mission, was a mercantilist tradition specialising 
in the art of buying and selling rather than in that of combining 
factors of production for production purposes. The lack of entrepreneurial 
quality in Sri Lanka had slowed down the country's progress. Thirdly, 
on the governmental side the Mission observed the failure of the 
developmental programmes already undertaken. Although carefully 
planned and well directed they seemed to have failed because of the 
administrative machinery selected for their operation: a clear
example of this was the effort to operate industrial enterprises 
through the regular departmental form.
What was wanted, the Mission believed, was (a) a suitable 
institutional arrangement to translate into action the government's 
interest in the development of industries; (b) a suitable institutional 
means to encourage, promote and utilise private enterprise and help 
its efforts with technical know-how and managerial and capital 
assistance; and (c) an institutional means to mobilise funds from 
both the commercial banks and the investing public with a view to 
increasing investments in industrial ventures. Rather than each of 
these functions being separately organised and individually 
administered the Mission saw the possibility of combining them in a 
single institution. The development corporation was thus to be a 
catalyst - an institutional arrangement to combine several functions 
related to industrial development in a single body.
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F u n c t i o n s :  The Ceylon Development Corporation proposed by the Mission
was for all-round industrial development. It was to provide finance 
necessary to initiate new projects and assist the progress of others 
with managerial and technical assistance. Like development corporations 
found elsewhere such as in Pakistan and India, it was to be a 
pioneering agency 'charged with giving primary impulse to economic 
expansion in the productive fields where private enterprise was 
lacking or laggard' (IBRD 1952:84).
The modus operandi proposed for this body makes this objective 
even clearer. In common with other development corporations it was 
in the first instance to investigate and formulate projects suitable 
for operation in Sri Lanka. These could be entirely new ventures 
which had not been undertaken before, or others which might call for 
expansion in existing undertakings. Whatever its nature, once the 
details of a project became finalised the corporation was to initiate 
its operation either by vesting it in a subsidiary corporation of its 
own, or offering it to the public to undertake its operation. In the 
latter case the corporation was to assist the private entrepreneur in 
whatever manner possible in launching the enterprise. It might provide 
finance, technical know-how and in certain cases co-operate with the 
private entrepreneur in managing the enterprise. The Mission was 
emphatic that a subsidiary corporation should only be formed if private 
enterprise failed to come forward to accept a project. Even then no 
project was to remain permanently under its charge, for the 
recommendation of the Mission was that as soon as any project became 
a viable and going concern it should be committed to private capital.
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This procedure was considered essential to the operation of the 
corporation as it would release more funds and personnel to pioneer 
other enterprises.
Apart from developing new enterprises, the corporation was also 
to organise support for enterprise started independently by private 
individuals and others wishing to expand. Such support might also 
take the form of loans and managerial or technical assistance.
The accent of its operation was thus to be on industrial production 
whether by public or private enterprise, but the emphasis seems to 
fall heavily on the side of promotion of private enterprise (Hanson 
1959:223). A partial explanation for this is the Mission's belief 
that (a) no government, however capable and enterprising, would be 
able to shoulder the entire burden of industrial development without 
the active participation and co-operation of private enterprise as 
the Ceylonese government had attempted in the past; and (b) whatever 
assistance that government wished to offer should be, in the main, to 
provide initiatives and financial assistance rather than 'actual 
operating control'.
Organisationally the setting up of a development corporation on 
the lines proposed by the IBRD Mission would have been advantageous 
for the reason that it would have succeeded in integrating the 
functions of planning and management of industries in Sri Lanka.
Part of the reason for the poor performance of the productive 
enterprises in this nation has been, and still is, the inadequate
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planning underlying their initiation (Naylor 1966:21; Srivastava 1969). 
Sometimes care is not taken in the choice of an industry' suited to 
the needs and potential of the country. Sometimes wrong technology 
is chosen for adoption in developing a given industry (CHRD 4 Sept 
1961 Col. 174). When the industry and technology are correctly 
chosen mistakes are often made in the siting of the factory and scale 
of its operation (Abeysingne 1967:63; CHRD 4 Sept 1961 Col. 174).
The trouble is always the poor appreciation of the need for proper 
planning and careful study and the failure to understand that such 
precautions would eventually make the difference between success or 
failure. Even when such studies are made political considerations 
may take precedence over purely economic judgment with the result 
that certain enterprises are established and kept in operation by 
government subsidy.
This weakness seems an inevitable part of the system of divided 
responsibility where one agency like the Ministry of Industries in 
Sri Lanka becomes responsible for planning and promotion of enterprises 
and another agency such as the individual corporation, takes over 
the function of management. Because of the gap this produces between 
planning and management (Chatterjee 1964:40), certain preconditions 
of efficient industrial management such as the availability of the 
right type of personnel, the adaptability of technology to local 
conditions, the suitability of local raw materials for production and 
the capacity of the local market tend to be minimised in importance 
at the planning stage of an enterprise (Bryce 1962:237). But in 
contrast, when the planning and management of industries are integrated
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under a body like the development corporation, managerial aspects and 
the requirements of productive enterprises should become a necessary 
part of the process of planning.
The proposed development corporation would probably have proved 
efficient in this respect. As it was to be both a financial agency 
and a promotional one, it would have been compelled to assess in 
advance every aspect of managerial requirements as much as technical 
and commercial feasibility before inaugurating or supporting an 
enterprise.
Aside from the integration of planning and managerial functions 
necessary to promote industrial ventures, the development corporation 
would also have provided an ideal framework for better utilisation 
and development of the scarce skills and expertise necessary to 
perform these functions. Besides it would also have afforded better 
facilities, through training, for developing expertise and skills 
necessary to perform the above tasks.
A third benefit from the development corporation would have been 
the facility it would have offered to coordinate activities relating 
to industrial development. Since this was to have been an overall 
development authority with full powers to initiate and promote any 
industrial enterprise and more importantly with the capacity to 
finance such efforts, every function relating to the development of 
industries could have been better linked and implemented.
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Although the concept of a development corporation presented by the 
IBRD Mission was not fully accepted, some of its features were adopted 
in the form of the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the 
Industrial Development Board (IDB) set up to provide economic and 
technical support for industrial development. The DFC established in 
1955 (TC 1966:243) undertook the functions of providing industrial 
credit and mobilising investable funds, while the IDB, established 
fourteen years after the Mission's recommendations, became responsible 
among other things for encouraging and promoting industrial development 
in the private sector.
Two reasons suggest themselves for the failure of the Mission's 
proposal to find acceptance. One was the report of the Commission on 
Commercial Undertakings which followed close on the heels of the IBRD, 
recommending an alternative arrangement for the initiation and 
management of state enterprises, the other was the government's 
uncertainty on the basic question of whether to give up altogether 
the ownership and management of state enterprises on a scale that 
would justify setting up a development corporation. Since the above 
Commission was appointed to make a close study of the organisational 
aspect of industrial enterprises in Sri Lanka, it was possible for the 
government to pay more attention to its recommendations than to those 
of IBRD.
As the development corporation did not become a reality the 
initiation and management of state enterprises were in fact separately 
organised and individually administered on the lines proposed by the
Commission on Commercial Undertakings.
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Commissions' A l te rna t ive  Proposals
The Commission on Commercial Undertakings, it must be emphasised, 
did not reject the concept of a development corporation, but what it 
found objectionable was the principle that government should at no time 
own and operate industrial enterprises itself. For the IBRD Mission 
had made it clear that it was opposed to state ownership and the 
proposed development corporation was a means to avoid this. With that 
view the above Commission did not agree. 'We are not in favour of 
complete socialisation of trade and industry, yet there might be some 
cases where government would want, in the national interest, to retain- 
the administration of an industry within its own authority though not 
necessarily in its own immediate hands (SP 19 1953:67).
Basing itself on this belief that government should be able to 
own and operate enterprises if ever it desired to do so, the Commission 
on Commercial Undertakings set out its plans for organising the functions 
of initiation and management of industrial enterprises. These may be 
summarised under the two headings: (a) launching of state enterprises
and (b) the management of state enterprises.
Like the Mission before, and partly influenced by it, the 
Commission maintained that project preparation, study and evaluation 
should receive far greater attention and thought than that was currently 
given if enterprises were to be successfully launched. More importantly 
such preparatory study and plan evaluation should not remain closed 
door affairs, and must be brought into the open for criticism and 
comment by experts in this field from outside. The Commission thus
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found unsatisfactory the prevailing practice of the Ministry of Industries 
taking overall charge of planning and preparatory studies for launching 
enterprises. Having conducted the survey investigation the Ministry of 
Industries now submitted proposals direct to the Cabinet for approval 
and proceeded to establish the industries thereafter. The deficiency 
in this procedure was that Cabinet in sanctioning the project for 
operation might not have had adequate knowledge, particularly on the 
economic and commercial viability of the proposals, to decide anything 
on correct grounds. For it was possible for a Ministry overenthused by 
the choice of its projects to recommend them without adequate testing . 
for their commercial and economic feasibility (SP 19 1953:64). The 
recommendation of the Commission was that an Advisory Committee composed 
of the secretary to the Department of Industries, two technical officers, 
representatives of the central bank, two businessmen and two other 
economists should be instituted outside the Ministry to study projects 
before they were submitted to the Cabinet for approval. The Ministry 
of Industries should retain the functions of survey and investigation 
of industrial possibilities and fostering others in the private sector- 
matters in which it would work closely with the proposed Institute of 
Applied Industrial Research.
The Commission also noted the relevance of the concept of the 
development corporation proposed by the IBRD, which it said could solve 
most of the problems faced by the government in launching state 
enterprises. But projects investigated and studied by such an agency 
should be placed before the government for a decision on their ownership 
and a corporation should be instituted if government decided in favour 
of state ownership of any recommended projects.
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The Commission's recommendation was a simple one and did not foresee 
any radical changes in the structural arrangements for launching an 
enterprise except to add an 'Advisory Committee' to the course taken by 
an investigated project on its way from Ministry to Cabinet. The 
Ministry of Industry was to remain as before the investigatory and 
promotional body for initiating new projects.
In so far as the management of enterprises chosen for state 
operation was concerned, the commission was strongly in favour of the 
corporation form of management, but it emphasised, in marked contrast 
to the IBRD, that state ownership in whatever field should be total and 
no private capital should be allowed to enter into these undertakings.
However on the basic question of whether there should be a single 
corporation for the management of all state owned enterprises or an 
independent corporation for each and every enterprise to be managed, 
the Commission's view was that each enterprise should be under the 
management of a separate board, but constituted under the authority of 
a single enabling statute (SP 19 1953:70). This last was its most 
novel recommendation in so far as the organisational framework of 
enterprises was concerned.
The act should enable the Minister to set up corporate boards to 
manage enterprises without the necessity to go before the House with a 
separate statute every time it decided upon an enterprise. A number of 
boards under a single statute was the form of management that the 
Commission favoured for the management of industrial enterprises.
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In sum the conception of the Commission on Commercial Undertakings 
was that the state should establish carefully selected enterprises in 
the industrial sector, planned and studied first by the Ministry of 
Industries, then vetted by the Advisory Committee. They should be 
independently organised under separate boards constituted under an 
enabling statute. The undertone in this recommendation was the 
expectation that government would confine itself to the ownership and 
management of a few enterprises probably in the basic industries.
The Commission on Organisation and Operative Methods of Government 
Departments appointed in 1948 to study changes in the organisation, 
staffing, cadre and operative methods of all public departments and 
government establishments, had however advocated a different arrangement 
for the initiation and promotion of industrial enterprises. While also 
recommending a corporate form of management for state owned enterprises, 
it argued strongly for a single State Industries Corporation for 
organising and managing enterprises worked under the Ministry of 
Industries and for planning and establishing others in the industrial 
field (SP 5 1948:173). In every case the task of investigating new 
industries and evaluating their technical feasibility was to be part of 
the function of the research section of the Ministry of Industries, but 
when this task was completed the State Industries Corporation should be 
responsible for making final recommendations on the practicability of 
establishing them. In the case of enterprises already set up the State 
Industries Corporation should have full authority and responsibility to 
manage them in a manner most suited to their advancement and efficiency. 
Thus the Commission on Organisation and Operative Methods did not see
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any need for a separate and individual corporation for every enterprise 
nor did it recommend the institution of separate boards to create new 
enterprises. Functions relating to the management of all industrial 
enterprises and to the creation of new enterprises were to be entrusted 
to a single Board of six members, two from the public service and four 
from the private sector, and its capital should be drawn from the 
consolidated fund. The State Industries Corporation, however, unlike 
the IBRD's proposed Development Corporation was solely for the purpose 
of promoting and developing state enterprises.
The State Industrial Corporations Act No. 49 of 1957 which eventually 
defined the framework for the organisation of industrial enterprises and 
assignment of corporate functions sought to incorporate the recommendation 
of the Gunasena Commission on Commercial Undertakings for 'plural boards 
under a single statute'. By sec.2 (1) it empowered the Minister with 
the approval of the government to create as many boards as he might 
think necessary as opposed to a single board to promote industrial 
development. Where the government considered it necessary that a 
corporation should be established for the purpose of (a) setting up and 
carrying on any industrial undertaking or (b) taking over and carrying 
on any industrial undertaking previously carried on by any corporation, 
the Minister with the approval of the government could incorporate it 
by order published in the Gazette (Sec.2, 1 (a)(b)).
The procedure established was thus a simple one; whenever and 
wherever the Minister considered there should be a corporate board to 
develop and promote an industry - steel, chemicals, tyre or paper for 
example - he could do so by publishing an incorporation order in the
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Gazette. This order would define the functions and objects of the 
corporation. In 1958 when the Textile Corporation was so constituted 
its functions were defined as follows:
(a) purchase of any lands producing cotton or suitable for the 
planting, cultivation and growth of cotton and of any 
concessions or rights over such lands;
(b) the leasing of lands of the description referred to in 
paragraph (1) ;
(c) the possession and working of lands of the description 
referred to in paragraph (1);
(d) the planting and cultivation of cotton and other plants 
producing substitutes of cotton;
(e) ginning, spinning, doubling, dyeing, weaving, printing and 
sale of all types of fibrous substances, natural or artificial, 
used in the textile industry;
(f) the manufacture, utilisation and marketing of any by-products 
resulting from the Corporation's work in connection with 
textiles; and
(g) the supply of electrical energy to any person (Gazette
Notification: 11237, 10 Jan 1958).
The Minister in placing before the House the demand for the initial 
capital for establishing this body, explained the nature of the objects 
assigned and the need to give such functions as cotton growing and 
supply of electrical energy in these words: 'The aims and objects set
out in the order are like aims and objects of a private company. Several 
ancillary objects have been set out along with the main objects and aims,
199
but the main purpose of that corporation is what is important, and the 
immediate task that this corporation should undertake is the setting 
up of a spinning mill at Veyangoda' (CHRD 28 Nov 1958; see also CHRD
16 Nov 1957:1353).
However, functions assigned in the first instance need not 
necessarily be the functions of the corporation for ever; depending on 
the circumstances the Minister could alter the functions by altering 
its objectives (sec.3,2). In certain cases he could increase the scope 
of its activities by adding more productive units related to the field 
of the corporation's operations, as was done in the addition of the 
Puttalam Cement Factory and Galle Cement Factory to the Ceylon Cement 
Corporation; or he could remove functions from one corporation and 
entrust them to another as in the transfer of the bricks and tiles 
factory from the National Small Industries Corporation to the Ceylon 
Ceramics Corporation; or he could completely wind up a corporation as 
in the case of the Ceylon Hardboard Board. The initiation and creation 
of corporations and the setting of economic objectives for realisation 
were functions solely entrusted to the Minister.
Parliament was given little or no part in this process; for there 
was no legal compulsion for the Minister to have prior approval of the 
Parliament. The only occasion when Parliament would obtain information 
of the affairs of a corporation was when the Minister went before the 
House to seek its approval for the initial capital expenditure. 
Parliament could then call for further information as to cost estimates 
and benefits to be derived from the enterprise and the Minister might 
obligingly disclose details to justify the project. But this in no way
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prevented a Minister or the government from setting up any number of 
enterprises, and in any sphere of industrial activity. Dr. N.M. Perera 
at the committee stage of the state industrial corporation bill proposed 
that the initial gazette notification, which incorporates details of 
functions, place and objectives of corporations, should be brought before 
the House for its approval so as to assure Parliament, and those who 
undertook the management of a project, that the objectives set were 
feasible and the project itself was desirable for the country. But 
that motion was not carried (CHRD 21 Oct 1957:967).
The Need for Reform
The kind of enterprise created under this legislation and the field 
in which it operates is thus dependent upon those at the helm of affairs. 
Economic plans such as the ten year and five year plans do set broad 
guidelines and demarcate sectors where enterprises might be initiated 
and developed (Gunawardena 1960:59). P.H.W. de Silva, the first Minister 
to use the act, justified the set of corporate bodies he created on the 
grounds of their strategic importance for any industrial development.
The choice is not always so rational. For the Minister who succeeded 
him, J.C.W. Nunasinghe, had no such answer for the Industrial Hardboard 
Board he set up invoking the same statute. Neither could he point to 
any reasons for his choice, nor could he explain the economic rationale 
behind the institution of the Board. P.H.W. de Silva the ex-minister
explained that the choice was a wrong one:
201
It is a wrong principle to start projects on a constituency basis.
It is a principle that was given up. When I relinquished office 
as Minister of Industries this was not one of the projects under 
contemplation by the Ministry or Department. This was not one of 
the projects that was in the programme of development worked out 
by the Ministry of Planning. The Minister must have used his power 
of persuasion to include a scheme without the economics of a 
project being worked out and approved by the Ministry (CHRD 24 Sept 
1959:391-2).
It is true that the Ministry of Planning and the Treasury collaborate 
with the Ministry of Industries in launching enterprises. But their 
assistance and advice are obtained on projects already decided and 
planned for development. Even here in the examination of selected 
projects, their co-operation and collaboration do not go far enough.
Short as they are of staff specialised in techniques of discounted cash 
flow and cost-benefit analysis, their assessment of projects is confined 
to checking arithmetic and studying other figures given in support of 
that industry. The need for such appraisal is even discounted on the 
basis that 'a strong and obstinate Minister may disregard all advice 
and go ahead with the project' (PAC 1963:103).
In the seventeen years this statute has been in force nearly thirty 
corporations have been constituted. Ten of them produce such consumer 
items as sugar, fish, oil, flour, textiles, tobacco, leather £>roducts, 
fertilizer, ceramics and tyres. Seven others operate to produce steel, 
hardware, cement, graphite, fertiliser, mineral sands, chemicals.
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Production of plywoods, timber, paper are the responsibility of another 
three separate boards. While the Industrial Estates Corporation and 
Small Industries Corporation render assistance and operate services for 
small scale production, the State Engineering Corporation undertakes 
the responsibility of building factories for the established corporations. 
Of the six boards created in the five years the U.L.F. government has 
been in office, three are to produce tobacco, graphite, drugs and 
pharmaceuticals, while the remaining three have been entrusted with 
responsibilities of supplying raw materials for the established sector 
(New Commonwealth 1972:20). These are all corporate bodies to operate 
in a sphere that has come to be termed import substituting industries 
(CHRD 15 September 1960:1638). Tyres, paper, textiles for instance were 
commodities imported on a large scale spending as much as ten per cent 
of the foreign exchange earned through exports and the establishment of 
the corporate bodies in these areas had the immediate objective of 
conserving foreign exchange and developing industries to supply these 
commodities at home. Industrialisation for import substitution is a 
policy pursued by every developing country and the protagonists of this 
policy emphasise its value for quick industrial development.
Certain features of the way the Ceylon government has set out to 
organise corporate boards are however worth noticing (CO 27 May 1974). 
Firstly, corporate boards instituted in accordance with this policy of 
import substitution are only assigned functions to 'manufacture, sell 
and distribute articles', without the allied function of planning and 
formulating policies for the overall development of the industry. Thus 
when the development of the textile industry was mooted the established
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corporate board only had the function of operating a spinning mill at 
Veyangoda; but the functions relating to the development of the textile 
industry as a whole such as studying capital needs and market conditions 
of the industry, and developing and promoting the textile industry as 
a cottage industry, did not constitute a declared part of the functions 
of the textile corporation. Secondly, where one corporate board would 
have sufficed, several have been created in the same sector (CO 27 May 
1974). (This may well be due to the restrictive nature of the functions 
assigned to corporations). This is further evident in the textile 
industry. Apart from the National Textile corporation to produce 
cotton yarn, coarse cloth and cotton cloth, there is the weaving supplies 
corporation to undertake the distribution of the yarn produced by the 
mills operated by the corporation, and an Industries Development Board 
to provide assistance and promote techniques to develop the textile 
industry in the private sector and also to develop it as a cottage 
industry, in the same sector.
This phenomenon is even more marked in the case of other corporate 
boards created under this statute. Thus we have a Plywood corporation 
to make tea-chests, furniture and other articles made of plywood and a 
State Timber corporation to supply wood. A State Fertilizer corporation 
operates to import fertilizer to mix, process and sell; and another 
State Fertilizer Manufacturing corporation created in 1966 hopes to 
manufacture fertilizer at home.
The problem here is that government instead of treating an industry 
as a single sector to be wholly planned and developed by a single 
corporation has been led into the position of creating a multiplicity
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of corporations with duplication of functions to achieve the same 
objective. Economists have been quick to pinpoint the excessive machine 
capacity, surplus work force, absence of forward planning as features 
which have emanated from this policy. A team of experts from the 
Central Bank illustrated the case by pointing to the 268 million rupees 
of governmental investments in a textile complex, where in fact 
hundreds of handlooms could have met the textile demands more effectively 
generating far more employment (CDN 15 September 1971). Others point 
at the heavy outlays, under-utilisation of installed capacity, and 
above all at the heavy dependence of most corporations on imported raw- 
materials to demonstrate the ad hoc, arbitrary nature of the corporate 
creation.
Administrators in particular have been critical of the lack of 
clear thought or principles underlying the formation of corporations 
and question the wisdom of not entrusting the function of creating a new 
enterprise to the existing viable and ongoing enterprise rather than to 
a raw organisation, a policy which they point out could have halved the 
number of corporations and have made easier the task of initiating new 
enterprises. 'Planners should always bear in mind', said Galbraith,
'that the most difficult part of the industrial process is its inception. 
It is precisely this difficult stage which should be entrusted to 
established and not to new enterprises. The common tendency is to 
create a new organisation for each new task but this means that 
all of the problems of a raw organisation must be gone through each 
time. If however existing organisations are given new tasks then use 
is made of going concern value and accumulated experience. Managers
205
may complain that their organisation is overstrained and their resources 
are overtaxed. But their resources will be much less taxed than those 
of a totally new organisation faced with the combine task of creating 
itself and doing the job (Galbraith 1959:100). Had this advice been 
followed or served as guiding principle for creating corporations apart 
from halving the existing number of corporations it could have also 
brought about a greater variety of enterprises; efficient and viable to 
serve economic growth.
In fairness to the government it is necessary to mention however, 
its early efforts to rationalise corporate structure (Karunaratne 1963:
28). In particular the attempt it made in 1961 was a laudable one. 
Realising the indiscriminate and haphazard growth of corporate bodies, 
it announced proposals to amalgamate existing corporate bodies in an 
allied field in a single administration (CT April 1962:20). In the 
same year towards this end (CO 5 February 1961) it brought about 
changes in the organisational structure of the administrative ministry- 
in that it replaced the Department of Industries with a Development 
Division (ADR 1963:67) with a view to better coordination and planning 
of overall development of the public sector industries. Again in 1965 
it proposed to bring tyres, iron and steel and hardware under a single 
board, and to reorganise paper, cardboard and hardboard similarly 
(CDN 20 April 1965). Despite these attempts state enterprises continued 
to grow and survive in the same manner with less of an economic or 
rational and more of a political motive behind their growth and 
creating. The Sector Development Corporation is the most recent proposal 
in this direction to reorganise and redefine productive functions 
(CHRD 25 October 1970; 30 November 1970).
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Sector Development Corporation
Compared to the proposals so far considered in regard to the 
initiation and pioneering of state enterprises, the sector development 
corporation is a concept with a different format and style (Holland 1972; 
Sahini 1971:63) and holds better prospects of making a success of Sri 
Lanks's efforts towards industrial progress and economic diversification 
and of curing many of the diseases seen in the state initiatives in 
promoting and developing industries. As proposed by the government in 
1970 (CHRD 25 October 1970:510) the concept itself is very simple; it 
is to impose over and above the existing corporate boards in allied 
fields super-boards with functions to plan and formulate policies and 
coordinate and regulate activities. More importantly the super-boards 
would possess powers to control and participate in the private sector.
In broad terms each such super-board or sector board would also have 
responsibility to (a) allocate resources to various production units in 
that sector; (b) organise and encourage research devoted towards the 
utilisation of local raw materials; (c) manage public owned industries 
in that sector; and (d) invest in and direct private sector units (CO 
30 November 1970). In short each sector corporation would be the policy 
maker, coordinator, regulator and provider of resources for all industrial 
units both public and private operating within that sector (see Indian 
Reform Commission Report 1967:123, for similar proposal).
In all there would be eight such sector corporations with broad 
functions and defined boundaries in the industrial field. For instance 
all activities connected with the textile industry such as spinning, 
weaving, finishing of textiles and the manufacture of garments, would
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constitute one sector under the specific authority and responsibility 
of a sector corporation. Similarly clay, sand and cement production 
would constitute another sector under another sector board. The other 
categories mentioned by the Minister (CO 1 December 1970) are:
(a) manufacture of wood, paper and pulp;
(b) petroleum, petroleum products, petro-chemicals, salt and salt 
based chemicals;
(c) basic metal industries, machinery, ferrous and non-ferrous 
metal products;
(d) transport equipment and stores;
(e) meat, fish, milk-products, confectionery, bakery and cereal 
foods, spirits, alcohol, beverages and aerated waters; and
(f) electrical goods, optical goods and precision instruments.
The entrie programme of industrial development would be entrusted
to these eight sector boards.
Within a sector so defined, each sector corporation would operate 
to control and regulate the overall production in that sector. For instance, 
it would regulate the supply and distribution of raw materials needed 
for industrial production and ration the allocation of foreign exchange 
for the purchase of machinery and equipment. Also, it could license 
any expansion in the ongoing industry, fix industrial prices and 
supervise the quality of goods produced within the sector. Through 
these and several other regulatory means a sector board would have 
authority to regulate the pattern of industrial production carried on 
within the sector for which it would be made responsible (CDN 19
September 1971).
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Apart from the regulatory and supervisory’ controls exercised over 
industrial production, sector boards would also have an opportunity to 
play a more positive and active part in the development of the particular 
industrial sector. Where a board thought, for instance, that a sector 
industry should be more diversified to suit the needs and requirements 
of the overall development of the economy, it could move in readily 
and participate in the management and capital structure of the private 
sector units (CDN 19 September 1971). The function assigned to the 
sector boards - to invest in, and buy shares in the private sector units 
and appoint members to their boards - would be appropriate to realise 
this objective. For by purchase of shares and appointment of members 
to the private sector firms the sector board would find itself in a 
position to motivate the private sector firms to serve the sector's 
overall interest rather than their private gain. It would not mean 
however that the sector board would take full control of the enterprise 
managed by the private sector firms, as that would be against the very 
spirit of the objective of the corporation. It would only exercise 
control, either through finance or management, to the extent necessary 
to make private sector firms do what they would not otherwise do 
through lack of security, certainty or finance, or the lack of other 
qualities associated with entrepreneurship. Giving the firms the 
freedom of management but making them operate only on lines consistent 
with the needs and requirements of the sector would be the aims that 
a sector board would strive to achieve in the private sector industries. 
This, I think, is a far better way of promoting development in the 
economic sector than through nationalising sectoral firms (CO 17 August 
1970) or establishing new undertakings to achieve the same thing. For
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under this set-up, while private sector firms served public ends in 
fulfilling the guidelines set for them by the sector boards, they would 
also have the advantage of separate management, such as employing their 
own personnel and setting their own procedures and controls to realise 
their objectives. If implemented (CO 23 January 1975) the sector board 
proposal could well mobilise the private sector and make it a partner 
rather than a competitor in industrial development.
Above all, however, the primary objectives of a sector corporation 
would be to plan the overall development of the entire sector and to 
formulate short term and long term investment policies consistent with 
the needs and resources of the sector. It would also be an important 
responsibility to conduct detailed and thorough surveys of the sector 
to ascertain market potential and the existing production capacity in 
order to establish the possible lines of expansion or contraction by 
the sector. The five year plan (1971:81) in fact emphasised this part 
of the function of the sector boards as the most important. The absence 
of detailed programmes for the main industrial subsectors, it said, has 
been the main drawback in the industrial field. The consequences for 
industrial development of unplanned and indiscriminate growth have 
already been highlighted: capital intensive investments have been made
where conditions were favourable for small scale development. Surplus 
capacity in certain areas prevails alongside under-investment in others.
It was this lack of planning and programming leading to the 
consequences highlighted by the five year plan that in fact prompted the 
policy makers to conceive the idea of the Sector Development Corporation.
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Broadly therefore the sector boards, if created, would have the 
following overall functions and responsibilities:
(a) the planning of all development in the particular sector of 
industry, and the coordination of its production programmes;
(b) the allocation of resources to various units in the sector;
(c) the organisation and encouragement of research devoted 
particularly to the utilisation of local raw materials;
(d) the management of publicly owned industries in the sector;
(e) investment in and direction of selected private sector units;
(f) the regulation of private sector units (CHRD 25 October 1970. 
Col.510).
Of special importance for us here is the relationship between the 
sector board and the existing boards for industrial production, and the 
nature of improvements, if any, it could make to the existing arrangements 
to initiate and promote state enterprises. Could a sector board bring 
about better quality enterprises more suited to the needs and requirements 
of economic growth than the Ministry of Industries? Could it in any way 
make the enterprises more efficient and economical, more enterprising 
than they are at present? If all functions outlined by the Minister 
were entrusted to it, the sector board certainly should prove effective 
in this regard. It would then be well equipped in terms of research and 
study; and well organised in terms of personnel and skill to select and 
develop industries that are suitable for the industrial sector and are 
necessary and important for overall economic development. In other words, 
the sector board would be more likely to bring into existence a better 
composed mixture of public sector enterprises consistent with needs and
resources than the Ministry of Industries.
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The importance of this aspect (Holland 1972: ch.l) namely the need 
to have a better combination of enterprises, is not well understood.
It is easy enough to decide, as the economic plans did in the past, what 
sector industry the country should develop based on import figures or 
some other criteria, but it is not as easy to determine how and in what 
order that development of a sector should proceed. If textiles is the 
chosen sector for instance, the immediate questions that would arise 
concern what kind of textiles should be produced within the sector and 
what level of technology should be used. Where should the selected 
industries be located and on what scale should their operations be?
These are difficult but nonetheless important questions, for on their 
answers will depend the nature and the quality of enterprises to appear 
in the island. But a board set on the lines of a sector development 
could tackle them easily and efficiently.
A further advantage to flow from the selection of enterprises by 
the sector board is that it would minimise the ideological content 
involved in the selection of industries and heighten the economic and 
administrative aspects necessary to make a success of the selected 
industries. That is, to choose only those that are economically worth­
while and administratively feasible for development by the state apparatus 
The overplaying of ideological themes in Sri Lanka has been the cause 
of some of the uneconomic and unrelated enterprises to appear in the 
island. But for politicians and policy makers they were necessary and 
important building blocks to achieve socialistic plans. When the 
ideology overpowers economic criteria state enterprises tend to be 
viewed more and more as a means towards social and political goals and
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less and less as economic units to be operated in a market subject to 
business principles. A sector board could not afford to be motivated 
by the same principle (ideology), since it would be judged for its 
overall financial performance, it would be forced to be more rigorous 
and rigid in the criteria it applied in selecting industries, and 
therefore less likely to be carried away by the ideological factor. The 
chances of fair selection of enterprises would be much higher under this 
arrangement and one could well expect the selection to be more like that 
of an entrepreneur operating under conditions of risk and uncertainty 
than that of a bureaucrat selecting to satisfy the vague vision of a - 
political master.
Apart from selection, a sector board would be even more effective 
and positive in the improvement it would make upon the existing arrangement 
to operate state enterprises. There are today more than tvrenty-five 
corporations working under the direction and control of the Ministry of 
Industries. Appointing boards of directors, fixing guidelines for 
their operation, determining investment policies are also matters that 
fall within the purview of the Ministry. The deficiency in this 
arrangement is that the corporations that operate under the Ministry are 
in increasingly varied fields. Some of the problems that a steel 
corporation face are not the same as those faced by the plywood 
corporation. A policy initiative suitable for a given corporation is 
not the same for others. In making policy decisions and setting 
operational targets, etc., the Ministry is forced to remain further 
away from the realities of the corporate problems and affairs than a 
sector board would be. And it would be highly unfair to expect the
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Ministry to be expert in every line cf operation. Organising existing 
corporations in an allied field under a sector board would remove this 
deficiency. Since a sector board, unlike the Ministry, would be 
operating in a limited area, it would have the advantage of having a 
closer and better view of managerial and administrative aspects of the 
enterprises operating under its control and supervision. Thus in making 
policy decisions, setting operational targets, fixing production limits 
etc., the sector board would be well aware of the problems, capacities, 
means and methods of enterprises operating under its control. Its 
policy framework would therefore be more realistic and acceptable than 
those of the Ministry of Industries. Further they would be more specific 
and better directed; and therefore enterprises would have less difficulty 
in internalising them.
The sector board and the constituent enterprises could therefore 
be expected to work closely together; one serving the other's interest 
more cordially and harmoniously than would be possible under the 
Ministry's direction. A sector board would serve as a policy brain 
for all initiatives while managerial boards at the factory level would 
exist for all operations resulting from policy decisions.
In all matters that are of concern and importance politically, a 
sector board would deal directly. It would negotiate with the Ministry 
for all major changes and obtain necessary finance and authority to 
effect those changes and it would at all times remain close to the 
organs of governmental policy e.g. Treasury and Ministry of Economic 
Planning, to obtain their approval and support for the pattern of
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development that should go on within that sector. The advantages that 
ensue from this arrangement are immense. Firstly, the political direction 
and control, the haggle-and-draggle pull between policy and economics, 
would be where they should be, at the higher level of the sector board.
The operational units working lower down, where business decisions 
should predominate, would be free from any of these worries and concerns. 
Working the enterprises successfully to make them financially viable 
would be their major responsibility. Apart from the freedom it gave to 
operational units, secondly, the sector board would also be free, under 
this arrangement, to employ any tactics it liked to make the enterprises 
efficient. It could design new structural arrangements for control, 
and institute new accounting practices and any other tools of management 
for the purpose of making enterprises perform better.
Conclusion
Establishing corporations is a simple matter; but establishing 
those that are essential and in areas where needed on the one hand, and 
clearly defining their functions and objectives on the other is far 
more difficult. Difficult because of the background thought and 
research required on the pattern and process of industrial structure 
of the country. A short cut of course is to set up industrial 
corporations in import substituting areas. This would ensure a ready 
market and a good return through near monopoly. But to believe that 
state enterprises originating in this fashion would provide a viable 
and healthy industrial structure for economic development would be 
foolhardy. The corporations created in accordance with this principle 
in Sri Lanka are good examples of how inadequate and at times irrelevant
to the total development need they can become.
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Selecting enterprises - enterprises that are essential and important 
to serve the overall development needs of the country, enterprises that 
could be operated with the local talent and skill and with local raw 
materials - is half the problem of industrial management. For enterprises 
hastily selected, ill oriented and utterly unsuited to the conditions 
of the country would be bound to fail no matter how efficient the 
corporate system of administration undertaking its management might be.
It is this realisation of the need and importance of careful selection 
and initial thought and research required for it that prompted reformers 
to suggest an organisational pattern different from the conventional 
public corporation: a setup where power and authority would exist to
plan, research and study the overall industrial development and select 
and establish enterprises suited to the country's needs; a setup where 
economic rationality would outweigh mere political considerations. The 
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SCHEDULE OF INDUSTRIES RESERVED FOR STATE, 
PRIVATE AND JOINT OWNERSHIP
Schedule A (State Reserve)




(5) Salt and its by-products
(6) Mineral sands

























B (Jointly by both State and private enterprise) 
Textile spinning and weaving 




















Wood-working, furniture and cabinet-making 
Concrete products
Schedule C (Private enterprise)
(1) Motorcar assembly
(2) Bicycle tyres and tubes



















(22) Solder and soldering wire
(23) Zip fasteners
(24) Metal fittings
(25) Bolts, nuts, rivets and screws










(36) Assembly of radio receivers
(37) Readymade garments




















(58) Tanning of leather
(59) Hardboard
(60) Cardboard and pressboard
(61) Paper cartons
(62) Fountain pens and propelling pencils







(70) Fireworks and bonbons





(76) Waxes and polishes
(77) Citric acid
(78) Caffeine
(79) Flue-organic and synthetic
(80) Rubber products
(81) Fungicides and pesticides
(82) Activated charcoal
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EXTRACTS FROM FINANCE ACT NO. 38 OF 1971
FINANCIAL CONTROL OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
5. (1) The provisions of this Part of this Act shall apply to every
public corporation notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the 
provisions of any other written law.
7. (1) It shall be the duty of the governing body of a public 
corporation to conduct the business of the corporation so that the 
ultimate surpluses on revenue account shall at least be sufficient to 
cover the ultimate deficits on such account over a period of five years or 
such other period as may be determined by the Minister of Finance. In 
determining the ultimate surplus or ultimate deficit for each year under 
this section, there shall be charged against the revenue account the charges 
specified in section 9 and the appropriations specified in section 10.
8. (1) Every public corporation shall prepare a budget in respect of 
every financial year and such budget shall be approved by the governing 
body of such corporation not later than three months prior to the 
commencement of the financial year to which the budget relates.
(2) Notwithstanding the approval of the budget by the governing body 
of a public corporation, no commitments of capital expenditure provided in 
such budget in excess of five hundred thousand rupees shall be incurred by 
such corporation except, -
(a) in any case where the appropriate Minister is the
Minister of Planning, with the prior approval of 
the appropriate Minister given with the concurrence 
of the Minister of Finance; or
(b) in any case where the appropriate Minister is not the
Minister of Planning, with the prior approval of 
the appropriate Minister given with the concurrence 
of both the Minister of Planning and the Minister 
of Finance.
(3) The budget of a public corporation shall give projections of 
revenue and expenditure both recurrent and capital, financial resources,
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investments of funds, cash resources and other relevant information.
Such budget shall show a budgeted profit and loss account or income and 
expenditure account for each financial year and a projected balance 
sheet showing the. position at the end of that year. The form and manner 
in which the budget shall be prepared, and the minimum information that the 
budget shall contain, shall be as determined in any case where -
(a) the appropriate Minister is the Minister of
Finance, by the appropriate Minister; or
(b) the appropriate Minister is not the Minister
of Finance, by the appropriate Minister with 
the concurrence of the Minister of Finance.
13. (1) The Auditor-General shall be the auditor for every public
corporation. For the purpose of assisting him in the audit, the Auditor- 
General may if he thinks it necessary to do so, employ the services of any 
qualified auditor or auditors who shall act under his direction and control.
(2) For the purpose of meeting the expenses incurred by him in the 
audit of the accounts of a public corporation, the Auditor-General shall be 
paid by the corporation such remuneration as the appropriate Minister may, 
with the concurrence of the Minister of Finance, determine. Any remuneration 
received from the corporation by the Auditor-General shall, after deduction 
of any sums paid by him to any qualified auditor or auditors employed by
him for the purposes of such audit, be credited to the Consolidated Fund.
(3) The Auditor-General shall inspect the accounts, the finances,
the management of the finances and the property of a public corporation. The 
Auditor-General shall as far as possible, and as far as necessary, examine -
(a) whether the organization, systems, procedures,
books, records and other documents have been 
properly and adequately designed from the point 
of view of financial control purposes and from 
the point of view of the presentation of 
information to enable a continuous evaluation 
of the activities of the corporation, and whether 
such systems, procedures, books, records and other 
documents are in effective operation;
(b) whether the conduct of the corporation has been
in accordance with the law, rules and regula­
tions relevant to the corporation and whether
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there has been fairness in the administration 
of the corporation;
(c) whether there has been economy and efficiency in
the commitment of funds and utilization of such 
funds;
(d) whether systems of keeping moneys and the safe­
guarding of property are satisfactory;
(e) whether the accounts audited have been so designed
as to present a true and fair view of the affairs 
of the corporation in respect of the period under 
consideration due regard being had to principles 
of accountancy/ fin ancing and valuation; and
(f) any such other matters as he may deem necessary.
(4) The Auditor-General shall at his discretion determine the nature 
and extent of the audit that shall be carried out in any particular period 
in respect of any particular public corporation, and may at his discretion 
dispense with the audit of any particular aspect or aspects relevant to a 
particular public corporation in the period under review.
(5) The Auditor-General shall have -
(a) the right of access to any books , records,
documents and any type of information which 
is directly or indirectly related to the 
activities of a public corporation under 
audit as he deems necessary;
(b) the right to call for such information, docu­
ments, explanations, reports or other material 
at any time as in his opinion are necessary 
for the purposes of the audit;
(c) the right to summon any person for examination,
and for the production of any documents where 
such examination or production is considered 
necessary for the purposes of the audit;
(d) the right to require the corporation to settle
its minimum internal audit programmes by 
agreement with the Auditor-General, and the 
right to give any directions to the corpora­
tion with regard to the conduct of the 
minimum, internal audit programmes and the 
manner of reporting by the internal audit.
The corporation or any person shall comply with any request
made by the Auditor-General in the exercise of his above-mentioned rights.
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(6) The accounts of a public corporation for each financial year 
shall be submitted to the Auditor-General for audit within four months 
after the close of that year along with any report on the accounts which 
the Auditor-General may require to be submitted in the manner specified 
by him. Any such corporation which contravenes or fails to comply with 
the preceding provisions of this sub-section shall be guilty of an offence 
under this Act and shall, on conviction after summary trial before a 
Magistrate, be liable to a fine not exceeding one thousand rupees.
15. The appropriate Minister may direct the governing body of a
public corporation to give effect to such recommendations made by the Public 
Accounts Committee in its reports to the House of Representatives relating 




Position in regard to the Tabling of Accounts of the State Industrial
Corporations as at 31 August 1970
Corporations Last account tabled in the 
House of Representatives
1 Ceylon Mineral Sands For the year ended 31 March 1965
2 National Salt For the year ended 31 March 1964
3 National Textiles For the year ended 31 March 1966
4 Eastern Paper Mills For the year ended 31 March 1965
5 Ceylon Ceramics For the year ended 31 March 1964
6 Ceylon Oils and Fats For the year ended 31 March 1965
7 Ceylon Cement For the year ended 31 March 1967
8 Ceylon Plywood For the year ended 31 March 1967
9 Paranthan Chemicals For the year ended 31 March 1966
10 Ceylon Leather For the year ended 31 March 1965
11 National Small Industries For the year ended 31 March 1964
12 Ceylon Hardboard For the year ended 31 March 1961
13 Industrial Estates For the year ended 31 March 1967
14 Ceylon Steel For the year ended 31 March 1966
15 Ceylon Tyre For the year ended 31 March 1966
16 Ceylon Hardware For the year ended 31 March 1968
17 State Fertilizer Manufacturing For the year ended 31 March 1967
18 Ceylon State Flour For the year ended 31 March 1965
19 Sri Lanka Sugar For the year ended 31 March 1966
20 State Engineering For the year ended 31 March 1964
21 Ceylon Fisheries For the year ended 31 March 1965
22 State Fertilizer For the year ended 31 March 1967




TERMS OF REFERENCE OF SOME SELECTED COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY
1 Commission on Commercial Undertakings
Appointed on 16 April 1951, to inquire and report on:
(1) the operation, by Government Departments, of business and
commercial undertakings (other than the Railway, the 
Electrical Undertakings and the Food Supplies) which are 
financed from the Advance Accounts of Government;
(2) the causes of the losses incurred in such operations and the
steps that should be taken with a view to preventing such 
losses in the future and to placing such undertakings on an 
economic footing;
(3) the advisability of ceasing to operate particular undertakings
which are uneconomic;
(4) the advisability of placing the operation of such undertakings
in the hands of institutions such as Co-operative Societies 
or Corporations; and
(5) the financial control exercised by Government, through the
Financial Regulations, and Treasury Circulars, in such 
operation, and the changes, if any, that should be 
effected in such control.
2 Commission on Organisation and Operative Methods
Appointed on 22 November 1946 to investigate and report on:
'the changes which, in order to secure efficient and 
economic administration and the elimination of overlapping and 
waste, are necessary in relation to the organization, staffing, 
cadre, and operative methods of all Public Departments and other 
Government Establishments, Services or Institutions for which 
financial provision is made in the Estimates for the year 1946-47 
under the Heads of Expenditure other than the following, that is 
to say, Heads 1, 3, 5 (save in so far as it provides for the 
Government Archives), 9, 10, 11, 17, 26, 27, 29, 32, 33, 35, 42,
48, 55, 60, 62, 72, 73, 77, 84 to 87, 90, 100, 105, 106, 107, 108, 
110, 112, 120, 128, 129'.
Commission Observation on its terms of reference: Our terms 
of reference might fairly be said to cover an inquiry into the 
whole machinery of Government, other than that part of it excluded 
from our consideration, with a view to recommending such changes 
as we may think desirable in the numbers, recruitment, training 
and conditions of service of all Government servants, and in the 
way in which all Government institutions carry out their functions.
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3 Salt  Commission of  Inquiry
A p p o in ted  on 22 S ep tem ber  1963 t o  i n q u i r e  i n t o  and  r e p o r t :
(1) W hether  any member o f  t h e  B oard  o f  D i r e c t o r s  o r  any o f f i c e r
o f  t h e  S a l t  C o r p o r a t io n  o r  o f  t h e  S a l t  D e p a r tm en t  had  
d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  m i s d i r e c t e d  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  
C o r p o r a t i o n  from th e  aims and  o b j e c t s  f o r  w hich  i t  was 
fo rm ed ; and
(2) W hether  any member o f  t h e  B oard  o f  D i r e c t o r s  o r  any o f f i c e r
o f  t h e  S a l t  C o r p o r a t io n  o r  o f  t h e  S a l t  D e p a r tm en t  h a d  by 
any a c t  o r  o m is s io n  c a u se d  any l o s s  t o  t h e  S a l t  C o r p o r a t i o n  
o r  impeded t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  t h e  work o f  such  C o r p o r a t i o n ,  
a n d ,  i f  s o ,  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  t h e  l o s s  so  c a u s e d .
4 Fisheries Commission o f  Inquiry
A p p o in te d  on 1 A ugust  1970 t o  i n q u i r e  and  r e p o r t :
(1) W hether  d u r in g  t h e  p e r i o d  commencing on 1 s t  A p r i l  1965 , and
e n d in g  on 3 1 s t  May 1970, any member o f  t h e  B oard  o f  
D i r e c t o r s  o r  any o f f i c e r  o r  em ployee o f  t h e  C ey lon  F i s h e r i e s  
C o r p o r a t i o n  h a s  d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  by  any a c t ,  o m is s io n ,  
n e g l e c t  o f  d u ty ,  i m p r o p r i e t y ,  m is c o n d u c t  o r  o t h e r w i s e  m is ­
d i r e c t e d  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  C o r p o r a t i o n  from t h e  aims 
and o b j e c t s  f o r  v;hich i t  was form ed o r  o t h e r w i s e  im peded th e  
work o f  t h e  C o r p o r a t i o n ;
(2) W hether  d u r in g  t h e  a f o r e s a i d  p e r i o d  any member o f  t h e  B oard  o f
D i r e c t o r s  o r  any o f f i c e r  o r  em ployee  o f  t h e  C ey lon  F i s h e r i e s  
C o r p o r a t i o n  h a s  d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  by any a c t ,  o m is s io n ,  
n e g l e c t  o f  d u t y ,  i m p r o p r i e t y  o r  m is c o n d u c t  c a u s e d  any l o s s  
t o  t h e  C ey lon  F i s h e r i e s  C o r p o r a t i o n  a n d ,  i f  s o ,  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  
t h e  l o s s  so  c a u s e d ;
(3) W hether  d u r in g  th e  a f o r e s a i d  p e r i o d  t h e r e  had  b een  any f a v o u r i t i s m ,
n e p o t i s m ,  c o r r u p t i o n  o r  o t h e r  i r r e g u l a r i t y  i n  t h e  m a t r e r  
o f  a p p o in tm e n t s ,  p ro m o t io n s  and  t r a n s f e r  o r  t h e  a s s i g n i n g  
o f  s t a t i o n s  t o  o f f i c e r s  and  em p loyees  o f  t h e  C ey lon  F i s h e r i e s  
C o r p o r a t i o n  o r  i n  t h e  m a t t e r  o f  g r a n t i n g  any i n c r e a s e  o f  p a y ,  
t r a v e l l i n g  a l lo w a n c e s  and  o t h e r  p e r q u i s i t e s  o f  o f f i c e  to  any 
member o f  t h e  B oard  o f  D i r e c t o r s  o r  any  o f f i c e r  o r  em ployee 
t h e r e o f ;
(4) W hether  d u r in g  t h e  a f o r e s a i d  p e r i o d  t h e r e  h a d  b e e n  any f r a u d u l e n t
o r  i r r e g u l a r  p r a c t i c e  on t h e  p a r t  o f  any  member o f  t h e  
B oard  o f  D i r e c t o r s  o r  any o f f i c e r  o r  em ployee  o f  t h e  C ey lon  
F i s h e r i e s  C o r p o r a t i o n  i n  c a r r y i n g  on t h e  b u s i n e s s  o f  th e  
C o r p o r a t i o n ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  i n  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  p u r c h a s e ,  s a l e  
o r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  f i s h ;
(5) W hether  d u r in g  t h e  a f o r e s a i d  p e r i o d  any  g r a t i f i c a t i o n  by way o f
g i f t ,  f e e ,  r e w a rd ,  lo a n  o r  a d v a n ta g e  had  b e a n  o f f e r e d ,  
p r o m is e d ,  g iv e n  o r  p a i d ,  w h e th e r  d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  t o  
any p e r s o n  who was o r  who h a d  b e e n  a member o f  t h e  B oard  o f
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Directors of the Ceylon Fisheries Corporation or who was 
or had been an officer or employee of the Corporation with 
the object or for the purpose of influencing his judgement 
or conduct in respect of any matter or transaction with which 
he, in his capacity as such member, officer or employee v/as 
■* or had been concerned;
(6) Whether during the aforesaid period any member of the Board of
Directors or any officer or employee of the Ceylon Fisheries 
Corporation has solicited, demanded, or received any grati­
fication by way of gift, loan, fee or reward as a motive for 
doing or forebearing to do any act in his capacity as such 
member, officer or employee;
(7) Whether during the aforesaid period any member of the Board of
Directors or any officer or employee of the Ceylon Fisheries 
Corporation has directly or indirectly received any commission, 
gift, favour, reward or any other benefit or advantage from 
any contract or other transaction;
(8) Whether during the aforesaid period any member of the Board of
Directors, or any officer or employee of the Ceylon Fisheries 
Corporation has directly or indirectly enriched himself at 
the expense of the Corporation and, if so, to what extent;
(9) Whether during the aforesaid period any member of the Board of
Directors, or any officer or employee of the Ceylon Fisheries 
Corporation has acquired property, movable or immovable, either 
in his own name or in the name of others, and if so, to what 
extent such person is able to account for his acquisitions 
from his legitimate sources of income;
(10) Whether during the aforesaid period any goods, stores, machinery
or equipment which are inferior, superfluous or unnecessary 
have been purchased for the Ceylon Fisheries Corporation and, 
if so, whether any member of the Board of Directors or any 
officer or employee of the Corporation, has been instrumental 
in or has in any way been responsible for or concerned in 
such purchases;
(11) Whether during the aforesaid period there has been any unauthorised
or illegitimate use or disposal or other misappropriation of 
any property or equipment belonging to the Ceylon Fisheries 
Corporation and, if so, what measures should be adopted to 
prevent such abuses in the future;
(12) Whether during the aforesaid period any member of the Board of
Directors or any officer or employee of the Ceylon Fisheries 
Corporation, has for the purposes of furthering or promoting 
the interest of such member, officer or employee or that of 
any other period, failed to make adequate use of the 
facilities provided for the repair and maintenance of fishing 
boats;
(13) Whether during the aforesaid period maximum use was made of the
trawlers and fishing boats of the Ceylon Fisheries Corporation 
for the purpose of taking fish;
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(14) What measures should be adopted to prevent the recurrence
of any irregularity or abuse which may have been revealed 
in the course of the investigations;
(15) What measures should be adopted to secure the efficient and
smooth working of the Ceylon Fisheries Corporation so as to 
realise the objects for which it has been constituted; 
and to make recommendations in respect of the matters 
investigated.
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